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ABSTRACT 
 In the 21st century strategic environment, small states face new security 
challenges caused by emerging great powers. These new powers seek to achieve their 
political goals in small states by avoiding major military escalation and focusing on 
combinations of statecraft and non-military means. This “hybrid threat” has strong 
implications for small states’ national security. This thesis explores small states’ 
vulnerabilities and opportunities across the political, military, economic, social, and 
informational (PMESI) spectrum to outline a favorable posture toward a great power 
hybrid threat. The hybrid threat is characterized, and small states’ opportunities and 
vulnerabilities are delineated. A systems-thinking approach is applied to assess how 
opportunities and vulnerabilities influence the relationship between large powers and 
small states, contributing to the small state’s ability to manage and counter a great-power 
hybrid threat. Three historical cases are analyzed to assess favorable or unfavorable 
postures for a small state and the interactive dynamics of these opportunities and 
vulnerabilities. Ultimately, the study shows that the great-power hybrid threat can be 
significantly lessened by a small state’s posture, namely by the interactions between its 
opportunities and vulnerabilities across the PMESI spectrum. By exploiting this systemic 
interaction, a small state can decisively influence a conflict with a great power and 
effectively limit the hybrid threat’s effects. 
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A. IDENTIFY THE PROBLEM 
Emerging great powers increasingly use a wide range of statecraft tools beyond 
conventional military means to coerce small states into agreeing to their political goals. 
They do this in an integrated, adapted and convergent way all while adhering to the 
principle of plausible deniability. For small states, classic defense strategies based on 
deterrence or membership in an alliance may be losing some of their value, especially 
against a more powerful state that, choosing a more comprehensive approach, does not rely 
on military means alone to coerce the smaller state. This evolution has strong implications 
for small states’ national security. In recent decades, small states like Georgia, Ukraine, 
and the Baltics were primary targets of this approach. Because this so-called “hybrid 
threat” may not create the conditions to justify armed intervention by the international 
community or allies, small states currently must confront the real possibility of facing this 
threat by relying primarily on their own means. This challenge led to discussions among 
scholars and military organizations about the character of hybrid warfare and its 
implications for small states. Unfortunately, the debates and measures developed so far 
lack a more comprehensive approach and are limited mainly to military means. 
B. OBJECTIVE AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
The research objective is to identify small states’ favoring conditions across the 
political, military, economic, social, and informational (PMESI) spectrum in countering a 
hybrid threat posed by a more powerful state. Because more powerful states now tend to 
choose more comprehensive approaches rather than relying on military means alone, 
smaller states should also seek to use all possible resources. Accordingly, this thesis 
explores the following research question: 
How can a small state establish favorable conditions across the political, military, 
economic, social, and informational spectrum to defend itself against the hybrid threat from 
a more powerful state? 
2 
The answer to this research question should allow small states to develop a 
favorable posture to face a more powerful state’s hybrid threat because—as political 
scientist Robert Keohane describes—“if Lilliputians will tie up Gulliver, they must be 
studied as carefully as the giant.”1 
C. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
The area of inquiry involves three main elements: the hybrid threat, the small state, 
and the relationship between the small state and a more powerful state. The thesis analyzes 
this puzzle by drawing on three primary areas of academic research: theories about present 
and future conflicts, the relationship between great powers and small states, and small-state 
theories. The characteristics of hybrid conflicts and their intersection with the 
characteristics of small states can shine new light on successful strategies in effectively 
countering hybrid threats from more powerful states.  
In Chapter II, this thesis defines the small state and performs a qualitative analysis 
of the current strategic environment and the concept “hybrid threat” to define more fully 
the framework of its characteristics. In Chapter III, via analysis of small-state theories, this 
study identifies vulnerabilities of and opportunities for small states across the political, 
military, economic, social, and informational spectrum. The thesis then matches 
vulnerabilities and opportunities with characteristics of the hybrid threat. This heuristic 
approach results in an analytical framework that can be applied to the chosen case studies.2 
Through a systems-thinking approach, this thesis applies the framework in order to identify 
any causal mechanism and causal relations between great powers’ hybrid threats and small 
states’ vulnerabilities and opportunities, as well as their influence on the dyadic 
relationship. Consequently, the thesis also applies the framework to define plausible 
favorable conditions for small states to counter hybrid threats posed by more powerful 
states.  
                                                 
1 Robert O. Keohane, “Lilliputians’ Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics,” International 
Organization 23, no. 2 (Spring 1969): 291–310. 
2 For further explanation about the heuristic theory building research approach see Alexander L. 
George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in The Social Science (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2005), 73–88. 
3 
The Chapters IV to VI of the thesis include a comparative analysis of three 
contemporary case studies to identify trends in small states’ vulnerabilities and 
opportunities when facing a great power. In Chapter IV, the first historical case study 
analyzes the coercive involvement of the United States in Guatemala between 1952 and 
1954. The author chose this case study for five reasons. First, it represents an excellent 
example of a small-state–great-power coercive interaction during the Cold War period. 
Second, it represents a short-term interaction (some years to a decade). Third, this covert 
U.S. approach shares some characteristics with modern hybrid warfare; hence, it allows to 
explore whether it is possible to observe characteristics of hybrid warfare during the Cold 
War period and, therefore, to deduce consequences about small-state vulnerabilities and 
opportunities.3 Fourth, this interaction shows fewer characteristics of the Cold War’s proxy 
conflicts such as Korea, Cuba, Vietnam, and Afghanistan, or other conflicts that involved 
the United States and the Soviet Union as the main actors or supporters of the involved 
small state. Fifth, it directly involves one of the current (and at that time) world great power, 
the United States.  
In Chapter V, the second case study analyzes the Russo-Ukrainian conflict from the 
1990s until now. The author chose this case study for four reasons. First, many scholars 
and military institutions consider this conflict as an exemplary case of Russian hybrid 
warfare.4 Second, it represents an example of a small-state–great-power interaction after 
the Cold War. Third, it represents a middle-term interaction (one to two decades). Fourth, 
the analysis of a second case study may reveal specific patterns in the Russian hybrid 
approaches, that can be exploited in the future by small states. This will allow for the 
exploration of analogies in Russia’s current behavior toward other European small states, 
helping to identify and analyze vulnerabilities and opportunities for the future.  
                                                 
3 Nick Cullather, Secret History: The CIA’s Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 1952–
1954 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006); Susanne Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala: Rebels, Death 
Squads, and U.S. Power (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991). 
4 Artis Pabriks and Andis Kudors, The War in Ukraine: Lessons for Europe (Riga: University of 
Latvia Press, 2015); Guillaume Lasconjarias and Jeffrey Arthur Larsen, NATO’s Response to Hybrid 
Threats (Rome: NATO Defense College, 2015). 
4 
In Chapter VI, the third case study analyzes the conflict between mainland China 
and Taiwan from the 1970s to the present day. The author chose this case for three reasons. 
First, in this case, the small state (Taiwan) can count on formal defensive support from 
another great power (the United States);5 consequently, it is possible to observe the 
possible impact that this defensive alignment has on the opportunities and vulnerabilities 
of the small state. Second, it represents an example of a long-term small-state–great-power 
interaction beginning during the Cold War and lasting to this day. Third, this case affords 
the possibility of an analysis of whether the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Three 
Warfare strategy can be integrated into the general framework of hybrid threats.6  
The author chose case studies covering a period, from the Cold War to the present 
day, for three reasons. First, it directly influences the current strategic environment. 
Second, since the concept of hybrid threats and warfare as well as other concepts from 
which it derives developed during this period, it is the period’s primary strategic focus. 
Third, this period shows the development and impact of globalization, information 
technologies, and the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) on the strategic environment. 
Furthermore, to better highlight the severity and types of exploitation of great-power–
small-state gaps and to include a diversity of great-power actors, this thesis purposely 
focuses on conflicts involving these three major powers: the United States, Russia, and 
China.  
There are two reasons why the small states chosen for this study do not have nuclear 
weapons in their arsenal. First, the number of small states that have or are presumed to 
have nuclear weapons in their arsenal is, in relation to the number of small states in the 
world, not significant.7 Consequently, any deduction from their vulnerabilities and 
                                                 
5 Government Publishing Office, “Public Law 96-8 – Apr. 10, 1979,” accessed August 27, 2018, 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-93/pdf/STATUTE-93-Pg14.pdf  
6 Stefan Halper, China: The Three Warfares (Washington DC: Office of Net Assessment, U.S. 
Department of Defense, 2013); Sangkuk Lee, “China’s ‘Three Warfares’: Origins, Applications, and 
Organizations,” Journal of Strategic Studies 37, no. 2 (April 2014): 198–221. 
7 Israel, Pakistan and South Sudan have never signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, and North Korea withdrew from the treaty later. Currently, Israel is alleged to possess some 
hundred warheads, Pakistan is a recognized nuclear power, both South Sudan and Taiwan do not officially 
possess nuclear weapons. For further information, see https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/. 
5 
opportunities from owning nuclear weapons would most likely be too specific to the 
individual country to generate favorable conditions for small states in general. Second, the 
impact that the possession of a nuclear weapon has on the security policy of a small state 
has long divided scholarly opinion.8 Accordingly, to keep a holistic approach and to avoid 
entering research fields that are tangential to this thesis, the small states chosen for case 
studies here do not include nuclear weapons in their arsenals. 
The analysis of the three case studies will be based mainly on secondary sources. 
Due to the contemporaneity of the facts, it will be problematic to access de-classified 
confidential documents. Despite this, it will be possible to integrate primary sources such 
as decision-makers’ statements and policies. This challenge leaves the way open for future 
researchers who may have more documentation available to conduct further analysis on 
these conflicts. These sources will allow the qualitative comparative analysis of the three 
case studies to formulate inductive theoretical assertions about favorable conditions for the 
small state’s defense against a more powerful state’s hybrid threat.  
Finally, in the fifth chapter, the thesis will conclude by highlighting some 
implications for small-state national security strategy and formulate possible 
recommendations for small states on how to establish favorable conditions across the 
political, military, economic, social, and informational spectrum and defend sufficiently 
against hybrid threats from more powerful states. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
To answer the research question, the thesis will draw on three primary areas of 
academic research: theories about present and future conflicts; the relationship between 
great and small powers; and small-state theories. The characteristics of the present conflicts 
and their intersection with the characteristics of small states, as well as their relationship 
with greater powers, may shed new light on the vulnerabilities and opportunities of small 
states, which may face a hybrid threat from more powerful states. 
                                                 
8 David Vital, The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1967); Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1968); Keohane, “Lilliputians’ Dilemmas.” 
6 
To evaluate the applicability of non-military means of statecraft in conflicts, 
theories on soft power, political warfare and influence will be analyzed.9 The thesis will 
compare and contrast theories about and concepts present in certain conflicts to define a 
framework that can be used to diagnose vulnerabilities of small states. 
To understand the characteristics of modern and future conflict, it is necessary to 
analyze the seminal works of scholars John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, who recognized 
profound changes in the international system, noted the emergence of new technologies 
combined with the rise of malicious non-state actors as a main threat, and therefore 
announced the advent of new modes of war such as cyberwar and netwar.10 The scholars 
Ivan Arreguín-Toft and Thaza Paul, who build on Andrew Mack’s concept of “political 
vulnerability” and “interest asymmetry” regarding how weak states win asymmetric wars, 
analyze the characteristics of modern asymmetric conflicts and developed the concept of 
“strategic interaction.”11 The historian Thomas Huber advances a notional framework of 
compound warfare, arguing for the simultaneous use of asymmetrically-acting irregular 
forces and regular or conventional forces as one strategy for a weak actor to fight 
successfully against a more powerful one.12 Other authors, such as Colonels James Callard, 
Peter Faber and Thomas Hammes, or the researcher William Lind who applies a holistic 
approach, developed the concept of warfare generations to explain the evolving character 
                                                 
9 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008 [1966]); Joseph 
S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004); Basil 
Henry Liddell Hart, The Strategy of Indirect Approach (London: Faber, 1954); Alvin H. Bernstein, 
“Political Strategies for Coercive Diplomacy and Limited War,” in Political Warfare and Psychological 
Operations: Rethinking the U.S. Approach, ed. Frank R. Barnett and Carnes Lord (Washington DC: 
National Defense University Press, 1989); Frank R. Barnett and Carnes Lord, Political Warfare and 
Psychological Operations: Rethinking the U.S. Approach (Washington DC: National Defense University 
Press, 1989); Thomas Wright, All Measures Short of War: The Contest for the Twenty-First Century and 
the Future of American Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017); Robert D. Blackwill and 
Jennifer M. Harris, War by Other Means (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016). 
10 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information 
Age (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1997). 
11 Ivan Arreguin-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005); Thazha Varkey Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker 
Powers, vol. 33 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Andrew Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose 
Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict,” World Politics 27, no. 2 (1975): 175–200. 
12 Thomas M. Huber, “Compound Warfare: A Conceptual Framework,” in Compound Warfare: That 
Fatal Knot, ed. Thomas M. Huber (Honolulu, HI: University Press of the Pacific, 2002). 
7 
of modern conflicts.13 The Chinese colonels Qiao and Wang propose in their study 
Unrestricted Warfare alternatives to direct military confrontation as a modern strategy for 
militarily and politically disadvantaged nations.14 Dr. Frank G. Hoffman reconceptualizes 
the evolving characteristics of modern conflict into the concept of hybrid threats and 
warfare.15 Despite the criticism of some representatives of the academic and military 
worlds, as well as of Hoffman himself, the “hybridity” concept is currently broadly applied 
to define present conflicts.16 In part due to Russia’s recent application of hybrid methods, 
many scholars and institutions have studied possible responses and approaches to this form 
                                                 
13 James Callard and Peter Faber, “An Emerging Synthesis for a New Way of War: Combination 
Warfare and Future Innovation,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs (Winter/Spring 2002): 61–
68; William S. Lind et al., “The Changing Face of War: into the Fourth Generation,” Marine Corps Gazette 
(October 1989): 22–26; Thomas X. Hammes, Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth 
Generation (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2005); Steven C. Williamson, “From 
Fourth Generation Warfare to Hybrid War” (research project, U.S. Army War College, 2009), 
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a498391.pdf; Sergey G. Chekinov and Sergey A. Bogdanov, “The 
Nature and Content of a New-Generation War,” Military Thought 4 (2013): 12–23. 
14 Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts 
Publishing House Arts, 1999); Halper, China: The Three Warfares. 
15 Frank G. Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars (Arlington: Potomac 
Institute for Policy Studies, 2007); Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,” Joint Force 
Quarterly 52, (2009); Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid Threats: Reconceptualizing the Evolving Character of 
Modern Conflict,” Strategic Forum 240, (April 2009). 
16 Frank G. Hoffman, “On Not-so-New Warfare: Political Warfare vs Hybrid Threats,” War on the 
Rocks 28, (July 2014), https://warontherocks.com/2014/07/on-not-so-new-warfare-political-warfare-vs-
hybrid-threats; Lasconjarias and Larsen, NATO’s Response to Hybrid Threats; Daniel T. Lasica, “Strategic 
Implications of Hybrid War: A Theory of Victory” (monograph, Army Command and General Staff 
College School of Advanced Military Studies, 2009), https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a513663.pdf; 
John J. McCuen, “Hybrid Wars,” Military Review 88, no. 2 (March/April 2008): 107; Timothy McCulloh 
and Richard Johnson, Hybrid Warfare, Report No. 13-4 (Tampa, FL: Joint Special Operations University, 
2013); David L. Raugh, “Is the Hybrid Threat a True Threat?,” Journal of Strategic Security 9, no. 2 
(Summer 2016): 1–13; Williamson, “From Fourth Generation Warfare to Hybrid War;” Paul Brister, 
William H. Natter, and Robert R. Tomes, Hybrid Warfare and Transnational Threats: Perspectives for an 
Era of Persistent Conflict (New York: Council for Emerging National Security Affairs, 2011). 
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of warfare, however mainly from a military perspective.17 Distinct from Hoffman’s 
hybridity concept, Michael Mazarr defines present security challenges as “competitive 
interactions among and within the state and non-state actors that fall between the traditional 
war and peace duality,” namely in a “gray zone.”18 Avoiding the limited explanatory 
power of labels, the chief of the Russian General Staff, General Valery Gerasimov, argues 
that present and future conflicts show a more significant proportion of non-military means 
than military ones.19  
To define the small state, it is first necessary to analyze and understand its 
characteristics. There are two main theoretical approaches for this. The first, applied by 
scholars such David Vital, Maurice East and Franz von Däniken, favors characteristics 
based on two main categories of capabilities: quantitative (e.g., population, gross domestic 
product, military expenditure, and territorial size) and qualitative (e.g., the level of 
influence that a state has on its environment).20 The second approach, supported by 
scholars such as Robert Rothstein and Robert Keohane, favors a perceptual approach based 
on the state’s people and institutions, which perceive themselves as small.21 Based on these 
                                                 
17 Michael Aaronson et al., “NATO Countering the Hybrid Threat,” Prism 2, no. 4 (2012): 111–24; 
Aapo Cederberg and Pasi Eronen, “How Can Societies Be Defended against Hybrid Threats,” Strategic 
Security Analysis. Geneva Centre for Security, no. 9 (2015); David Eugene Johnson, Military Capabilities 
for Hybrid War: Insights from the Israel Defense Forces in Lebanon and Gaza (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 
2014); Michael Kofman and Matthew Rojansky, “A Closer Look at Russia’s’ Hybrid War’,” Kennan 
Cable, no. 7 (April 2015): 8, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/7-KENNAN%20CABLE-
ROJANSKY%20KOFMAN.pdf; Andrew Radin, Hybrid Warfare in the Baltics: Threats and Potential 
Responses (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017); Frank Steder, “Countering Hybrid Warfare: The Best Uses 
of SOF in a Pre–Article V Scenario,” Combating Terrorism Exchange (CTX) 6, no. 4, (November 2016): 
7–18; Martin Zapfe, “‘Hybrid’ Threats and NATO’s Forward Presence,” Policy Perspectives 4, no. 7 
(September 2016): 1–4. 
18 Michael J. Mazarr, Mastering the Gray Zone: Understanding a Changing Era of Conflict (Carlisle 
Barracks, PA: United States Army War College Press, 2015); Philip Kapusta, “The Gray Zone,” Special 
Warfare, (October-December 2015); Hal Brands, “Paradoxes of the Gray Zone,” Foreign Policy Research 
Institute, (February 2016), https://www.fpri.org/docs/brands_-_grey_zone.pdf; Frank G Hoffman, “The 
Contemporary Spectrum of Conflict: Protracted, Gray Zone, Ambiguous, and Hybrid Modes of War,” The 
Heritage Foundation, (2016), 25–36. 
19 Valery V. Gerasimov, “Tsennost’ Nauki v Predvideniyi [Prevision is what science is valued for],” 
Military Industrial Kurier, no. 27 (February 2013). 
20 Vital, The Inequality of States; Maurice A. East, “Size and Foreign Policy Behavior: A Test of Two 
Models,” World Politics 25, no. 4 (July 1973): 556–76; Franz Von Däniken, “Is the Notion of Small State 
Still Relevant?,” in Small States Inside and Outside the European Union, ed. L. Goetschel (Dordrecht, NL: 
Kluwer Academic Publisher, 1998). 
21 Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers; Keohane, “Lilliputians’ Dilemmas.” 
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two approaches, it is possible to develop a definition of small-state power that allows 
further analysis of a small state’s characteristics.  
The behavior of small states in international relations is typically studied from three 
main perspectives. The first one, based on (neo-)realist theory, studies behavior regarding 
capabilities.22 The second, based on neoliberal institutionalism, analyzes small-state 
behavior as apparent through its institutions.23 The third, sharing some likeness with 
theories about social constructivism, favors a relations-based approach to the field of 
inquiry.24 Another approach to analyzing the interaction between small states and other 
state actors in the international system is related to their foreign policy behavior and 
diplomacy.25 Based on political scientist James Rosenau’s influential work, scholars such 
as Jeanne Hey apply a comparative foreign policy approach by developing a framework 
based on three levels of analysis (system, state, and individual leaders) to identify small 
state foreign policy behavior.26 Yet other scholars, such as the international relations 
specialist Ronald Barston, Robert Steinmetz, and Anders Wivel, focus on goals, 
challenges, and opportunities related to the smallness of these states.27  
A further field of inquiry to characterize small states is related to their economy 
and their response to economic change. The scholar Peter Katzenstein refers to democratic 
                                                 
22 Annette Baker Fox, The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War II (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1959); David Vital, The Survival of Small States: Studies in Small Power/Great Power 
Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971). 
23 Peter J. Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1985); Michael I. Handel, Weak States in the International System (New York: 
Routledge, 1990). 
24 Neal G. Jesse and John R. Dreyer, Small States in the International System: At Peace and at War 
(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2016). 
25 Fox, The Power of Small States. 
26 James N. Rosenau, “Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy,” in Approaches to Comparative 
and International Politics, ed. R. Barry Farrell (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University, 1966): 27–93; 
Jeanne A. K. Hey, Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior (Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003). 
27 Hey, Small States in World Politics; Ronald P. Barston, The Other Powers: Studies in the Foreign 
Policies of Small States (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1973); Robert Steinmetz and Anders Wivel, Small 
States in Europe: Challenges and Opportunities (New York: Routledge, 2016). 
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corporatism as distinguishing elements of European small-state economies.28 The political 
scientist Baldur Thorallsson, although agreeing with the importance of corporatism 
expressed by Katzenstein, suggests considering more heavily the size and the particular 
characteristics of small administrations.29 Other scholars such as Lino Briguglio, who 
applies an inductive approach, develop specific frameworks to diagnose and operationalize 
the economic resilience of small states.30  
Another critical small-state characteristic has to do with their strategies regarding 
security. In an attempt to ensure their security, states develop different approaches. One 
theoretical approach, supported by scholars such as Rothstein and British diplomat and 
political scientist Alyson Bailes, analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of alliances 
from a small-state perspective.31 Conversely, other scholars such as the historian Efraim 
Karsh and political scientists Christine Agius and Karen Devine analyze how neutrality is 
a useful instrument for small-state security policy.32 Other security studies researchers 
such as Bernard Loo, Håkan Wiberg, and Martin Hurt explore a third approach to this field 
of inquiry that is more focused on military affairs and those challenges from a small state’s 
standpoint.33  
                                                 
28 Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets. 
29 Baldur Thorhallsson, “The Size of States in the European Union: Theoretical and Conceptual 
Perspectives,” European Integration 28, no. 1 (2006): 7–31. 
30 Lino Briguglio, Gordon Cordina, and Eliawony J Kisanga, Building the Economic Resilience of 
Small States (London: Formatek Publishing for the Islands and Small States Institute of the University of 
Malta and the Commonwealth Secretariat, 2006). 
31 Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers; Alyson J. K. Bailes, Bradley A. Thayer, and Baldur 
Thorhallsson, “Alliance Theory and Alliance ‘Shelter’: The Complexities of Small State Alliance 
Behaviour,” Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal 1, no. 1 (August 2016): 9–26; Insu Choi, “Small 
States and The Balance of Power” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1995), 
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/31415; Olav F. Knudsen, “Of Lambs and Lions: Relations Between Great 
Powers and Their Smaller Neighbors,” Cooperation and Conflict 23, no. 3 (1988): 111–22. 
32 Efraim Karsh, Neutrality and Small States (London: Routledge, 1988); Christine Agius and Karen 
Devine, “‘Neutrality: A Really Dead Concept?’ A Reprise,” Cooperation and Conflict 46, no. 3 (2011): 
265–84. 
33 Bernard Loo, Military Transformation and Strategy: Revolutions in Military Affairs and Small 
States (London and New York: Routledge, 2009); Håkan Wiberg, “The Security of Small Nations: 
Challenges and Defences,” Journal of Peace Research 24, no. 4 (1987): 339–63; Martin Hurt, Lessons 
Identified in Crimea: Does Estonia’s National Defence Model Meet Our Needs (Tallinn: International 
Centre for Defence Studies, 2014). 
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The impact of social structures also characterizes small states. Social segmentation 
within small states can have far more devastating effects than in larger states. For this 
reason, scholars such as Stephanie Neuman and Val Lorwin have studied the implication 
of both successful and failing national political integrations, arguing that internal cohesion 
and division may be directly related to pressure from the international environment rather 
than to existing ethnocultural or political divisions within the society itself..34 
In the information age, media has a decisive impact on states at different levels. 
This impact is even more significant on small states. Accordingly, media and 
communication specialists Josef Trappel, Jean-Claude Burgelman and Caroline Pauwels 
argue that small states show specific characteristics in the way that they regulate the media 
environment, being inclined to an interventionist approach to media regulation.35  
Analyzing modern conflict as well as small states’ characteristics and their 
relationship with greater powers enables the comparison of hybrid conflicts’ characteristics 
with those of small states at the system and state levels of analysis. This assessment allows 
for the outlining of vulnerabilities and opportunities of state “smallness” and accordingly, 
suggests favorable conditions for a small state to defend itself against a hybrid threat posed 
by a major state. 
Before exploring small-state characteristics more deeply, it is necessary to clarify 
the two central terms of “small state” and “hybrid” within the context of threat or warfare. 
  
                                                 
34 Stephanie G. Neuman, Small States and Segmented Societies: National Political Integration in a 
Global Environment (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976); Val R. Lorwin, “Segmented Pluralism: 
Ideological Cleavages and Political Cohesion in the Smaller European Democracies,” Comparative Politics 
3, no. 2 (1971): 141–75. 
35 Josef Trappel, “Born Losers or Flexible Adjustment? The Media Policy Dilemma of Small States,” 
European Journal of Communication 6, no. 3 (1991): 355–71; Jean-Claude Burgelman and Caroline 
Pauwels, “Audiovisual Policy and Cultural Identity in Small European States: The Challenge of a Unified 
Market,” Media, Culture & Society 14, no. 2 (1992): 169–83; Daniel Biltereyst, “Language and Culture as 
Ultimate Barriers? An Analysis of the Circulation, Consumption and Popularity of Fiction in Small 
European Countries,” European Journal of Communication 7, no. 4 (1992): 517–40; Manuel Puppis, 
“Media Regulation in Small States,” The International Communication Gazette 71, no. 1–2 (2009): 7–17; 
Matthias Künzler, Manuel Puppis, and Thomas A. Bauer, “Public Value in Kleinstaaten [Public value in 
small states],” in Public Value, ed. M. Karmasin, D. Süssenbacher, N. Gonser (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für 
Sozialwissenschaften, 2011), 99–111; Nicole Gonser and Markus Beiler, Public Value in Europa und 
Herausforderungen für Österreich [Public value in Europe and challenges for Austria], 6-2016 
(Wien:Julius Raab Stiftung, 2016). 
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II. DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS 
Due to a lack of clarity of the terms “hybrid threat” and “small state,” a definition 
of these terms is a natural first step in the analysis of small states’ vulnerabilities and 
opportunities when facing a hybrid threat from a great power. This chapter will first explore 
the meaning of small state and then move on to the analysis of the concept of hybrid threat, 
assessing its validity and defining its characteristics. This chapter will show that the term 
“small state” is a combination of various characteristics related to quantitative and 
qualitative aspects that are fundamentally influenced by the asymmetric relationship 
between the involved state actors. Furthermore, it will demonstrate that the term “hybrid” 
has consistent explanatory power in describing modern threats. Moreover, the explored 
discussions about hybrid threats suggest that the concept is not revolutionary per se, but is 
instead an evolution and integration of previous concepts. Finally, the chapter proposes a 
characterization of the term “hybrid threat” based on features of the modern strategic 
environment and creates an analytical framework.  
A. DEFINING SMALL STATE 
Since the seminal work of the international relations scholar Annette Baker Fox, 
The Power of Small States,36 the struggle for a definition is often central to the study of 
small states. Scholars and state practitioners have studied small states for over 60 years. 
However, an academically agreed-upon small state’s definition remains absent.37 The 
main reason is that significant disagreement exists over the type of criteria that should be 
applied to characterize the small state.38 The most evident sign of the dispute over the 
definition is the numerous pages or whole sections dedicated to that definition in academic 
works that have a small state as the object of analysis. 
                                                 
36 Fox, The Power of Small States. 
37 Alan K. Henrikson, “A Coming ‘Magnesian’ Age? Small States, the Global System, and the 
International Community,” Geopolitics 6, no. 3 (2001): 49–86. 
38 Matthias Maass, “The Elusive Definition of the Small State,” International Politics 46, no. 1 
(2009): 65–83. 
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Many of those definitions are based on quantitative values—an appealingly 
simplistic approach—and demonstrate essential limitations. Definitions based on absolute 
or relative quantitative values focus on such indicators as population, size of territory, gross 
domestic product (GDP) or military expenditure.39 These definitions typically derive from 
a traditional (neo)realist school of international relations, which links resources with power 
capability.40 The quantitative approach, therefore, allows an operationalizable and 
straightforward definition of the small state. Furthermore, because the quantitative 
definition is rooted in material power capabilities, it allows the scholar to draw on the broad 
literature on power and security in international relations.41 Despite the virtues that, at first 
glance, this approach can provide, it has essential shortcomings. First, as argued by 
Rothstein and Keohane, categorizations based on purely objective criteria can only be 
divided arbitrarily.42 Second, the absolute measurement of objective values is necessarily 
linked to a temporal evolution that allows reflection at the global level; however, global 
trends do not take into account regional geopolitical specificities.43 Third, an exclusive 
focus on quantitative values disregards the distinction between absolute and relative 
power.44 Accordingly, the objective values that characterize a small state’s behavior in a 
specific geopolitical environment do not lead necessarily to the same behavior of another 
small state, showing the same indicator’s value but existing in another environment. Thus, 
the quantitative approach neglects relative measures based on qualitative characteristics. 
                                                 
39 See Vital, The Inequality of States; East, “Size and Foreign Policy Behavior”; Thorhallsson, “The 
Size of States in the European Union”; Paul Sutton, “The Concept of Small States in the International 
Political Economy,” The Round Table 100, no. 413 (2011): 141-53. 
40 Clive Archer, Alyson J.K. Bailes, and Anders Wivel, Small States and International Security: 
Europe and Beyond (New York: Routledge, 2014). 
41 Anders Wivel, Alyson J.K. Bailes and Clive Archer, “Setting the Scene,” in Small States and 
International Security, ed. Archer et al., (New York: Routledge, 2014), 3-25. 
42 Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers; Keohane, “Lilliputians’ Dilemmas.” 
43 Jesse and Dreyer, Small States in the International System. 
44 For further discussion on relative and absolute power see Robert Powell, “Absolute and Relative 
Gains in International Relations Theory,” American Political Science Review 85, no. 4 (December 1991): 
1303–20; John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 2014). 
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While a qualitative approach avoids the “cutting-off point” trap, it raises some 
methodological doubts about the absolute idea of “small state.” Avoiding arbitrary 
processes, qualitative approaches to the definition of small states focus on their behavior; 
in other words, they look at group-specific behavior patterns.45 Scholars studying small 
states have recognized numerous characteristics that small states are expected to exhibit.46 
The qualitative perspective reflects policy actions and tends to focus more on the overall 
context. Nonetheless, the qualitative approach tends to generalize the definition of small 
states. The list of behaviors that should characterize small states is too long and the 
commonality of those behaviors among small states too weak, and so, the definitions are 
less useful.47 Accordingly, as argued by numerous scholars, the qualitative approach 
should be combined with a relational one.48 The relational approach assists in avoiding 
subjective partitions based on quantifiable measures and highlights commonalities in a 
dyadic relationship.49 Moreover, the relational approach also introduces the power aspect, 
namely the power that actors within the dyadic relationship exert upon each other.  
To be comprehensive, the small state definition requires focus on the weaker actor 
in an asymmetric power relationship. Smallness is a relative and not an absolute idea, 
shifting “the focus from the power that states possess to the power that they exercise.”50 
Concurrently, states interact in various power dispositions with unique sets of actors and 
across multiple domains of statecraft; accordingly, the fact that an actor might be powerful 
                                                 
45 East, “Size and Foreign Policy Behavior.” 
46 Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers; Vital, The Survival of Small States; Laurent Goetschel, 
“The Foreign and Security Policy Interests of Small States in Today’s Europe,” in Small States inside and 
Outside the European Union, ed. Laurent Goetschel (Dordrecht, NL: Kluwer Academic Publisher, 1998), 
13–31; Briguglio, Cordina, and Kisanga, Building the Economic Resilience of Small States. 
47 Tom Long, “It’s Not the Size, It’s the Relationship: From ‘Small States’ to Asymmetry,” 
International Politics 54, no. 2 (2017): 144–60. 
48 Thomas J. Volgy and Alison Bailin, International Politics & State Strength (London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2003), 40–42; Anders Wivel and Hans Mouritzen, The Geopolitics of Euro-Atlantic 
Integration (New York: Routledge, 2005), 15–42; Wivel et al., “Setting the Scene,” 8–9. 
49 Godfrey Baldacchino, “Thucydides or Kissinger? A Critical Review of Smaller State Diplomacy,” 
in The Diplomacies of Small States, ed. A. F. Cooper and T. M. Shaw (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2009), 21–40. 
50 Steinmetz and Wivel, Small States in Europe, 7. 
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in one relationship but weak in another fits a distinct relational spatio-temporal context.51 
For this reason, in general terms, a small state is not per se a weak state; it is the actor(s) 
with which it relates and the context of the relationship that makes the small state the 
weaker element in the relationship. Consequently, this work utilizes the small state 
definition provided by the political scientist Anders Wivel, who characterizes a small state 
“as the weaker party in an asymmetric relationship, which is unable to change the nature 
or functioning of the relationship as a whole on its own.”52  
This characterization allows some powerful deductions. First, the relationship is 
not necessarily just dyadic (two actors) but can be multivalent (many actors); furthermore, 
it can be viewed at the systems level. For instance, a state can be small at the global level 
but not necessarily at the regional level. Second, it allows for domain differentiation. For 
example, if compared to B, A is a small state in a specific domain of the relationship, but 
A may still not be small in all relationships with B. This fact would allow A to influence 
the nature of the first relationship by leveraging another relationship with B (in which A is 
and does not behave as a small state) in order to change the balance of the first one. Finally, 
it suggests that the more powerful state persists or shifts the nature or functioning of the 
relationship according to the behavior of both the small state and the strategic environment 
to maintain the asymmetric relationship. 
The question that arises from the aforementioned deductions is: Why should a great 
power—given that the great power has an asymmetrical advantage in a relationship with a 
small state—adapt this relationship? Moreover, how? The next section explores the 
character of the modern strategic environment and the related hybrid threat. showing that 
some of the environment’s characteristics encourage great powers to threaten small states 
in a hybrid way. 
                                                 
51 Steinmetz and Wivel Small States in Europe, 7. 
52 Wivel et al., “Setting the Scene,” 9. Italic added by the author. The small state may be able to 
influence part of the relationship’s constitutive elements but has not the power to change it as a whole. 
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B. ON CONFLICT AND HYBRID THREATS IN THE 21st CENTURY 
The modern strategic environment drives assertive great powers to foster a hybrid 
approach in achieving their political goals. This section explores the characteristics of the 
contemporary strategic environment, illustrating the reasons that lead a great power to act 
in a hybrid way and assessing the appropriateness of the term “hybrid.” After 
demonstrating the suitability of the term, this section proposes a characterization of “hybrid 
threat.” 
1. The Modern Strategic Environment 
Competitiveness, volatility, complexity, and interdependencies characterize the 
modern strategic environment. State actors are closely linked with each other economically 
and technologically. Contrary to prevailing opinion in the past,53 this interdependence is 
no longer perceived by political scientists as promoting collaboration but as a source of 
vulnerability and competition, whether it involves sanctions, cyber warfare, or other means 
of coercion.54 Robert Blackwill and Jennifer Harris emphasize how today’s geo-economic 
instruments—trade and investment policy, economic sanctions and assistance, cyber 
activities, as well as financial, monetary, energy and commodities policies—are exploited 
jointly as means of statecraft in order to achieve national goals.55 In recent decades, this 
trend has led to a shift in methods of conflict toward the broad use of all means of statecraft, 
including informational, humanitarian and other non-military measures, applied in 
coordination with potential social unrest.56 The modern strategic environment is not a 
binary world characterized by peace and war but is an arena of constant competition in 
which the various actors adapt their ways and means to avoid repercussions.57 The 
increased complexity and volatility of these relationships, the actors’ interdependence, as 
                                                 
53 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 2nd ed. (Boston: Scott, 
Foresman and Company, 1989). 
54 Wright, All Measures Short of War. 
55 Blackwill and Harris, War by Other Means. 
56 Gerasimov, “Tsennost’ Nauki v Predvideniyi [Prevision is what science is valued for].” 
57 Donald J. Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/new-national-security-strategy-new-era/. 
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well as the competition for resources have blurred the distinction between the various forms 
of conflict and competition between states as well as between states and non-state actors, 
exposing small states to the interests of assertive, more powerful states, and, accordingly, 
to their malicious actions. 
Contesting established international norms and seeking to avoid major military 
escalation, malicious state and non-state actors use—in an integrated, adaptive and 
convergent way—a wide range of means. They try to reshape regional order according to 
their national interests and challenge the international system’s stability and security to 
achieve political advantages.58 To achieve these goals, such actors apply and combine “a 
wide range of means, both violent and non-violent, military and civilian, in a carefully 
planned way.”59 These actors, avoiding compromise, prefer to act within the complex and 
dynamic arena of constant competition, blurring the lines between their actions and thereby 
avoiding any triggering of sanctions or even a plausible conventional military response.60 
Furthermore, based on their needs and abilities, these actors can make use of proxies. These 
proxies, acting according to a principal-agent relationship, encapsulate the interests of their 
principal actor, exploit their characteristics in achieving the desired effect, and if necessary, 
receive the tailored support of the principal. In today’s strategic environment, assertive 
state actors adapt to the environment itself to optimize the probability of success in 
achieving their goals. 
U.S. military power and the American penchant for interventionism, has prompted 
possible adversaries to take measures alternative to direct military confrontation in 
achieving their goals. From the end of the Cold War until today, the United States of 
America has remained a potent world power.61 Since 9/11, the United States has made the 
preemptive and preventive use of force one of its principal tenets in countering possible 
                                                 
58 Wright, All Measures Short of War, 158-161. 
59 Cederberg and Eronen, “How Can Societies Be Defended against Hybrid Threats,” 4. 
60 Matthias Fiala, “Die Psychologischen Fallen Der Hybriden Bedrohung [The hybrid threat’s 
psychological traps],” Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitschrift, 184, no. 5 (May 2018): 7-9. 
61 Robert D. Kaplan, The Return of Marco Polo’s World (New York: Random House, 2018). 
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challenging actors, regardless if they are state or non-state actors.62 This strategy has 
pushed assertive great powers, among others, to adapt and combine several ways and 
means, developing other, more indirect methods to achieve their goals in attempts to avoid 
coercion by the U.S. military’s overwhelming apparatus and the related risks to their 
integrity. 
In recent decades, several scholars, military analysts, and senior leaders use the 
term “hybrid” to describe the threats and modes of war that combine several ways and 
means, including the indirect approach mentioned previously. Nonetheless, the lack of 
understanding of the term and its varied applications has led to discussions on its definition 
and explanatory power, which in turn has prompted subsequent changes to its meaning 
over the years. 
2. Hybrid: Just a Fancy Word? 
In the last decade within military and security environments, the use of the term 
hybrid has become common. Many critics of the application of the concept of hybridity in 
the security studies field have discredited its meaning by classifying it as one of the many 
“fancy words” used to describe an alleged new kind of warfare. To judge whether the term 
hybrid is appropriate to describe a threat or a form of conflict, an examination of its 
meaning in other fields provides criteria to judge its explanatory power in the field of 
security studies. 
A word has two interrelated orders of meaning. The first, denotation, states “what 
the object of the description is,” while the second, connotation, functions conceptually and 
ideologically, introducing a figurative sense related to the term.63 According to the 
philosopher John Stuart Mill, a word should be considered as connotative if it indicates, in 
addition to an object, also its properties.64 The explanatory power of a word, therefore, lies 
                                                 
62 Karl P. Mueller et al., Striking First: Preemptive and Preventive Attack in U.S. National Security 
Policy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006). 
63 Oxford Reference, s.v. “denotation and connotation,” accessed August 20, 2018 
http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095710580. 
64 John Lyons, Semantics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1977). 
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in its denotation and connotation. Consequently, to understand whether there may be 
denotations and/or connotations common to the term hybrid, it is necessary to start 
examining its meaning in fields in which this word is commonly used. 
According to the general term that can be found in dictionaries, the term hybrid 
characterizes the combination of two or more different elements. The Cambridge 
Dictionary describes the application of the term hybrid to “something that is a combination 
of two different things, so it has qualities relating to both of them.”65 The Online Etymology 
Dictionary describes its origins: from Latin hybrida (a variant of hybrid), related to hubris 
as a back-formation from hubristic or else from Greek hybris meaning “wanton violence, 
insolence, outrage.”66 Hence, hybrid denotes something generated by the combination or 
a mixture of at least two different things, revealing a possible negative connotation related 
to a change in the natural order of things. 
In different domains, the term hybrid is used to indicate the combination, melting 
or mixing of elements with different characteristics, resulting in a new element that many 
times exploits the advantages of its original constituents. In marketing and advertising, 
hybrid marketing channels describe “two or more marketing channels set up by a single 
firm to reach one or more customer segments, hence, in this form of multichannel 
distribution a variety of direct and indirect approaches are used to deliver the firm’s goods 
to its customer.”67 In biogeography, a hybrid zone represents an area where two divergent 
species or subspecies meet, cross-fertilize so that their offspring becomes prevalent; it can 
also develop from an area where a new lineage evolves.68 In genetics, the term hybrid 
means the offspring of parents that vary in genetically determined traits; the process of 
hybridization is significant biologically because it increases the genetic variety within 
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66 Etymology Dictionary Online, s.v. “hybrid,” accessed August 20, 2018, 
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species, which is essential for evolution to occur.69 In electronics, a hybrid computer is 
one that exhibits features of analog and digital computers, combining the advantages of the 
analog part for computing (solver) with the digital part for logical operations (controller).70 
In organization science, as argued by Greenwood et al., hybrid organizations are likely to 
appear and succeed in a complex and dynamic environment because they combine 
elements prescribed by various logics and therefore probably develop at least partial 
suitability to a broader set of institutional referents.71 Hence, the term hybrid denotes the 
combination of at least two different elements from separate subsystems that are part of a 
common supersystem. Moreover, the term can take on a pejorative connotation, as 
something not natural, which modifies the natural course observed up to that moment. 
Likewise, hybrid connotes the recombination of components as an adaptation to a dynamic 
environment (e.g., nature, market, institutions, laws) to create a new item that combines 
and exploits the advantages derived from its original components and better fits the new 
environment. 
The characteristics of the modern strategic environment favor actors that have a 
high degree of adaptability and agility. Some descriptions of the modern strategic 
environment’s dynamics and of actors’ newly generated threats indicate that the term 
hybrid may be applicable. The combination of state and non-state actors in a principal-
agent relationship fits the idea of the mixture of at least two different elements from 
separate subsystems that are part of a common supersystem encapsulating some qualities 
relating to both. 
Assuming that international order and the rule of law are the natural order of the 
international system, then the fact that great powers can try to distort that natural order 
makes the term hybrid appropriate for labeling their threats to small states. Likewise, the 
described combination and recombination of different means as an adaptation to the 
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dynamic strategic environment reflect the use of this term in other domains. Having 
demonstrated the explanatory power of the term “hybrid,” this thesis explores the term in 
its applicability to defining threats in the next section. 
3. The Hybrid Threat and Its Framework 
In the last three decades, numerous concepts describing modes of warfare have 
followed one another, usually based on a simple description of the respective observed 
reality, or otherwise situated in the development of a theoretical framework, and many have 
not escaped the “definition trap.” Trying to define the phenomenon that they aspire to 
describe, the proposed concepts rise to criticism from other scholars and security analysts. 
Despite the different characteristics between the various concepts, it is possible to notice 
that it is above all Western thinkers who favor a deterministic approach, while Russian and 
Chinese thinkers prefer a more stochastic approach linked to a characterization of the 
threats and the possible warfare mode linked to them.72 
Despite the variation, many of these concepts underline the increasing difficulty in 
clearly laying down the thin line that divides a conflict from a war. The dynamism and 
complexity of the modern world, combined with increasingly advanced technologies 
available to all, allow state and non-state actors to blend numerous ways and means of war 
or conflict. This mixture also blurs the strategic environment. The resulting obfuscation 
makes it increasingly difficult—particularly for those who still cling to a definition—to 
judge when an alleged conflict type turns into another one. In most cases, the research 
remains incongruous; in some critical cases, the finding is too late. 
These observations naturally leave doubts about the fact that the hybrid concept 
will not fall into the same trap as its predecessors or contenders. If the original term hybrid 
warfare coined by Nemeth refers to forms of warfare conducted by specific (hybrid) 
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societies, then Hoffman changed the referent to focus on non-state actors. This eventually 
evolved into the present-day inclusion of all state and non-state actors. In his seminal work 
Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, Hoffman defines hybrid wars as 
those which “incorporate a range of different modes of warfare, including conventional 
capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorists’ acts including indiscriminate 
violence and coercion, and criminal disorder.”73 He emphasizes the multimodality of this 
new type of warfare characterized by the convergence and combination of many modes of 
warfare and actors, whose activities are directed and coordinated to obtain synergetic 
effects across the battlespace, at both tactical and operational levels. This form of conflict 
blurs the categories and features of warfare not by just applying tactics of the weak but by 
exploiting continuous engagements in time and space of an ample array of state and non-
state actors.74 The hybrid character of the threat, therefore, resides in the mixture of state 
and non-state actors and their ability to fuse numerous means and ways. Furthermore, time 
and space are blended, so actions that take place in a specific space and time can have an 
effect in the same space and time but may also purposely achieve the effect in another 
space and time; accordingly, the actions take place along a continuum. Moreover, through 
the synchronized convergence of multiple actors and the simultaneous use of all forms of 
war, the threat becomes amorphous, increasing the challenge of defining precisely which 
actor one is encountering, and consequently, the most suitable means of countering it. Little 
is left of the original idea of hybridity. Nevertheless, other scholars, military analysts, and 
institutions have sensed the astuteness of this concept and developed it further. 
The concept of hybridity should not assume a general value, but rather characterize 
specific conflicts or threats. Russel Glenn expands Hoffman’s definition of a hybrid threat 
to address all the tools of statecraft and possible modes, defining it as “an adversary that 
simultaneously and adaptively employs some combination of political, military, economic, 
social, and information means, and conventional, irregular, catastrophic, terrorism, and 
disruptive/criminal warfare methods. It may include a combination of state and non-state 
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actors.”75 Glenn’s observations—integrating the tools of state power—bring the essential 
strategical level into the concept of hybridity. While Russel’s theoretical extension captures 
some strategical elements of the modern environment, it still misses a fundamental 
element, namely the cognitive aspect. 
To comprehensively address threats in the strategic environment, it is necessary to 
capture the cognitive motivation that drives an adversary to mix these many ways and 
means.76 Any actor’s approach to warfare is a mix of physical and cognitive capabilities, 
so the hybrid concept needs also to describe why adversaries choose the ways and means 
that they do.77 A useful approach is to consider the contextual side, seeing hybrid warfare 
as an “optimized form of warfare that allows a combatant to attempt to utilize all available 
resources—both conventional and unconventional—in a unique cultural context to produce 
specific effects against the opponent.”78 Although incorporating the strategic and 
contextual aspects of hybrid warfare, many definitions remain nonetheless material and 
kinetic-centric. To overcome this deficiency, NATO has reformulated the characterization 
of hybrid warfare to better address its characteristics by defining it as “the broad, complex, 
and adaptive combination of conventional and non-conventional means, overt and covert 
military, paramilitary, and civilian measures, employed in an integrated design by state and 
non-state actors to achieve their objectives.”79 Despite its more comprehensive approach, 
this characterization remains structured mainly on a binary system of opposing 
characteristics, which limits consideration of the strategic environment, and in particular 
the asymmetric relationship between small states and great powers. 
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Russia is increasingly asserting itself in relations with the small states on its 
periphery, pushing the European Union to examine hybridity in the modern strategic 
environment. In its “Joint Communication to the European Parliament and Council,” the 
European Commission defines a hybrid threat as a “mixture of coercive and subversive 
activity, conventional and unconventional methods, which can be used in a coordinated 
manner by state or non-state actors to achieve specific objectives while remaining below 
the threshold of formally declared warfare.”80 To better shape this definition, the European 
Commission characterizes hybridity as “an emphasis on exploiting the vulnerabilities of 
the target and on generating ambiguity to hinder the decision-making process; massive 
disinformation campaigns, using social media to control the political narrative or to 
radicalize; and recruited and direct proxy actors can be vehicles for hybrid threats.”81 
Indeed, it is possible to recognize a particular strategic approach through ends, ways, and 
means within this definition of a hybrid threat. In contrast to NATO, the European Union 
did not adopt a binary approach and—acknowledging the cognitive aspect suggested by 
previous definitions—it highlights the ambiguous approach as aimed to deceive the 
adversary. However, even this definition emphasizes specific elements (e.g., social media), 
while remaining vague on others (conventional and unconventional methods). 
Ultimately, a holistic approach to characterizing this type of threat allows for 
overcoming the “definition trap.” According to the Countering Hybrid Warfare project 
group of the Multinational Capabilities Development Campaign (MCDC)82 hybrid warfare 
is not a prerogative of state actors; indeed, non-state actors can also engage in hybrid 
warfare. Both actors may have the capability to target specific vulnerabilities across the 
spectrum of societal functions with multiple instruments of power achieving linear and 
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non-linear synergetic effects.83 Additional elements of this characterization encompass the 
definition of vulnerabilities in the political, military, economic, societal, informational and 
infrastructure domains as well.84 Linearity and non-linearity are expressed by the 
asymmetry and escalation in intensity as well in the applied instruments of power.85 This 
approach allowed the MCDC to build an analytical framework based on three key 
categories: critical functions and vulnerabilities being exploited (political, military, 
economic, social, information, infrastructure); the means’ synchronism; and the non-linear 
action’s effects.86 The MCDC approach—relying partially on characterization and 
categorization instead of definitions—seems to be promising, especially considering the 
endless discussions that mark these decades, which prevented moving past the “definition 
trap.” 
It is prudent to characterize the term hybrid threat rather than to strive to define it. 
For a term to generate explanatory power, it is necessary to associate it with characteristics. 
As stated earlier, attempts to create definitions of the term “hybrid threat” or “hybrid 
warfare” show limitations. Although a definition allows for a certain elegance and clarity, 
such a definition-oriented approach is limiting. The following characterization lies in the 
author’s analysis of modern threats in the strategic environment, other certain concepts 
developed in recent decades, and the evolution of the concept of hybridity. Accordingly, a 
hybrid threat shows the following characteristics: 
• To attain linear (first order) and non-linear (second and third order) synergetic 
effects in achieving specific objectives, it shows an integrated design of 
simultaneous, synchronized and adaptive uses of multiple instruments of power 
along the political, military, economical, societal, and informational (PMESI) 
continuum; 
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• To exploit the characteristics of the adversary society, it targets specific physical 
and psychological vulnerabilities across the full spectrum of societal functions, 
generating ambiguity, compulsion, coercion or a combination of these; 
• To maintain the initiative, hinder the adversary’s decision-making process, and 
avoid counterproductive consequences, it applies strategic gradualism of 
escalation and de-escalation through a combination of salami-slicing approach 
and fait accompli;87 
• To avoid military confrontation and to blur the continuum between peace and war, 
it is mostly non-military in nature, applying military means only in the case where 
the strategic environment allows it; 
• To bypass the international or national norm system, overcome the lack of 
capabilities and reduce the socio-economic costs, it mixes or combines—in a 
networked principal-agent relationship—endogenous and exogenous state or non-
state entities. 
The appearance of this kind of threat does not ipso facto mean the disappearance of 
other types of threats. A threat posed by a great power is not hybrid per se. If a state acts 
in a malicious way these actions are not necessarily hybrid in nature. Even if carried out in 
a covered manner these malevolent activities do not represent by themselves hybrid threats. 
Accordingly, to judge if an opponent is applying a hybrid approach and consequently to 
implement effective countermeasures, it is vital to have the appropriate awareness systems, 
the appropriate active and reactive strategies, as well as the related tools and mechanisms. 
The concept of hybridity combines different ways and means already known from the past. 
Exploiting characteristics of the complex strategic environment gives rise to new and more 
sophisticated features that the assertive great power can apply to shape the asymmetrical 
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relationship with a small state, mitigating the risks and minimizing the costs of this 
interaction as it relates to environment and the possible reactions of other major powers. 
4. Hybrid Warfare or Just Political Warfare 
Since one of the prominent characteristics of the hybrid threat is that it is not 
predominantly military in nature and instead encompasses different means of national 
power, many scholars and analysts tend to compare it to or even assimilate it within the 
concept of political warfare. George Kennan, the attributed father of the concept of political 
warfare, defines its measures as “short of war.”88 Accordingly, his concept of political 
warfare does not consider military and lethal military methods as main efforts.89 
Conversely, it directly and solely targets governance systems and institutions, where a 
state’s ability to govern is challenged.90 Countering Kennan’s understanding of political 
warfare, hybrid warfare is not limited to “activities short of war” and instead encompasses 
many other necessary military means along the peace-war continuum. Accordingly, the 
concept of hybridity differs from political warfare and goes beyond the formal distinction 
between peace and war by encompassing “all the means at a nation’s command” along the 
peace-war continuum and not, as Kennan suggests, only “in time [s] of Peace.”91 (See 
Figure 1.) 
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Figure 1. Political versus Hybrid Warfare along the Peace-War Continuum 
Both historical and more current formulations of political warfare show that 
military means can be part of it; nevertheless, the concept does not avoid the trap of starkly, 
artificially dividing war and peace. In Modern Political Warfare, Robinson et al. argue that 
applying diplomatic, informational, military and economic methods is exerting power 
“short of conventional combat.”92 This approach, however, like the one described by 
Kennan, is limiting and differs from the concept of hybridity for two reasons. First, 
although the suggested diplomatic, information, military and economic measures in this 
modern concept of political warfare “must be carried out outside the context of traditional 
war,”93 past and recent conflicts show that these measures are not limited to this alleged 
period antecedent to a conventional war, and they do not end when a conventional war 
begins.94 The modern concept of political warfare is bound up in this ante and poste trap 
of the “conventional war outbreak” definition, describing just a piece of the conflict puzzle 
and not its comprehensive framework. Second, conventional military forces play a role in 
the field of political warfare; however, theirs is primarily a function of deterrence, of 
diplomatic coercion in Schelling’s sense of the term, and not as an effective kinetic force.95 
The ability to mix military resources with other instruments of power assures strategic 
gradualism, preparing and applying military force at the most appropriate time and space 
even though it is not the only nor the main component. In a hybrid approach, the use of 
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military means serves as an option for a possible resolutive act, building a continuum along 
the escalation of conflict and not creating a break or abrupt change in strategy as the modern 
political warfare concept suggests. 
A further fundamental difference between the two terms lies in the evolution and 
acceptance by scholars of their definitions. There is an inherent tautological combination 
of the term “political” with the term “warfare”; in fact, in Clausewitzian terms, the first is 
a constituent element and raison d’être of the second one, accordingly, all wars are 
political.96 Hence, “political warfare,” as synecdoche, has weak explanatory power. For 
this reason, the intrinsically explanatory impotence of the term led several scholars, 
analysts and senior military leaders in the past to interchange and even equate the term 
political warfare with other disparate modes of warfare.97 Even in its most modern 
formulation, the term “political warfare” is questioned and deemed inappropriate.98 Even 
though the term “hybrid warfare” has evolved, today it is implemented and accepted in 
various doctrines at different levels.99 The same cannot be said of the term political 
warfare, which, today as in the past, is considered an unsuitable term as a description of 
the activities it seeks to characterize. Although there are many similarities, the two terms 
political and hybrid warfare are not the same. The tools in the former are basically non-
kinetic in nature, while the second mixes kinetic and non-kinetic tools. The former concept 
focuses on an alleged period “short of war,” while the second embraces the continuum 
between peace and war. The concept of political warfare emphasizes what means should 
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be employed, while the hybrid one also encompasses why and how the means should be 
employed. 
Having defined why a great power would choose a hybrid approach in a conflictual 
relationship with a small state and how the hybrid threat can affect this relationship, the 
next chapter will explore small state vulnerabilities and opportunities, suggesting which 
variables—across the political, military, economic, social and informational spectrum—
may prove most significant for a small state. 
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III. SMALL STATES’ CHARACTERISTICS 
Discourse over the vulnerability of small states as their most striking characteristic 
as compared against more powerful states crosses both millennial history and different 
schools of international relations. The realist approach, focused on the intrinsic 
vulnerability of the small, is probably best summarized by Thucydides in The 
Peloponnesian Wars when the Athenians remind the Melians that “the strong do what they 
can and the weak suffer what they must.”100 A neorealist approach based on structural 
power suggests that the system structures shaped by great powers’ competition and the 
resulting hegemonic institutions mostly influence small states’ constraints in achievement 
of their goals.101 Yet, liberal international relations theories of interdependence suggest 
some opportunities for small states; as argued by the political scientist David Baldwin, 
“[S]o-called ‘weak powers’ influence so-called ‘strong powers’ because of the power 
analyst’s failure to account for the possibility that a country may be weak in one situation 
but strong in another.”102 In the same vein, the constructivist approach emphasizes the 
small state’s opportunities to act as norm entrepreneurs in various fields, able to advance 
norms without the support or influence of great powers.103 Regardless of the school of 
thought, all these approaches have one common denominator, namely that small states—
in their asymmetrical relationship with a more powerful state—are confronted with 
vulnerabilities but also with opportunities. Accordingly, this chapter explores small states’ 
vulnerabilities and opportunities along the PMESI spectrum to define in each of these 
domains’ salient small-state characteristics that the great power (G) can exploit in a hybrid 
way, but also that the small state (S) can leverage to oppose its more powerful challenger. 
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Some of the explored vulnerabilities and opportunities are not a small state’s 
prerogative, and not all small states will show them to the same degree, or perhaps will not 
show them at all. Nonetheless, the asymmetrical relationship and the resulting limitations 
for the small state force it to rely on its opportunities to a greater extent. Furthermore, this 
catalog of analyzed characteristics does not intend to be complete. Conversely, the chosen 
holistic approach should encourage questions and future explorations of additional small 
state vulnerabilities and opportunities. 
A. POLICY 
Domestic and foreign policy are interdependent, influencing each other and each 
being a source of vulnerabilities and opportunities for the other. Foreign and domestic 
concerns shape what Dr. Robert Putnam calls a “two-level game,” in which the government 
and the populace interact in permanent tension between group interests in domestic policy 
and strategic rationality in foreign policy.104 Accordingly, vulnerabilities and 
opportunities at both levels can influence each other positively or negatively. 
1. Vulnerabilities 
S has fewer diplomatic resources than G to maintain diplomatic ties; consequently, 
it is not able to cover the same wide-ranging network of foreign relations. S has less power 
as a single actor to pursue an independent political agenda; this evidence leads S to have a 
proportionally greater level of interest and participation in intergovernmental organizations 
(IGO), which can act as a force multiplier and supplement its sparse diplomatic resources 
for representation, negotiation, and information gathering.105 For example, Singapore is 
now a pivotal player in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations; similarly, Qatar 
increased its international visibility through the Gulf Cooperation Council.106 This higher 
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dependence on IGOs compels S to be more open to negotiation and bargaining, with an 
added importance on being able to create ad hoc groups of interest with other states to 
shape its political environment and counter-balance the individual political weight of G. 
An example of this dynamic are the “Cotton Four” (or C-4) countries, Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Chad, and Mali; this IGO allows its members to shape the trade of cotton from their 
countries above and beyond their capability as single actors. Furthermore, due to S’s 
relatively smaller diplomatic capability, S is more geographically and politically 
constrained in its goal achievement, leaving G with the advantage of a more extensive 
diplomatic network that allows it greater influence over the dyadic relationship with S 
through third parties (e.g., states or IGOs) acting as a proxy. 
Domestic political interests and structure influence S’s policy in more considerable 
measure than for G; changes related to the domestic political environment therefore can 
seriously affect S’s policy. The worsening of the relationship between S and G may have a 
more significant impact on the former than on the latter.107 As argued by political scientists 
Neal Jesse and John Dreyer, when G threatens S, S tends to behave according to social 
constructivist theory and partially on domestic/liberal theory, basing actions more on 
norms and identity, and being influenced to a greater extent by domestic institutional 
changes.108 The domestic governance of S is more exposed to the influence of its elite 
across the political, economic, and societal sectors. The Icelandic example, linked to the 
2008 financial crisis, demonstrates that too much consensus and mutual trust between 
political leadership and the economic elite can degenerate into complacency, leading a 
country to the brink of bankruptcy in the resulting political and social crisis.109 In line with 
this, political scientists Andrew Cooper and Timothy Shaw argue that the closeness “of the 
ruled with their rulers” blurs the distinction between state and non-state, or political and 
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economic.110 This relationship’s closeness and its possible consequences expose a critical 
vulnerability of S policy, namely the balance of trust between S political leadership and the 
state elite. 
2. Opportunities 
The small state can define clear policy priorities by focusing its attention on specific 
problems in the relationship with G. In an asymmetrical relationship, the weaker actor S 
has more at stake than the stronger actor G; accordingly, the former has more incentive to 
prioritize its policy in achieving its goals.111 The asymmetric relationship that S faces can 
be relatively common for other states. Hence, it will be easier for S to link up with other 
small states. The creation of interest groups can take place at multiple levels. International 
organizations are an effective platform for enhancing the influence of S on specific 
functional and geographic issues that are recognized by other peer members. Some 
examples of these initiatives in international organizations are the Forum of Small States 
at the UN, and at the regional level in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) or the 
Visegrad Group.112 Accordingly, S’s membership in a supra-national organization is an 
opportunity to multiply its limited structural power; by exploiting the organization’s power 
S can achieve a degree of influence over G that would not be possible in an isolated dyadic 
relationship. Supra-national organizations can also be influenced by G through its external 
pressure on the organization as a whole, or, if G is also a member of the organization, 
through its structural influence within it. For this reason, S must also explore other 
opportunities to support its policies. 
The small state S can bypass its structural lack of diplomatic capabilities by 
engaging non-state actors as well as implementing and participating in sub-state 
diplomacy. Political scientists David Criekemans and Manuel Duran argue that small states 
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can seize opportunities from the dynamics of sub-state diplomacy.113 Various successful 
initiatives support this argument: the EUREGION La Grande Region, aimed at promoting 
and enhancing cross-border cooperation between Belgian, German, French and 
Luxembourg regions; or the Regio Insubrica, which aims to enhance cross-border 
cooperation in the Italian-Swiss regions of the Pre-Alpine Lakes. Accordingly, S could use 
its political sub-components (e.g., regions, states, provinces) to increase relations with 
specific peer areas in other countries, thus freeing diplomatic resources at the state level so 
they can be employed in another geographic or political areas. Similarly, S could engage 
with specific non-governmental-organizations (NGO) in order to enhance its impact in the 
policy domain. The role of the combined interaction of NGOs and other civil groups allows 
emerging and developing countries to obstruct moves by major powers to complete the 
Doha Round.114 While G can rely primarily on its state means to support its policy, S has 
alternative opportunities outside its bureaucratic apparatus to boost and support its policy 
toward G. 
Its smallness should allow S to be more flexible and adaptable to change in the 
political environment. Scholars from organizational science argue that small organizations 
are more responsive and flexible and are better positioned to develop a hybrid 
organizational structure that allows them to succeed in a pluralistic institutional 
environment.115 Similarly, smallness of a state should allow a higher degree of flexibility 
and adaptability of its political-economical system.116 Despite smallness affording these 
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advantageous conditions, this does not mean a state has ipso facto flexibility and 
adaptability. The economist Atle Midttun provides an example: he convincingly claims 
that small state like Norway, not taking into consideration its external environment, under 
some circumstances shows a degree of institutional inflexibility that has consequences at 
the economic and social levels.117 Hence, smallness favors institutional flexibility, which 
if adjusted to the environmental conditions can lead to a higher degree of environmental 
adaptability. 
B. MILITARY 
The hybrid threat is mostly non-military in nature. However, if the strategic 
environment allows it, military means of statecraft can come into play to influence the 
opponent decision-making. The exploitation of military means of statecraft can, but must 
not necessarily, lead to the outbreak of a military confrontation. In this domain, as in the 
others, smallness can accentuate specific vulnerabilities and opportunities. 
1. Vulnerabilities 
In an asymmetrical relationship, the weaker party’s lack of a military alliance may 
represent a significant vulnerability.118 Scholars have explored the significance of 
numerous terms such as neutrality, non-alignment, non-belligerency, and their underlying 
positive and negative effects for small-state security.119 While taking into consideration 
all the positive and negative aspects, history shows the fragility of a small state that is not 
a member of a military alliance. The invasions experienced by Belgium and certain Nordic 
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countries in World War II, and the persistent Indo-Pakistani conflict of the last seventy 
years, are just some examples demonstrating that neither neutrality nor non-alignment 
provide ipso facto immunity from armed conflict, regardless if triggered by external powers 
or by that state’s own political decisions. Conversely, as argued by the political scientist 
Robert Rothstein, a military alliance “is an instrument, par excellence, of deterrence and 
defense.”120 To protect its autonomy, a state can adopt a defensive attitude opting for 
neutrality; nonetheless, the efficacy of this posture relies on the extent to which it can 
preserve its neutrality. In a direct confrontation between G and S, the latter can no longer 
remain neutral and must engage. It is called, willingly or unwillingly, to be an active part 
of the confrontation. Consequently, in that case, S’s non-member status in any military 
alliance, whether for its own reasons or due to external pressures, proves to be a 
vulnerability. 
A small state’s internal violent conflict can attract the military involvement of 
larger external actors. Since the resources that S can make available to quell the internal 
conflict are sparse, or because the consequences of violent disorder could afflict a larger 
actor, international organizations or more powerful countries with regional interests may 
be tempted to apply military intervention to restore order. Leaving aside the numerous 
IGO-led missions (UN and other regional security organizations), in the past many 
individual countries have intervened in smaller ones with the alleged purpose of solving or 
supporting the resolution of the internal conflict.121 Accordingly, an internal violent 
conflict represents a severe vulnerability for S that can be exploited by G to affect the 
dyadic relationship in G’s favor. 
The small state may have fewer resources to allocate for military purposes, causing 
reduced military capabilities. Going beyond the alleged RMA and regarding the ever-
expanding costs of new technologies, it is appropriate to argue that limited resources might 
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prevent S from keeping pace with the military technology dynamic.122 Furthermore, S’s 
more limited financial resources will presumably prevent it from maintaining a large 
defense industry at the expense of supporting other state domains.123 The great power may 
also face this dilemma, but for S, the related difficulties (e.g., shortages, dependence on 
external suppliers) intensify at a higher rate. The weakness of its national defense industry, 
as well as its attempt to balance technology quality and quantity, would limit S’s adoption 
of a specific military doctrine and organizational structure, representing an important 
vulnerability for S in attempting to militarily influence the asymmetrical relationship with 
G. 
2. Opportunities 
Involvement in multilateral security arrangements can provide the small state an 
opportunity to enhance its military posture. A military alliance represents, at least formally, 
the highest form of commitment to a security organization. Despite transferring part of its 
political autonomy to the will of the alliance’s dominant state, this commitment gives S the 
opportunity to increase its security in absolute terms and, eventually, by free riding, to 
reduce the costs of its security in relative terms.124 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) in the Baltic States is an excellent example of 
this dynamic.125 Another less invasive approach is available through membership in 
regional organizations like the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE) or the African Union; although they are not military alliances, they make the 
maintenance of security in their region one of their core objectives. Partnership programs 
represent a third approach for the small state; although these programs do not explicitly 
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focus on imposing or maintaining security, they do allow members to enhance their 
security capability by sharing experiences and training. Despite its neutral posture, 
Switzerland is an active member of the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) Program. Hence, 
multilateral security arrangements offer various options for strengthening a small state’s 
military posture based on the degree of involvement that the small state can embrace. 
During the Cold War, the concept of total defense represented for the non-allied 
small states the most comprehensive and independent answer for protecting their territory 
from more powerful countries. Numerous smaller countries around the world adopted and 
adapted, according to their characteristics, the concept of “Total Defense.”126 Total 
defense relies on a posture of deterrence, combining dissuasion and territorial defense to 
diminish the great powers’ expected utility in a confrontation with the small state.127 This 
concept poses many challenges to civil-military relations in the small country and is 
intimately linked to the concept of “citizen in arms,” which leads to a non-aggressive policy 
not adapted for conducting external offensive military operations. In the last few decades, 
in many countries the traditional separation between the role of the armed forces defending 
the frontiers and beyond, and that of police forces guaranteeing homeland security, has 
blurred due to terrorist threats and limited resources.128 Furthermore, the rise of an 
assertive Russia pushed some smaller European countries to revitalize and modernize their 
total defense concept as an opportunity to invigorate their resilience and deterrence in 
facing internal and external threats.129 Thus, comprehensive security, combining and 
integrating military, and civil security forces, as well as other domains of civil society, can 
characterize a small state’s opportunity in facing a more powerful actor. 
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In a conventional military confrontation, the application of irregular warfare by the 
weaker actor can increase its chances of success. Based on historical records of the last two 
centuries, Arreguín-Toft convincingly claims that a conflict’s outcome between a weaker 
and a more powerful actor represents the result of the interactions of their strategies which 
are themselves rooted into two distinctive approaches: direct and indirect.130 The British 
historian B. H. Liddert Hart suggests that a direct approach focuses on annihilating the 
adversary’s military capacities, while an indirect one targets the opponent’s will to fight.131 
Arreguín-Toft argues that, in an asymmetric confrontation, if the two actors engage in a 
similar manner (direct-direct or indirect-indirect), the weaker actor almost always loses.132 
Adopting this theory as a starting point, Hungarian officer Sandor Fabian suggests the 
creation of irregular professional units in small states as a viable military strategy for 
offsetting the stronger actor’s conventional approach.133 As discussed previously, the 
hybrid approach does not make conventional use of military forces its main instrument. 
Conversely, it applies an agent-based indirect approach to avoid triggering a conventional 
conflict. For this reason, a small state’s military strategy based unilaterally on irregular 
forces would only lead to a strategic symmetry (indirect-indirect), which, as suggested by 
Arreguín-Toft, would point to the almost certain defeat of the weaker actor. Nonetheless, 
if G will decide to engage conventional military forces, for example, to obtain specific 
goals, S’s irregular capacity would provide a solid opportunity to threaten G’s 
achievements. 
C. ECONOMIC 
In the modern strategic environment, international economics and geopolitics are 
increasingly entangled and gaining momentum as means of statecraft. The increased 
interdependence between states amplifies opportunities and vulnerabilities in the economic 
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domain. Moreover, economic smallness can give rise to specific vulnerabilities and 
opportunities of which a state must be conscious.  
1. Vulnerabilities 
Smallness can lead to economic vulnerabilities that arise partly because production 
is a function of accessible resources, while consumption is a function of income.134 In line 
with this, economic historian Richard T. Griffiths argues that the smaller the state, the more 
likely it is the following characteristics will be found: limited range of output, fewer 
resources, and a small domestic market.135 This is supported by numerous other scholars 
who emphasize the propensity of S to have a high import rate to meet its domestic 
consumption and investments, which in turn requires an export-oriented domestic economy 
focused on a smaller range of products and, eventually, countries to balance imports and 
exports.136 In Profiling Vulnerability and Resilience: A Manual for Small States, the 
director of the Islands and Small States Institute in Malta, Professor Lino Briguglio 
recognizes four variables to define and assess small-state vulnerability: economic 
openness, reliance on a limited range of exports, dependence on strategic imports, and 
“peripherality”—referring to insularity and remoteness.137 The first of Briguglio’s 
variables is the most controversial and is much discussed in the literature. While empirical 
literatures tend to emphasize the positive relationship between openness and economic 
growth, other authors underline the adverse effects of too much market exposure and 
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volatility.138 Leaving the discussion aside about the impact of economic openness on an 
alleged small state, it is arguable that the dependency on strategic goods importation and 
the limited range of export diversification may represent small-state key vulnerabilities. 
The dependency on strategic importation and the limited range of export 
diversification exposes a small state to fluctuating policies of its major trading partners. 
Knowing S is reliant on its specific products and availability, the major trading partners 
find themselves in a favorable situation of being able to compel S by manipulating trade 
conditions. The blazing rise and catastrophic fall of Iceland’s financial system in the first 
decade of the twenty-first century represents an example of this small state’s vulnerability. 
The political scientists Edward Mansfield and Eric Reinhardt propose a possible solution 
to it, namely by tying as close as possible to one major trading partner through a preferential 
trading arrangement, like a customs union.139 Nonetheless, this strong tie with a few 
greater states or even a single greater state may allow those greater states to press their 
interests unilaterally by employing their more substantial economic capabilities.140 This 
economic asymmetry is a critical vulnerability that can be exploited to the detriment of the 
small state. 
2. Opportunities 
To lessen possible economic vulnerabilities, a smaller state should rely more 
heavily on multilateral economic organizations. As suggested by Michael Handel in Weak 
States in the International System, small states tend to seek protection or rely on 
international organizations to overwatch and impose fair trade regulations.141 For instance, 
after World War II, small states were the most enthusiastic supporters of multilateral 
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economic organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), the World Bank, the European Economic Community (EEC) and its 
successor the European Union (EU). Furthermore, the markets’ globalization allows small 
states to create complex economic relations with other entities, increasing their integration 
in the global economy and subsequently their resilience against external pressures by great 
powers. The EU Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) is an example of how small 
states can make use of this mechanism. Because of the continuing accusations of 
preferential EU trade agreements, the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States 
(ACP) are encouraged to conclude the EPAs in regional groupings.142 Despite critiques 
and  different outcomes of the EPAs, based on the degree of regional specificity, the ACP 
states that showed a higher degree of regional cooperation among them clearly obtained a 
better negotiation outcome relative to the greater power (EU).143 Accordingly, 
membership in a multilateral economic organization and the exploitation of this 
membership in the asymmetrical relationship with a more powerful state is an opportunity 
for the small state. 
Small states can mitigate the negative consequences of their relatively smaller-scale 
economy, and hence, also their limitations in diversifying their exports, by focusing on 
niche products and services. Both small developed and developing countries have found 
niches in the global economy.144 Many examples demonstrate how small states can 
develop unorthodox strategies focusing on specific niche products or services. The flags of 
convenience, started after World War I by small maritime countries, represent 50 percent 
of the commercial world fleet and generate significant revenue for the registered 
countries.145 Other examples of the wide variety of products and services offered by 
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various small states include fishing rights, passports (residence), country codes, domain 
names, satellite slots, and internet gambling platforms.146 Other countries focus on 
advantageous market mechanisms and specific skills or natural resources present in their 
territory thus allowing a small state to establish itself among world leaders in specific areas 
and mitigating the circumstances of their possible smallness in other domains.147 The 
emphasis on specific niche commodities and services allows the small state to increase its 
leverage in those specific markets where its economy can excel; if the malicious great 
power shows a relative degree of interdependence with the small state’s specific market or 
product, the latter can leverage and exploit that interdependence to its advantage. 
The small state’s comparatively small bureaucracy and relative short relational 
distances between policy decision makers, permit S to adapt quickly to new economic 
circumstances. As suggested by Mikko Kautto et al., small states may be swifter and better 
capable of adjusting to international competition and other challenges than non-small 
states.148 There are different ways this adaptability unfolds. While Handel argues that 
small states often withstand economic pressures from more powerful states by shifting 
trade patterns, Katzenstein claims specific corporative governance as a potential key to 
success.149 For instance, a comparative analysis of small European states with neighboring 
regions of larger countries shows that the former eventually achieved better economic 
performance because of the independence and flexibility in defining its economic 
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policies.150 Hence, the adaptability to the challenges arising from a global dynamic 
economic environment may represent an opportunity for the S facing a malicious G. 
D. SOCIETAL 
Societal security refers to the level of equilibrium that exists within a social system 
and is one of the underlying aspects of a state’s security system. The political scientist 
Barry Buzan in his seminal work about societal security People, States and Fear adopts 
societal security as one of the essential components of modern security.151 He argues that 
the security of the state is entangled with the security interests of society’s sub-groups and 
individuals.152 Accordingly, society represents both the reference element and the 
potential actor of societal security. Consequently, the state153 and its citizens are mutually 
and concurrently security suppliers and customers. Endogenous and exogenous sources of 
pressure can cause a disequilibrium within and between the values and environmental 
sources of the two constituent elements, leading to societal conflicts and, if not equalized, 
causing state disruption.154 Therefore, even in the case of a small-state–great-power 
relationship, vulnerabilities and opportunities for a small state’s societal security can be 
generated by its major opponent (exogenous pressure) and by the small state itself 
(endogenous pressure), namely by the small state’s constituent components: the society 
(and its sub-groups) and the state. 
1. Vulnerabilities 
The presence of societal subgroups tied with other countries may be a source of 
social pressure for the small state. Societal sub-groups linked to neighboring countries and 
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diasporas can reduce small-state social homogeneity, introducing substantial and 
increasing differences that can generate pressures and antagonism with other subgroups 
not tied to the neighbor state.155 The Balkans, specifically Kosovo, represents a typical 
example where tensions between ethnic groups supported by neighbor countries can 
endanger state societal security. Another example related to ethnicity and religion is the 
support that the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) received from Malaysian officials 
during the conflict against the Philippine government between 1969 and 1975.156 Even 
though in the Cold War period proxy conflicts were more an expression of competition 
between great powers rather than of a great-power/small-state conflict, the revealed 
principal-agent relationship between the great power and its proxies within the target state 
effectively reflect how a great power could exploit a society subgroup to destabilize the 
societal security of the targeted small state. 
Societal polarization and radicalization can cause devastating effects on the small 
state’s societal security. According to the two economists Esteban Joan and Debraj Ray, 
polarization is the result of the interrelation of within-group identity and across-group 
alienation.157 Social identity theories demonstrate that the social group construct maintains 
collective identities by drawing symbolic boundaries and distinctions between themselves 
and other groups.158 These categorical distinctions based on ethnic origin, religion, 
nativity, and other “societal classifications” can lead to enduring systems of social closure, 
exclusion, and control over the “others,” imprinting patterns of durable inequality within 
the more extensive system’s social structure.159 Social closure understood as the closure 
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of the in-group network to external ties leads to a group’s radicalization.160 Both 
polarization and radicalization have a significant positive relationship within the level of 
conflict.161 At this point, it is necessary to draw a fundamental difference between 
polarization and fractionalization. While a larger number of groups increases 
fractionalization, the same large number decreases polarization, with the highest level of 
polarization by two equally sized groups.162 In the framework of intra-state dynamics, 
societal fractionalization reduces the risk of conflict, while polarization and radicalization 
increase it.163 In the asymmetrical relationship, the great power’s influential support of the 
radicalization of small-state societal sub-groups can affect the internal stability  of the state, 
and in the worst case, may cause disruption of societal security and finally of the political 
system. 
Smaller states are particularly exposed to favoritism and clientelism. In small 
societies there are relatively short ties between groups or individuals, and social 
relationships tend to become more personal.164 This closeness and the relatively increased 
network density enhance the degree of cohesiveness between the elite and its electorate. 
Research on in-group favoritism illuminates a widespread mechanism that fosters trust for 
those on the inside of the circle as well as distrust for outsiders.165 This dynamic between 
elites and their in-group members can blur the notions of ethics and public service, 
potentially facilitating the rise of favoritisms, such as nepotism and clientelism. Different 
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kinds of social delineations can exacerbate these forms of favoritism.166 The small state’s 
inclination toward favoritism has a major implication for its societal security, which is a 
common good of all members of the considered society. Eleonor Ostrom recognizes some 
ideal fundamental principles for governing the allocation of common goods, among these 
the idea that those affected by the rules should have the opportunity to engage in adapting 
those rules, and that there exists a need for a mechanism to match the rules to local needs 
and circumstances.167 Consequently, the presence of favoritism, and the relative tendency 
to include specific members of a group in the participatory rules-setting process while 
excluding others, would undermine the trust the out-group citizens have in the elite. The 
resulting trust erosion is a threat to societal cohesion, undermining the societal security 
equilibrium between citizens and state. 
2. Opportunities 
Social cohesion represents a significant source of resilience for the small state and 
reduces internal insecurity. The political scientist Anton Steen argues that the greater the 
insecurity and the smaller the state, the higher is the elite’s involvement in and 
cohesiveness during the political discussion.168 The resulting strong social cohesion allows 
the small state to adapt quickly to changing circumstances.169 Given a certain level of 
democracy, the readiness and willingness to compromise and to negotiate decisions are 
more pronounced in a small state. For instance, Luxembourg shows a greater ability to 
reach national political consensus than, for instance, France or Britain.170 This enhanced 
predisposition to collaboration is explained by the fact that cohesive groups are more 
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efficient at generating normative, symbolic, and cultural structures. Accordingly, the 
smaller the state, the greater the adaptability in the citizen-state relationship as concerns 
societal security. 
The small state’s ability to integrate the minorities present in its territory is 
positively correlated to its level of social cohesion and, accordingly, to its societal security. 
A national majority’s elite can attempt to include and contain the ambitions and demands 
of minorities’ elites through several policies, relying on ideological appeal, sharing of 
political power, distribution of economic and utilitarian rewards, coercion, or a 
combination of all or some of these.171 The success of these policies depends mainly on 
the interaction between the minorities’ demands, the suitable majority policy response, as 
well as the stimuli from the international environment. The success or failure of this 
interaction will decide whether the integrative process is constructive or disruptive. The 
history of modern Pakistan between the enactment of its constitution in 1947 and 
Bangladesh’s secession in 1971 represents a practical example of a destructive integration 
process.172 On the other hand, the integration of minorities in the Czech Republic and 
Romania during the EU membership entry process shows a successful example of this 
interaction.173 Thus, the successful integration of minorities within its territory represents 
for the small state a significant opportunity to enhance its societal security and to influence 
the asymmetrical relationship with a more powerful state in its favor. 
Societal pluralism can be viable opportunity for a small state to enhance the 
integration of minorities and to increase its resilience against external and internal threats 
to its societal security. The political scientist Robert Dahl refers to organizational pluralism 
as “the existence of a plurality of relatively autonomous (independent) organizations 
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(subsystems) within the domain of a state.”174 Hence, the pluralist system places greater 
emphasis on joint decision making and mutuality of rights and obligations than upon 
majority decisions and majority-minority alternation of power, adapting the political 
system to local societal characteristics and values.175 Another important pluralism tenet is 
the idea of crosscutting affiliation.176 Societal pluralism calls for representation of 
diversity within the same political space, whereby there is deliberate association between 
members and representatives of different groups across in-group boundaries. The more the 
affiliation is crosscutting, the smaller the number of persons who are (or are represented) 
solely in one of the different cleavages; hence, the more difficult it is to build a coalition 
or a potential conflict-group consisting exclusively of individuals who have no link or 
interests with other groups.177 This mechanism represents one of the reasons why, “if 
ethnicity is crosscut by socioeconomic class, geographic region, and religion,” even civil 
war onset is consistently reduced.178 Consequently, societal pluralism is a real opportunity 
for a small state to relax the threat of internal unrest between different social groups that 
could challenge its societal security. 
E. INFORMATIONAL 
Mass media systems are a decisive constituent of state influence and control. As 
argued by Max Weber, state sovereignty represents the legitimate monopoly on the use of 
force.179 Legitimacy arises from the success of the state to induce in its citizens a 
reciprocally-acknowledged right to expect from everyone a behavior conforming to the 
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state’s prescriptions.180 This inductive process and the resulting production of compliance 
rely broadly on the use of communication to produce commitment.181 Accordingly, it is 
not surprising that the political scientist Camber Warren empirically “demonstrates that 
mass media infrastructure represents one of the most powerful forces for peace and 
stability,” producing substantial barriers to mobilization against the state.182 
Consequently, this evidence suggests that mass media represents one of the most dominant 
forces for consistently shaping the informational spectrum to maintain or achieve political 
control over the population and state legitimacy, and hence, state stability.183 The 
following section analyzes small state opportunities and vulnerabilities in the informational 
domain, focusing primarily on mass media. 
1. Vulnerabilities 
The audience of the small state is exposed to the influence of foreign mass media 
to a greater extent than non-small states. The more limited resources of the small-state 
media enterprises induce the mass media home-market to become more exposed to 
transnational influence.184 The more powerful the neighbor country’s media system, the 
higher the risks of its influence on the small-state media environment, especially if that 
neighbor shares the same language.185 This mechanism applies broadly to the press, but in 
particular to broadcasting, since sovereignty in broadcasting is not formally sheltered from 
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effects of foreign television channels via natural “terrestrial spillover,” satellite, and highly 
developed cable networks.186 While small-state media production is often focused on 
appeasing home-market peculiarities and not on producing export-worthy content, media 
productions of larger states tend to be more internationalized to amortize costs by selling 
the product to outside markets.187 Because of this, the probability that a small state’s 
audience consumes media products from larger states’ media is higher than the reverse. 
For instance, small European countries with same-language larger neighbors show a higher 
audience market share of foreign television channels than small countries with specific 
languages; similarly, larger states sharing a smaller neighbor’s language show only 
marginal market sharing (see Figure 2).188  
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Key: AT: Austria; BE/CF: Belgium/Wallonia; BE/VG: Belgium/Flanders; CH/D: 
Switzerland/German-speaking region; CH/F: Switzerland/French-speaking region; CH/I: 
Switzerland/Italian-speaking region; DE: Germany; DK: Denmark; EE: Estonia; ES: 
Spain; FI: Finland; FR: France; GR: Greece; HU: Hungary; IE: Ireland; IT: Italy; LT: 
Lithuania; LU: Luxembourg; LV: Latvia; NO: Norway; SE: Sweden; SI: Slovenia; UK: 
United Kingdom. 
Figure 2. Audience Market Share of Foreign Television Channels, 2004.189  
This language specificity may draw the focus of the small-state audience from the 
small state’s media to the great power’s media, so that, in turn, the great power is better 
positioned to influence the small-state audience by inoculating its narrative and values to 
the small state’s detriment. 
Small-state mass media companies may be taken over by foreign companies, 
decreasing the state’s channels of communication and its means to shape the populace’s 
attitude. Shortage of financial resources or the temptation of higher incomes may instigate 
small states’ mass media companies to commit to joint ventures or even full fusions with 
larger companies from a more powerful country. While for a larger company the 
acquisition of or participation in a smaller state’s mass media enterprise may not represent 
a big deal financially, for the smaller partner the participation may substantially strengthen 
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its financial bases.190 The appropriation by larger foreign companies eventually means a 
considerable loss of domestic control over the media outcomes, which involves a change 
in program structure and content to fit the larger enterprise strategy.191 The risk for the 
small state is to lose control not only over the communication content but also over the 
communication infrastructure and service distribution.192 Consequently, S would not only 
see its narrative overwhelmed by G, but it would also experience rising difficulties in 
accessing the communication system in its territory. In an attempt to regain control, S could 
impose more restrictive media policies, although these carry the risk of undermining media 
freedoms from censorship intervention and over-regulation. 
A lack of governmental support for the public service heightens small state 
vulnerability in terms of the state’s narrative influence and control. The political scientist 
Colin Hay argues that institutionalization of the neo-liberal economic paradigm caused a 
“shift from a normative to a normalized and necessitarian neoliberalism.”193 This shift 
could explain why the socio-political media policy paradigm that emphasizes mostly 
technical and market-focused factors replaced normative concerns about the need for 
democracy and the media’s social responsibility.194 Of course, in the short term, relaxing 
state support to public service—in particular, when previously there was a state 
monopoly—may have positive effects such as the increase of mass media dynamicity and 
service alternatives. Nonetheless, underestimating the role of public service may induce 
the small state to leave some vacuum in the mass media landscape, which in turn can be 
filled by great-power-backed media companies. 
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To protect state legitimacy and induce popular compliance when a small state is 
threatened by a larger state, the small state may need to implement specific media 
regulations. As mentioned previously, mass media in larger countries may face fewer 
obstacles in satisfying their social and cultural responsibilities than those in a smaller one, 
particularly if the small state audience is a segment of a broader language market; under 
these conditions, media regulation seems especially relevant to protect the population 
against foreign influence.195 Increased mass media regulation represents a small state 
opportunity to reduce the vulnerabilities mentioned previously and protect the 
informational environment. Regulatory measures do not ipso facto imply a monopolistic 
state control of the media; specific synergies between the private and the public sector can 
arguably enhance the small-state mass media’s resilience in both media production and 
distribution.196 Regulatory measures do not exclude media diversity; on the contrary, they 
represent a viable way to promote a more interventionist articulation of diversity.197 
Accordingly, media regulation does not only help in protecting the small-state mass media 
environment from outside malicious interventions but also supports further opportunities 
in the informational domain, namely for media diversity. 
Media diversity, especially in a small state, ensures the availability of diverse 
sources and content for a populace, preventing unilateral exploitation of the informational 
spectrum by a more powerful actor. A diversified media environment weakens penetration 
efforts from great powers. The population is already accustomed to specific sources of 
information about aspects of the environment important to them. Accordingly, as the 
sociologist Phillips Davison argues that “to influence behavior under these conditions the 
communicator’s information must be more accurate or otherwise more useful than the data 
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from competing sources.”198 A multitude of communication channels offers an equally 
broad range of options for exploitation and redundancy, which is important particularly in 
the cyber domain, where attributing malicious activities to a source is usually difficult, a 
prominent characteristic of the current informational environment.199 Nonetheless, to 
make people do what the corrupted media says, one must first persuade those people to 
believe what it says.200 The more diverse the sources and the content to which the audience 
is exposed, the more challenging to focus the audience on one specific and redundant 
message. Yet, Internet-based communication allows the formation of virtual communities 
of similarly minded people that offer new and easier methods of spreading 
misinformation.201 Fitting design and appropriate delivering method present the 
fundamental elements for successful communication in order to attain the audience’s 
attention; as such, people from similarly minded communities—albeit virtual one—are an 
easy target for specific tailored messaging.202 Consequently, the small state, parallel to the 
centralized and vertically structured public service apparatus, can exploit media 
diversification to expand its influence in the informational domain in a decentralized, 
horizontal, and relatively inexpensive way. 
The relatively greater orientation to the homeland informational domain allows the 
small state to develop specific and exclusive media products. Productions from smaller 
countries are less exportable because they are too socially specific to appeal to a more 
significant and international audience.203 Nonetheless, a small state’s specific pattern of 
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programming customized to the preferences of its own population may represent a strength 
rather than a weakness. The media scientist Josef Trappel argues that if small states’ 
“national channels succeed in this respect, they would be merely unbeatable by large-scale, 
international-oriented channels;” in particular, in the case of a shared language, small-state 
media may be able to create niche products that appeal to the neighbor population as 
well.204 This would allow reduced influence by the great power over the small state 
through addressing in a more tailored way the small-state population; at the same time it 
would enable the small state to take advantage of its geographic and ethnic vicinity to target 
the great-power neighboring community. 
F. DOES GEOGRAPHY MATTER? 
One of the most widely accepted traits of world politics is the anarchy that 
underlines the system of international relations between states; however, these relations 
occur within a whole closed network composed of all the states present in the world and 
their relationships (or ties)—namely, the international state system.205 As already widely 
demonstrated by social network scholars, the position of an actor within a network 
influences that actor’s ability to exercise power and influence over other members of the 
network.206 Although in social network studies the location is not understood as the 
geographical position, the application of this science in international relations  
demonstrates that geolocation is one of the components that can affect an actor’s position 
within a network, and hence, a state actor’s ability to exercise power and influence within 
its international relations network.207 
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The geographical closeness of states influences their relations. Brantly Womack 
contends that “locatedness” of interests is a fundamental characteristic of a state’s 
asymmetric relationship.208 As a distinct level of analysis, moving from the international 
system as a whole into the region, it is possible to observe that security-relevant events 
originating from a specific geographic area tend to influence the regional set of states to a 
greater extent than other states outside the area.209 Tom Long argues that “proximity is 
likely to matter” and that “extra-regional and regional asymmetrical relationships might 
differ in consistent ways.”210 States, to maintain the regional order, manage their security 
in different ways, from the dominance of a regional power to balance of power, from 
regional power agreements to collective security organizations.211 Regardless of its 
typology, the regional security system depends on the regional power, and in particular, its 
self-perceptions as a regional power and the perceptions of the other states in the region.212 
Thus, the geographical position in a specific world-region and the related presence of 
regional power and its attitude, as well as the attitude of the other states toward the former, 
influences every state located in that region. 
The closer states are, the more likely their interests are tied. Understood as territory 
and population, a state has interests that are linked explicitly with its location and populace. 
Neighbor states will also have a territory and population with their own interests that, 
because of proximity, will be more likely tied with the first state than with the interests of 
another country far away. Hence, geographical proximity between states has a direct 
impact on the interests and relationship these states share. For instance, Belgium and 
France will have more shared interests than Belgium and China because the first two share 
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a regional neighborhood. Therefore, the geographical proximity of two states reinforces 
their asymmetrical relationship, having important implications for a country that is close 
to a more powerful state. 
The proximity of a great power influences different domains of the small state. In 
her seminal work, Annette Fox argues that the geographic location of the small states she 
analyzed had a significant influence on their involvement in World War II.213 Other 
scholars argue that small states’ vulnerabilities increase with their closeness to a greater 
power’s sphere of influence.214 More recent studies go beyond vulnerabilities as the only 
characteristic of the small-state–great-power relationship. The proximity of more powerful 
countries can influence the foreign policy of small nations as described by studies on Latin 
American international relations that, exploring the foreign policy of small powers in the 
proximity of a more powerful one, find that autonomy is a central policy goal of those 
small states.215 Another example is Luxembourg: its geopolitical environment and 
historical experiences make it particularly aware of the proximity of more powerful states, 
influencing in a significant way its foreign policy decisions.216 Similarly, proximity with 
Russia was eventually Lithuania’s main argument for joining NATO, and for Finland to 
keep its neutrality. These examples indicate that small states facing a systemic challenge 
from a more powerful state nearby respond in numerous ways based on the hegemonic 
power’s behavior, the small state’s internal political dynamics, politicians’ individual 
choices, as well as historical circumstances.217 This fact underlines the influence of 
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geography and specifically the small state’s proximity to a great power, which exposes the 
former to the influence of the latter more so and encourages the latter to exert that influence. 
G. THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
Given the characteristics of the hybrid threat exposed in Chapter II, an analysis of 
the small-state–great-power asymmetrical relationship based on single factors, linear 
modeling, and regression or game theory reductionist approaches is destined to fail. 
Systems thinking, however, is “a scientific field of knowledge for understanding change 
and complexity through the study of dynamic cause and effect over time,”218 and as such, 
is inherent to complexity theory. Complexity theory or the science of complex systems 
stretches over many disciplines including the sciences.219 Thus, a systems-thinking 
approach may help to capture the complexity of the hybrid threat in a holistic way. But, 
why should we study the hybrid threat as a complex system? And what are complex 
systems? Before presenting the systems model that is applied in the case studies to explore 
the small state’s opportunities and vulnerabilities, it is necessary to answer the two previous 
questions, starting with the latter. 
Complex systems are mutually influencing multilayer networks and are highly 
sensitive to initial conditions. A system can be considered complex if its constitutive 
elements (or agents) meet at least the following criteria: diversity, connection, 
interdependence, and adaptation; and if the system as such usually shows non-linear and 
emergence behaviors.220 In a complex system, diverse elements vary in kind and number, 
and they interact with the other individual components and with the system as a whole, 
creating interdependence, especially mutual influence, whether intentional or not.221 These 
mutual interactions, which can be of different types and may change over time, may cause 
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adaptation of the constitutive elements, their network, and even of the system as a 
whole.222 These adaptations can lead to emergent phenomena. Emergence is a 
phenomenon whereby aggregate system behavior arises from the localized elements’ 
behavior.223 The neuro-anthropologist Terrence Deacon describes three levels of 
emergence.224 First order emergence occurs when individual localized behavior 
aggregates into system behavior disconnected from its origin.225 For instance, the 
properties of water emerge from the relations among its constitutive molecules but are not 
the properties of the same molecules in isolation. Second order emergence, also called self-
organization, occurs when a system’s spatial pattern or structure emerge and change over 
time even though the individual behavior rules of its constituents are constant; an example 
of this phenomenon is a birds’ flock.226 Third order emergence, also called phase transition 
or tipping points, involves radical changes of kind in the system. This event occurs when 
endogenous forces of the system or exogenous forces are not properly balanced out, so they 
accumulate and reach a critical threshold, causing an abrupt change in the macro-level 
properties of the system.227 The emergence’s dynamics may cause non-linear 
relationships; that is to say, “if the value(s) of the causal elements change by any given 
amount, it is possible to predict the change in the value of the dependent element.”228 In 
other words, we know the function, regardless of how complicated it may be, which exactly 
relates the dependent variable with its independent constituents. Given these complex 
systems’ characteristics, are there some commonalities between them and those of the 
hybrid threat? 
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The characteristic of the hybrid threat (HT) shows many commonalities with those 
of a complex system. Referring to the hybrid threat’s features highlighted in Chapter II, the 
HT system meets the conditions to be defined as a complex system (Table 1). The 
application of multiple instruments of statecraft and the related combination of various 
actors involved satisfy the characteristic of diversity. The actions and interactions of these 
constitutive elements of the HT system are linked in the achievement of specific goals, 
meeting the connection criteria. In particular, the non-military means of statecraft show a 
high degree of interdependence.229 The instrument of statecraft and its related actors adapt 
themselves according to the other system’s constituents (both its own and an opponent’s 
actors), the output of the HT system as a whole (achieved results), and the supra-system 
(international environment). The HT system’s constitutive elements meet the criteria of 
diversity, connection, interdependence, and adaptation; hence, the HT system can be 
considered a complex system. 
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Table 1. HT System and Complex System’s Characteristics Combination. 
Hybrid Threat’s characteristics Complex System’s characteristicsa 
To attain linear (first order) and non-linear (second and third order) synergetic effects, 
in achieving specific objectives, it shows an integrated design of simultaneous, 
synchronized, and adaptive uses of multiple instruments of power along the political, 
military, economical, societal, and informational (PMESI) continuum. 
Constituent: Diversity, connection, 
interdependence, adaptation. 
System: Non-linearity 
To exploit the characteristics of the adversary society, it targets specific physical and 
psychological vulnerabilities across the full spectrum of societal functions, generating 
ambiguity, compulsion, coercion, or a combination of these. 
Constituent: Diversity, adaptation. 
System: Emergence, non-linearity 
To maintain the initiative, hinder the adversary decision-making process, and avoid 
counterproductive bursts of force, it applies strategic gradualism of escalation and de-
escalation through a combination of the salami-slicing approach and fait accompli. 
Constituent: Adaptation. 
System: -- 
To avoid military confrontation and blur the continuum between peace and war, it is 
mostly non-military in nature, applying military means only in the case where the 
strategic environment allows it. 
Constituent: interdependence 
System: Non-linearity 
To bypass the international or national norm system, overcome the lack of capabilities 
and reduce the socio-economic costs, it mixes or combines—in a networked principal-
agent relationship—endogenous and exogenous state or non-state entities. 
Constituent: Diversity, connection, 
interdependence, adaptation. 
System: Non-linearity 
   a Referred to the constituent characteristics as well as the system characteristics as a whole. 
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Furthermore, the HT system shows elements of emergence and non-linearity. 
Through the application of a measure in a time-space defined physical domain, it is possible 
to observe outcomes in the psychological domain on a larger time-space scale. For instance, 
on December 23, 2015, the three-hour-long cyber-attack on seven substations of the 
Ukrainian power grid, impacted not only portions of the distribution grid, causing the loss 
of power of 225,000 customers, but also had nation-wide consequences in the 
informational domain.230 This is clear proof that, concerning hybrid threats, the macro 
outcome differs from the micro input not just in scale but also in kind, demonstrating the 
effect of emergence. 
Given the fact that the hybrid threat is a complex system, applying a systems 
thinking approach to small-state vulnerabilities and opportunities substantially facilitates 
understanding the behavior of the HT system. Systems thinking allows exploration of the 
asymmetrical relation as a whole, and the behavior of its constituent elements: the agents 
(the actors related to the PMESI domains) and the principals (the small state and the great 
power). This enhanced understanding should enable the author to recognize emergent paths 
of opportunities and vulnerabilities, as well as feedback that may alter the dynamics of the 
system,231 allowing the proposal of potential measures for changing the system’s dynamic 
in favor of the small state. 
This model considers the small-state political power as the dependent variable. 
Political power refers to a state’s “capacity to achieve intended effects.”232 This is 
regardless of whether the power sources are intrinsic (from endogenous assets), derivative 
(drawing from the relations with another state), or collective (from the network with other 
countries).233 The opportunities and vulnerabilities explored in the previous section build 
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the independent variables of the system. The assumption is that, given the asymmetrical 
relationship, S will try to capitalize on its opportunities, while G will exploit S’s 
vulnerabilities (respective to the second hybrid threat’s characteristics). 
The author is aware that modeling, as the philosopher and sociologist Edgar Morin 
argues, restricts the complexity, blurring “the relation of the whole-part mutual 
implication.”234 Nonetheless, modeling allows a certain degree of formalization, without 
focusing on small, linear, and discipline-oriented relationships between phenomena as in 
the traditional reductionist approach. Accordingly, systems thinking implies that the 
constituents of the system, in this case, the vulnerabilities, opportunities, and the related 
actors, must be considered dynamically in terms of processes. The variables’ interaction 
can be positive, negative, or neutral.235 The interactions are not independent and may 
generate feedback loops or cycles that play a fundamental role in system stability.236 
Feedback loops are generally classified in positive (also reinforcing) cycles, which amplify 
the changes leading to instability; and, negative (or balancing) cycles, which absorb the 
change and thus stabilize the system.237 In the HT model presented in Figure 3 feedback 
loops are not yet present. The analysis of the cases studies will allow the recognition of the 
emergence of feedback cycles and the relative impact on the system. 
With the analytical framework defined, it is now time to apply it to the selected 
case studies to explore the small state’s opportunities and vulnerabilities, and to identify 
trends when a small state faces a great power’s hybrid threat. The temporal amplitude 
should allow one to assess whether the characteristics of the hybrid threat can be observed 
even before its formal conceptualization. The differentiation of the great powers and small-
state actors should permit the formulation and evaluation of possible strategies. 
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Figure 3. Hybrid Threat System 
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IV. GUATEMALA 1944–1954 
On June 27, 1954 the Guatemalan president Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán was 
overthrown during a US-backed coup d’état; however, the events of June 1954 were rooted 
in the Guatemalan Revolution of 1944. 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND  
In the spring of 1944, a series of protests initiated by students and further 
augmented by teachers, lawyers and other professionals, as well an important part of 
Guatemalan society and elites, forced the president-dictator Jorge Ubico Castañeda to 
resign on July 1, 1944. When army generals wanted to seize the opportunity to rise to 
power, young army officers backed by the armed populace prevented the establishment of 
a military dictatorship, which marked the beginning of the Guatemalan Revolution. Even 
though the revolution broke the corrupt and repressive oligarchic system that had reigned 
in Guatemala for almost seventy years, the economy and, most importantly, the social 
structure remained untouched.238 The elected president Juan José Arévalo did not disrupt 
the traditional latifundista (landowner) land-tenure system and avoided agrarian reform. 
He focused on moderate social-reform programs, such as the new constitution’s social 
guarantees, freedom of speech and the press, social security law, educational system 
improvement, and the labor code.239 While advancing the ideas of the 1944 revolution, 
supporting the lower and middle classes in urban areas, and more broadly improving the 
conditions of the working class, the Arévalo presidency did not undermine the fundamental 
interests of U.S. companies. 
Despite being moderate, Arévalo’s reforms represented a change in the status quo 
ante revolution that did not please the most prominent foreign landowner and agrarian 
monopolist, the American-owned United Fruits Company (UFCO), nor did it please the 
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Guatemalan upper class or the ruling elites of Guatemala’s neighbor countries. For the 
UFCO, the labor code was a deliberate attack aimed at the company, and accordingly, the 
Guatemalan government had to adapt or remove it.240 In summer 1947, UFCO began to 
lobby various offices of the U.S. government to pressure the Guatemalan leadership into 
changing the legislation, alleging communist infiltration into Guatemala.241 United Fruits 
Company and its lobbyists were aware of the deep fear of communist expansion that 
permeated American foreign and internal policy makers at that time; exploiting this fear, 
the company employed this narrative with U.S. government officials. 
The conservative upper class, closely tied to the Guatemalan Catholic Church led 
by Archbishop Mariano Rossell y Arellano, condemned Arévalo’s labor reforms as 
“communist” because in the upper class view the reforms undermined the current social 
order and endangered “the Catholic sensibilities of our [the Guatemalan] people.”242 The 
opposition of the Guatemalan elite during this period was divided; its activities were 
limited to accusations of communism published in the local media that fed the UFCO 
narrative about the alleged rising communist threat in Guatemala. 
Neighbor countries began to accuse the Guatemalan government of shifting to 
communism. Fearful that Arévalo’s reforms could awaken similar requests from their own 
populations, the neighboring authoritarian elites of Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras 
also pressed U.S. officials with allegations about the communist shift in the Guatemalan 
government and the possible implications for the security of the region.243 While the 
Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza actively exchanged with Guatemalan 
counterrevolutionaries and asked the United States for support in the counterrevolutionary 
enterprise, the Honduran and Salvadoran regime of Juan Manuel Gálvez and Oscar Osorio 
periodically reported to U.S. officials the alleged communist infiltration from 
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Guatemala.244 These accusations did nothing but foment the distorted image that the 
American government had of Guatemala and its changes since the revolution of 1944. 
Accordingly, by the late 1940s, U.S. leadership saw Guatemala as a country 
plagued by communists. After his arrival in Guatemala in 1948, the U.S. Ambassador 
Richard Patterson—being susceptible to allegations of communist influence—aligned 
quickly with the point of view of UFCO, the senior embassy staff, and finally the American 
Republics Area (ARA) of the State Department.245 Additionally, the opinion of the U.S. 
government was framed by influential politicians such as Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and 
propaganda luminary Edward Bernays, both enlisted by the UFCO: the first to shape the 
political environment in a direct way, the latter to design a specific media propaganda 
campaign to discredit the Arévalo government.246 All this misinformation led the Truman 
administration to implement pressure measures: in 1949 it imposed an embargo on U.S. 
military equipment; then in 1950 it excluded Guatemala from its new Point Four technical 
assistance program and blocked a World Bank Loan that Arévalo had requested.247 
While they increased the pressure on Arévalo’s government, these measures were 
not designed for his overthrow. Under the Truman administration, the State Department 
and in particular its Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, which in this specific case had 
primary responsibility for policy implementation, was firmly opposed to any suggestion of 
intervention in Guatemala.248 Furthermore, Arévalo accepted the reality that geopolitically 
Guatemala was tied to the United States.249 Moreover, U.S. Intelligence reports indicated 
as likely winner of the 1950 election the middle-class army officer and minister of defense 
Jacobo Arbenz, backed by the conservative army, who would have reversed Arévalo’s 
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reforms and drifted the revolution rightward with a “determined anti-communist 
policy.”250 Accordingly, the Truman administration remained patient until March 1951 
when President Arévalo’s term ended. 
Despite the U.S. government’s expectations, Arbenz turned the revolution 
leftwards, increasing pressure on U.S. leadership and finally compelling it to intervene. 
The new president intended to confront two deep-seated interests left untouched by the 
previous administration: foreign monopolies and the landowner oligarchy.251 
Accordingly, Arbenz started new public projects like the new port on the Atlantic Coast to 
gain control over maritime export and import monopolized by the UFCO: the “Highway to 
the Atlantic” to lessen the transportation’s monopoly held by the International Railways of 
Central America (IRCA); and finally, to break the American monopoly on electricity, a 
state-run hydroelectric plant to commercialize cheaper energy.252 
Despite being more than legitimate, and pursuing a capitalistic approach of market 
competition rather than a communist approach of nationalization and control planning, all 
these projects undermined the established order as well as past and future American 
interests and investments. Furthermore, they fueled hostile feelings of UFCO toward the 
Guatemalan government and the resulting measures undertaken by the company to 
discredit it in the eyes of the U.S. government. As Arbenz argued in front of the 
Guatemalan Congress in 1952, the Agrarian Reform was “the most important pragmatic 
point of [his] government and of the revolutionary movement of October [1944].”253 The 
agrarian reform legislated as Decree 900, and enacted on June 27, 1952, demonstrated from 
the beginning its implementation problems. First, the law contemplated the expropriation 
of idle land from holdings of over 223 acres and its redistribution to eligible recipients, and 
so it further widened the already existent rift between the government, the wealthy upper 
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class of the ladino latifundistas, and the largest landowner in Guatemala, UFCO. Second, 
violent actions between the interested parties took over; finqueros (farm owners) 
determined to defend their property from expropriation reacted violently against the 
peasants who received the farmers’ expropriated land; conversely, impatient peasants, 
encouraged by leftist radicals, initiated spontaneous and sometimes violent land 
occupations.254 The agrarian reform further catalyzed the activities of the UFCO in 
discrediting the Guatemalan government and lobbying for a U.S. intervention, at the same 
time it brought to the surface the social tension created by the October revolution but 
remained dormant or only at a rhetorical level until that moment. 
Despite Arbenz lacking communist imprinting, as argued by historians Jim Handy 
and Stephen Schlesinger, his strong ties with Guatemalan communists and their 
disproportionate influence on his decision making suggested to external observers a robust 
communist influence on the Guatemalan presidency. As demonstrated by the political 
scientist Piero Gleijeses, Arbenz and his influential wife María started to create strong ties 
with Guatemalan communists by the late 1940s.255 In particular one man, José Manuel 
Fortuny, who in 1948 became the secretary general of Vanguardia Democrática—the 
precursor organization to Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT)—grew close to 
Arbenz; he wrote Arbenz’s speeches during the 1950s campaign and finally became the 
most senior personal counsel of Arbenz during his presidency, helping him in the redaction 
of the agrarian reform.256 The Communist party as such had a marginal function within 
the Guatemalan government.257 Nonetheless, the fact that its most influential members 
were personal advisers to the president and some of its members held highly visible 
positions in the administration did nothing but support the narrative of those who accused 
Arbenz of communist drift. 
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In the early 1950s, many officials in the U.S. State Department, Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) and Pentagon considered all communists as Soviet agents. Immediately after 
World War II, the threat of Soviet expansion became the most feared threat in the Western 
world and shaped U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. government saw containment of this threat 
as the primary goal of its foreign policy strategy.258 Accordingly, Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) officials regarded Guatemala as a potential beachhead for Soviet expansion 
in the western hemisphere.259 Moreover, proximity justified even more energetic measures 
to secure the United States’ backyard from a communist penetration. The Truman 
administration, however, was divided over the threat posed by Arbenz; the State 
Department warned about the risk that covert actions posed to U.S. policy in Central and 
South America, while the CIA saw the alleged communist penetration as sufficiently grave 
by 1952 to justify a covert action program.260 Doubts were swept away on May 1952 when 
the government put into effect the Decree 900. 
The economic and political measures undertaken by the U.S. State Department had 
produced poor results in changing Guatemalan policies; for this reason, the CIA was tasked 
to develop a plan to support Arbenz’s overthrow. Truman policy toward Arbenz until 
spring 1952 was analogous to that adopted with Arévalo in 1940s: diplomatic pressure 
supported by denial of economic aid.261 The CIA was skeptical about the results of these 
measures; hence, in early 1952, its director Walter Bedell Smith tasked the CIA’s Western 
Hemisphere Division to find dissidents willing, with the help of other Central American 
countries, to overthrow Arbenz.262 During the summer of 1952, the CIA intensified 
exchanges with the Nicaraguan dictator Somoza and its protégé the Guatemalan army 
officer in exile Castillo Armas to coordinate the plan for covert intervention called 
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Operation PBFORTUNE that received White House authorization in September 1952.263 
The plan called for a CIA-backed invasion by counterrevolutionary forces led by Castillo 
Armas, supported by dissatisfied Guatemalan army’s senior officers, UFCO (arms 
delivery), as well as neighbor countries.264 In October 1952, though, following the 
intervention of the Department of State, and in particular by its head Dean Acheson, 
President Truman called off the plan.265 The CIA did not have to wait long to find more 
fertile ground in the following administration. 
The Eisenhower presidency, determined to show its resolve against the communist 
threats, supported and approved the covert operation that would bring the overthrow of 
Arbenz. During the first half of 1953, many signals increasingly pressured the new 
administration to approve intervention in Guatemala. On February 18, in a National 
Security Council meeting, the CIA director argued that the communist threat in Guatemala 
was about to bring crisis to the region; in April after his visit in Guatemala, the Assistant 
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs John Moors Cabot reported to the president 
that Arbenz was not open to policy changes; on May 19 the National Intelligence Estimate 
(NIE) concluded that the political situation in Guatemala “is averse to U.S. interests.”266 
Moreover, in July 1953 after his return from a fact-finding mission in Guatemala, 
Eisenhower’s brother and adviser, Milton Eisenhower, argued that Guatemala “has 
succumbed to communist infiltration.”267 Finally, the assessment presented during the 
National Security Council of August 19, 1953, warned that “the U.S. present position in 
Guatemala is progressively deteriorating … [and that] ultimate communist control of the 
country and elimination of American economic interests is the logical outcome … 
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[meaning] a policy of inaction would be suicidal.”268 Consequently, the Eisenhower 
administration decided to reanimate the CIA’s covert action plan to overthrow Arbenz and 
expand it into a comprehensive exploitation through different means of statecraft.269 
Operation PBSUCCESS would combine all of the tactics proven useful in previous covert 
operations. 
B. PMESI VULNERABILITIES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
The domestic institutional changes represented the most striking vulnerability in 
the political domain. Arbenz’s agrarian reform was the most severe challenge to the system 
of political closeness. After its implementation, the different social groups were further 
polarized, and despite the possibility of the reform uniting cross-ethnic and cross-class 
interests, the fact that it was discredited and finally perceived as a product of communist 
thought fueled polarization and disrupted social cohesion within the population and distrust 
among the elites.270 The leaders of the revolutionary party considered the agrarian reform 
premature and too radical, in addition, they were neither informed, involved, nor consulted 
during the draft redaction; their complaints were supported by the claims of the Asociación 
General de Agricoltura (AGA), which claimed to “reject the communist origin of the 
project.”271 The lack of integration of most political parties and the landowner elite was 
an essential sign of the decreasing trust among the elite of the country. A segment of the 
army officer corps feared that the Arévalo and Arbenz reforms would cause a decrease in 
budget for the army and increased chaos in the society.272 The latter especially could 
become true after the agrarian reform and internal conflict that rose between landowners 
and peasants impatient to receive their land. The fact that Arbenz tasked one of his friends, 
a self-professed communist, Víctor Manuel Gutiérrez to be the intermediary between the 
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president and local land reforms officials only exacerbated the impression of favoritism 
toward communist representatives.273 This process further undermined the trust between 
the administration and the elite. These divisions and the resulting polarization and 
radicalization disrupted the possibility for an organized opposition able to restraint 
Arbenz’s behavior or offer the United States the option for a peaceful change.274 The 
resulting decrease of crosscutting social elements undermined societal pluralism. 
Another consequence of the institutional changes created by the agrarian reform 
was the increasing isolation of Guatemala. The governments of Nicaragua, Honduras, El 
Salvador, and the Dominican Republic opposed Arbenz and were decisive in convincing 
the U.S. government that Arbenz was dangerous and needed to be removed.275 This 
negative attitude further weakened the poor Guatemalan diplomatic network pushing 
Guatemala to rely on its membership in supranational organizations but forcing it into 
greater dependence on the same international organizations. This effect came into play a 
couple of times during PBSUCCESS. The first time was in March 1954, the negative 
attitude of Guatemala’s neighbor was exploited by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles 
during the Inter-American Conference in Caracas in order to further isolate Guatemala 
from the Pan-American international community.276 The impressive speech of the 
Guatemalan foreign minister Guillermo Toriello accusing the United States of supporting 
the overthrow of the Arbenz government caused a change in the final conference 
resolution. Nonetheless, the United States achieved its goal of further fueling the feeling 
of isolation among the Guatemalan leadership.277 
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A further example is Toriello’s request to the United Nation Security Council 
(UNSC) on June 19, 21 and 22, of that year to intervene to stop the ongoing aggression and 
to help in resolving the crisis.278 On June 20 the council approved a French motion 
enjoining all member nations to refrain from supporting the insurgency.279 Despite the first 
signs of support from the UNSC, the intervention of the American president, the European 
allies, and members of the UNSC on the one hand, and the work of the American envoy 
Henry Cabot Lodge and members of the Security Council on the other, the UNSC 
abandoned plans of undertaking concrete measures to stop the invasion.280 The events in 
Caracas and by the UNSC show on the one hand how Guatemala tried to exploit the 
membership of supranational organizations; on the other, they bring to light the dependence 
a small state has on international organizations. 
Membership in international organizations can also foster unexpected 
consequences. At the beginning of June 1954 rumors spread (allegedly generated by the 
United States) that the United States was envisaging a special Organization of American 
States (OAS) conference to vote on sanctions against Guatemala, and U.S. journals argued 
that a majority of the Latin American Republics supported the sanctions.281 Guatemalan 
leadership was very troubled that they were neither integrated into the preparative 
discussions nor knew the content of the sanctions. This fact eventually fueled tensions 
among government officials and mistrust of the internal opposition who was continually 
attacking the president and its entourage, compelling the government to suspend the 
constitutional guarantees on June 8.282 The introduction of censorship coupled with 
increasing arrests further fed the opposition’s radicalization and the international claim of 
authoritarian drift. 
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Arbenz did not seize the characteristics of the strategic environment, failing to adapt 
his policy accordingly. That Arévalo was widely denounced in the United States as pro-
Communist despite his explicitly anti-communism platform was an early sign of 
Washington’s unreliable faith in even a pro-American government in Guatemala. Arbenz 
should have caught the U.S. belligerency and should not have further pushed domestic 
institutional changes.283 It is incorrect to define the Arbenz Government as communist but 
his actions, in the light of the Cold War-shaped strategic environment, were a clear 
provocation to those who were moved by anti-communist ideology. Cullather supports this 
argument arguing that CIA officials judged the situation through the global pattern of 
communist activities instead of seeing the events in a historical Guatemalan context.284 
The lack of adaptability polarized and radicalized Guatemalan society and exposed the 
government to armed confrontation. 
Guatemala’s military vulnerabilities were exacerbated by the U.S. operation but 
also by critical internal vulnerabilities. Guatemala was not a member of any military 
alliances, and so when on June 1954 the group of insurgents led by Armas pushed into 
Guatemala neither Arbenz nor his army could count on external help. The institutional 
changes initialized by Arévalo and accelerated by Arbenz significantly catalyzed other 
vulnerabilities. Internal violent conflicts arose within the frustrated opposition, formed by 
the upper-class, Catholic groups, anti-revolutionary activists, and landowners on one side, 
and the lower-class and peasants in the countryside on the other. This violent spiral led to 
polarization and radicalization among the different societal groups. The CIA plan had the 
foresight to unify the most influential of Arbenz’s opponents, to increase pressure on 
Arbenz and finally overthrow him via the surest option, a military coup.285 Accordingly, 
the U.S. government first needed to weaken the significant support Arbenz had from the 
army. 
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The CIA knew that army compliance was mainly based on the government’s ability 
to provide it the necessary military capabilities. In 1949 and 1951 the Truman 
administration restricted U.S. military equipment sales to Guatemala as a warning to the 
Guatemalan Armed Forces that the United States was dissatisfied with Arévalo’s politics. 
The CIA identified the Guatemalan army as the center of gravity of the Arbenz presidency, 
and for this reason the operation was designed to target mainly the army by preventing 
Guatemala from importing arms and other materials, undermining Arbenz’s efforts to keep 
his officers content.286 In 1953, the U.S. Department of Defense interfered aggressively to 
prevent arms transfer deals between Guatemala and Canada, Germany, and Rhodesia.287 
Consequently, by the end of the same year, Guatemala was no longer able to buy military 
equipment of any kind; this fact worried the military leadership, who observed a vast flow 
of equipment into Nicaragua and Honduras, and saw its small arsenal jeopardized by the 
tasks in the countryside due to security issues related to the land reform decree.288 Hence, 
the institutional changes caused a degradation of military capabilities, which were already 
put under pressure by internal violent conflicts. The precarious capabilities situation, the 
influence of the U.S. mission in Guatemala, Arbenz’s support for the PGT, and his 
friendship with senior communist leaders all pushed the military away from Arbenz.289 
The distancing of the army leadership from Arbenz did nothing but increase the distrust 
within the Guatemalan elite and undermined the opportunity for robust civil-military 
integration. 
Arbenz’s attempts to leverage opportunities in the military domain were 
undermined by Guatemala’s internal dynamics and by U.S. intervention. Arbenz’s reliance 
on multilateral security arrangements like the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal 
Assistance or OAS proved ineffective because of U.S. influence efforts aimed at other 
member states, which were facilitated by the hostility of Guatemalan’s neighbor countries. 
Although nearly thirty coup attempts occurred during the Arévalo presidency, the army 
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remained the unchallenged organization in maintaining social order and defending the 
country. Accordingly, there were no civilian security forces ready to step on the president’s 
side when the army compelled him to resign the June 25, 1954. Arbenz and his entourage 
understood the shifting attitude of the army and tried, unsuccessfully, to organize a popular 
militia of laborers and peasants.290 Facing an international arms embargo, Arbenz 
clandestinely tried to import Czech weapons and ammunition for his militia. Unfortunately 
for him, information about the cargo’s arrival leaked to the army, which then confiscated 
the weapons. This failed attempt to acquire military equipment from an Eastern Bloc 
country only enhanced the narrative of international communist interference, further 
fueling the mistrust and societal polarization, undermining Guatemalan social cohesion. 
The United States’ measures to target Guatemala’s economic vulnerabilities did not 
have a decisive influence. Guatemala was primarily an agrarian state, and hence relied 
extensively on imports to sustain its common goods needs. By 1952–1953, 85 percent of 
Guatemalan coffee exports, which alone made up 80 percent of all exports, and 83.2 
percent of all exports went to the United States, while 62.9 percent of all imports originated 
from there.291 Accordingly, it is not surprising that this dependency on strategic imports 
and the limited export diversification became the target of U.S. pressure. A group of high-
level U.S. entrepreneurs were tasked to cut Guatemalan export earnings and create critical 
imports’ shortfalls by exercising covert economic pressure.292 UFCO, willing to reverse 
the labor code and in particular the agrarian reform, supported the U.S. government in its 
enterprise and changed their policy toward the Guatemalan government, becoming 
instrumental in the U.S. sanctions architecture.293 By contrast, the CIA and its planners, 
counter to the views of many U.S. senior politicians and government officers, did not see 
economic sanctions as an effective strategy.294 The U.S. cut off direct financial assistance, 
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excluded Guatemala from the Point Four Program, and stopped development loans from 
the World Bank, but did not substantially undermine the Guatemalan economy. Hence, the 
dependency on strategic imports was more accentuated in the acquisition of military 
equipment rather than in civilian goods, and the changes in U.S. trade policy while putting 
some pressure on Arbenz government did not compel a change in Arbenz policy. 
The Arbenz government, focused on the implementation of its reforms, was not 
able to exploit economic opportunities. After the U.S. sanctions in 1951, the Guatemalan 
government refused to conform to some World Bank recommendations, becoming an 
isolated entity in the international credit community.295 Arbenz’s steadfast rejection of 
external requests such as this reduced his ability to obtain help from multilateral economic 
organizations to relax U.S. economic sanctions. The only element that avoided a critical 
increase in economic sanctions was Guatemala’s position in the international coffee 
market, in particular from the U.S. perspective. In March 1954, at the OAS conference in 
Caracas, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles failed to orchestrate an embargo on 
Guatemalan coffee, because UFCO executives warned that the burden of paying for such 
sale restrictions would fall on American consumers.296 In this case, the focus on the niche 
product of coffee proved to be a critical if undeliberate element that prevented Guatemala 
from further malicious economic sanctions. 
President Arbenz’s reforms and strong ties with Guatemalan communists 
exacerbated societal vulnerabilities present in the Guatemalan society. The agrarian and 
social reforms were supposed to ameliorate conditions for the broad underprivileged lower-
class workers both in rural and urban areas. However, the rapidity and in some areas the 
abrupt implementation of the reforms did nothing but fuel polarization and radicalization 
of the revolution’s skeptical social sub-groups, which saw their privileges put at stake.297 
The administration of Decree 900 included expropriation and attribution of land in ways 
that ignored local needs and sometimes exploited the reform to pursue the administrators’ 
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own ambitions.298 These procedures gave birth to favoritism, further polarizing the rifts 
among peasants and Mayan Indian land workers and white Ladino landowners.299 This 
ultimately empowered indigenous leaders who disregarded the old order and embraced the 
government idea of pluralization and secularization of local politics, thus threatening 
traditional local authorities. 
Consequently, the section of the population that sought to contain the effects of the 
1944 revolution were increasingly deeply dissatisfied by the Arbenz reforms and became 
progressively prone to the U.S. influence. In The Last Colonial Massacre historian Greg 
Grandin explores the experiences of numerous members of the Guatemalan society, 
revealing the failed attempt of minority integration initialized by the Arbenz reforms.300 
The misapplication of the agrarian reform decisively hindered the integration of Indian 
minorities into peasant society. Furthermore, the strong and mostly hermetical social 
horizontal and vertical divisions made it necessarily impossible to achieve any form of 
societal pluralism.301 
The United States massively exploited Guatemala’s informational vulnerabilities, 
creating decisive conditions for Arbenz’s overthrow. The negative propaganda campaign 
against the Guatemalan government was initialized by UFCO already during the Arevalo 
government. This campaign was later enlarged and intensified by the CIA.302 The 
escalating year-long campaign of rumors and propaganda weakened and demoralized 
government supporters and created dissension in the society, fueling polarization, 
undermining social cohesion, and eroding trust within the elite. For instance, the United 
States Information Agency (USIA) propagated stories throughout Latin America about 
Guatemalan communist drift; the U.S. media screamed about the communist danger in 
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Guatemala; CIA-backed pamphlets distributed in Guatemala encouraged suspicion within 
the military apparatus, alarming and polarizing the middle and upper classes.303 The 
massive influence not only created the illusion of organized and robust opposition against 
Arbenz but also of a dramatic spiral toward an inevitable confrontation with the United 
States which pushed potential Arbenz supporters into becoming only inert spectators.304 
Accordingly, it is arguable that the U.S. influence campaign decreased the probability of a 
popular uprising and profoundly affected the morale of the Guatemalan armed forces. 
The CIA campaign was not only planned to shape the informational environment 
from abroad but also envisaged the information take-over within Guatemala. The CIA, with 
the support of local opposition members and the Roman Catholic Church, started to 
distribute flyers and pamphlets spreading lies about the agrarian reform and inculcating 
mistrust within the Guatemalan elite.305 On May 1, 1954, Radio Voz de la Liberación went 
on air; the alleged rebels’ radio broadcast represented the last and eventually decisive piece 
of the information campaign puzzle, spreading anti-government propaganda and arguing 
an imminent revolt.306 The public service in Guatemala at that time was very fragile, the 
government did not have an official newspaper, and in the last month before the overthrow, 
the only one supporting Arbenz was the Tribuna Popular, the communist official party 
newspaper. Furthermore, in the middle of May 1954 the only state-run radio station TGW 
went off the air for three weeks because of a scheduled antenna change, giving the rebels 
a broadcast monopoly on the radio by default.307 The mostly illiterate rural populace, 
unable to read newspapers, turned to La Voz de la Liberación for information about the 
confusing events in the capital, thus becoming highly exposed to the “rebels’” propaganda. 
This event demonstrates the lack of public service apparatus and media diversity within the 
Guatemalan information landscape. 
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The propaganda campaign pushed President Arbenz to misguided media regulation. 
Being unable to contain the malicious influence, he revoked the freedom of speech and 
assembly, and coercively closed some opposition newspapers, supporting his opponents’ 
narrative of a repressive communist government. At no time did the Arbenz government 
make use of exclusive media channels to specifically address the rural communities or the 
urban middle-class to counter the malicious narrative. Furthermore, he never consistently 
reached out to foreign media to expose and explain his policy to relax the U.S.-forged 
criticism in the international community. President Arbenz did not exploit informational 
opportunities, and when he tried to undertake measures to mitigate informational 
vulnerabilities, the measures only further negatively influenced vulnerabilities and 
opportunities in other domains. 
C. ANALYSIS 
Capturing PMESI vulnerabilities and opportunities in the Guatemala case we can 
create a HT System model specific to this case (Figure 4). The very first observation of the 
Guatemala–United States HT system is the absence of specific opportunities. The 
government never engaged in sub-state diplomacy, and because foreign companies mainly 
led the economy, the government never showed any economic adaptability. Furthermore, 
the inherent fragmentation of Guatemalan society never allowed the development of 
societal pluralism. Similarly, the less developed mass-media environment did not allow the 
development of media diversity. Moreover, the Guatemalan government never exploited 




Figure 4. Guatemala–United States HT System
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To define the influence of each variable it is necessary to create a cross-impact 
matrix (see Appendix).308 In the matrix, AS (active sum) describes the sum of all the 
outgoing influences that can be ascribed to a specific variable. Thus, AS indicates how 
strongly the specific variable influences the system, the higher AS the higher the influence 
on the system. Conversely, PS (passive sum) describes the sum of all the incoming 
influences. Hence, PS indicates how strongly the system influences the specific variable. 
Vulnerabilities are inversely proportional to S (Guatemala) political power, while 
proportional with G (U.S.) political power. Conversely, the opportunities are proportional 
to S political power, while inversely proportional to G political power. The degree of cross-
linking represents how heavily the variables are interconnected: the higher the degree 
value, the more essential is the variable for the persistence of the system. 
Not surprisingly, the exerted power of S and G shows the highest PS cross-linking 
score. Logically both variables have the highest crosslinking value because both are 
essential for the survival of the system: if one does disappear, the asymmetric dyadic 
relationship will disappear; hence, the HT system would not exist. Similarly, both show 
the highest PS, because the HT system decisively influences the power that both S and G 
can exercise on one another. This implication underlines how important it is to understand 
the hybrid threat as a system, and as a system, it can be exploited to increase its own 
exercised power and decrease the exercised power of the opponent. As expected, G’s 
political power value (32) is higher than that of S (30), indicating that G was the actor with 
more influence on the HT system, and confirming the asymmetry of the relationship. It is 
very interesting to note the closeness of the values, which indicates that the United States 
was not the overwhelming “influencer” of the system, and Guatemala was highly 
responsible for the dynamics of the system. 
The three variables with the highest cross-linking value are vulnerabilities, 
indicating that in the Guatemala case the power balance was decisively influenced by 
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vulnerabilities; hence, the Guatemalan government was highly vulnerable to the U.S. 
exerted power (Table 2). 
Table 2. Guatemala–U.S. HT System, Top Vulnerabilities and 
Opportunities309 
 Crosslink (AS+PS) Active Sum (AS) Passive Sum (PS) 
Rank Vulnerability Opportunity Vulnerability Opportunity Vulnerability Opportunity 












































The most central and at the same time influential variable of the system was the 
vulnerability domestic institutional changes. The highest crosslink and AS values 
demonstrate that the reforms initiated by Guatemala were not only the main cause of the 
American threat, but also the variable that continued to fuel American opposition to the 
Guatemalan government. The second most important vulnerability for the permanence of 
the threat was the distrust within elites, namely between Guatemala’s political elite and the 
conservative elite of Guatemalan society (Church and landowners) as well as the political 
elite and leadership of the Guatemalan armed forces. In addition to self-generated 
vulnerabilities, the second most active vulnerability, foreign influence, shows that the 
United States and its information operation campaign had a very important role in shaping 
the HT system. 
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The opportunities that show the highest degree of cross-linking are social cohesion, 
civil-military force integration, and irregular forces; these variables have more ingoing 
than outgoing links, meaning that as an influencing factor they are susceptible to changes 
in the HT system. Yet, all three opportunities had detrimental effects on Guatemala’s 
political power. Social cohesion was more a passive rather than an active system variable. 
That means, the variable did not affect other variables but was affected by other variables. 
Specifically, this opportunity was negatively affected by other vulnerabilities and 
opportunities, ultimately having a detrimental effect on Guatemalan political power. The 
same can be said of the variable civil-military force integration. On the other hand, 
irregular forces was the most active opportunity. But, this opportunity turned out to have 
a negative effect on the system, namely by degrading another opportunity (social cohesion) 
and fueling two vulnerabilities (distrust within elite, and polarization and radicalization). 
The Guatemalan Government was responsible for generating specific reinforcing 
feedback loops that destabilized the system, and finally decreased Guatemala’s expressed 
power. Figure 5 shows the two primary reinforcing feedback cycles generated by the 
Arbenz administration. Accordingly, it is possible to observe that variable domestic 
institutional changes is involved in six feedback loops, confirming its importance within 
the system but also demonstrating its decisive role in destabilizing the system. Distrust 
within elites is involved in three loops, indicating that its role in destabilizing the system 
warrants intervention. The variable polarization and radicalization is involved in two 
feedback loops. The implication for the Guatemalan government is that it would have been 
able, without necessarily relying on external means, to decrease its vulnerabilities and 
increase its opportunities, primarily relaxing the feedback loops by addressing the three 




Figure 5. Guatemala’s Primary Reinforcing Feedback Loops 
In a system approach, time plays a leading role, even moreso when the analysis 
explores a hybrid threat, which exploits and extends time in support of strategic gradualism. 
To understand how the HT system can be leveraged over time and knowing that the 
adjustment of one variable does not affect the whole system immediately, it is crucial to 
consider delays in the model. In the cross-time matrix, the values of the cross-impact matrix 
are substituted with a time value. The time delays are short-term (< 1 month, value 1), mid-
term (1 month–1 year, value 2), and long-term (> 1 year, value 4). The produced delay 
(PD) and received delay (RD) show the mean values of every row (PD) and column (RD). 
The cross-time matrix allows defining which variables have a faster impact on the system 
(see Appendix).310 Given the impact of the variables on the system and the time needed 
for the variables to influence the system effectively, it is possible to establish which 
variables are most appropriate for intervention. The assumption is that the higher the 
impact and the shorter the delay, the better suited the variable is for intervention. The 
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combination of the cross-impact and the cross-time matrices allows identifying the 
intervention variables (see Figure 5).311 The variables with the quickest and highest impact 
on the system, hence those to be prioritized, are visible in the quadrant with the Roman 
number one (I). 
 
Figure 6. Guatemala Intervention Variables 
The intervention variable is one that President Arbenz would have been able to 
control or at least address. Accordingly, this fact excludes variable 2 (U.S. political power). 
The variables domestic institutional changes (3), foreign influence (28), and polarization 
and radicalization (23) satisfy the criteria of being ideal (relative high impact, and quick) 
and controllable. Additionally, it is also appropriate to consider the variable distrust within 
elites (5) because of its high cross-linking score and low produced delay. 
D. DISCUSSION  
Although it is possible to recognize some of the characteristics of the hybrid threat, 
the American intervention in Guatemala does not adequately demonstrate the level of 
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integrated design and synchronized actions along the PMESI spectrum expected in a hybrid 
approach. The American government applied a variety of instruments of statecraft during 
the period between 1947 and 1954, targeting Guatemalan vulnerabilities and limiting that 
state’s opportunities. Nonetheless, most of the vulnerabilities and the missing opportunities 
were already present in Guatemalan society. 
Furthermore, as Cullather consistently demonstrates in his analysis of disclosed 
CIA documents regarding the operations PBFORTUNE and PBSUCCESS, within the U.S. 
government the opinions regarding the measures to be implemented toward the 
Guatemalan government were partially conflicting. Moreover, until the last day of 
Arbenz’s resignation, the CIA had serious doubts about the success of the plan focused on 
propaganda operations and the support of Armas’ rebels. As the declassified CIA 
documents show, its officials that participated in the plan’s development often had “little 
understanding of and interests in the motives of those in the Department of State, the 
Pentagon, and the White House”; accordingly, it should not be surprising that in the end 
they could not really explain the positive result of the operation.312 Hence, it is tough to 
argue that the overall campaign was an integrated design of simultaneous, synchronized, 
and adaptive use of multiple instruments of statecraft attaining synergistic effects, as the 
first characteristic of the hybrid threat suggests it should be. 
The operation PBSUCCESS generated the expected psychological effects. The 
U.S. propaganda campaign targeted the various Guatemalan social groups successfully. 
The lower classes of society were fed with ambiguous information about the government’s 
decision, and the negative narrative about the agrarian reform created a feeling of 
compulsion in the Ladino peasantry that, following the land expropriations, felt coerced by 
the government. The stories about death threats and sabotage that the CIA planted in the 
Guatemalan press created a feeling of dissension and confusion within the Arbenz 
government. Finally, the misinformation about Arbenz’s communist drift and the related 
shadow and U.S. intervention compelled the upper classes and the armed forces to act and 
coerce Arbenz to resign. 
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The measures taken by the U.S. government were focused primarily on escalation 
and were not the primary cause of the poor decision-making process of the Arbenz 
government. As confirmed by Jose Fortuny, the PGT secretary and personal advisor of 
Arbenz until his resignation, Arbenz and his entourage were idealists who did not 
comprehend the gravity of the situation until the very end.313 It was this idealism that 
prevented Arbenz and his entourage from recognizing at the right time the signals that 
should have led them to different decisions. The negative consequences for the U.S. 
government were not avoided by de-escalation tactics, but by the intervention of external 
actors, as in the case of the avoided embargo on coffee beans or in the case of the Caracas 
resolution. Thus, there is a lack of evidence to confirm the presence of strategic gradualism. 
PBSUCCESS was originally non-military in nature. Nevertheless, it targeted 
military opportunities and vulnerabilities to achieve secondary and tertiary order effects in 
the political and informational domains. Despite the final act of the operation involving a 
paramilitary operation, the decision about conducting the paramilitary operation was less 
based on the strategic environment rather than forced by the loss of momentum by the 
opposition. This time pressure would also in part explain the level of improvisation of the 
paramilitary action. Although Armas’ action had never been conceived to depose Arbenz 
militarily but to force the army’s hand in doing so, the invasion was factually a failure.314 
Accordingly, the strategic environment’s constraints played a minimal role in the decision 
of the American government to execute the military action operation. 
As the most covert operation, PBSUCCESS relied mostly on proxies. United Fruits 
Corporation played an important role in convincing the U.S. government to intervene in 
Guatemala; however, later it became an American proxy, instrumental in fulfilling the U.S. 
government’s aims. The paramilitary force that entered Guatemala was formed and 
conducted by Guatemalan exiles. International organizations such as the UNSC, the OAS 
or the World Bank were also instrumental for the implementation of U.S. plans. Similarly, 
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Guatemala’s neighboring countries not only supported the U.S. intervention actively but 
also influenced the United States to act. Guatemalan actors played a fundamental role in 
Arbenz’s overthrow. The Catholic Church, the opposition, the upper-class and the armed 
forces should not be strictly understood as agents of the U.S. government, but more as 
actors who aligned with the intent of the overall plan. 
The overthrow of President Jacobo Arbenz was less the result of a designed hybrid 
operation, rather than it was the result of many Guatemalan external and internal factors in 
which the U.S. intervention played a pivotal and resolutive role. As suggested by many 
scholars, demonstrated by the declassified CIA documents, and confirmed by the system 
analysis in the previous section, the success of the covert operation against the Arbenz 
government does not indicate it was a well-designed operation. Conversely, it was the 
convergence of the Guatemalan situation, the inability of the Arbenz government to 
understand that it was a central part of the problem, and its incapacity to undertake the 
necessary measures to relax the system that caused the operation to proceed as it did. The 
intent, and failure, to apply the Guatemalan scheme in Cuba almost ten years later is further 
evidence proving that the United States was not really aware of Guatemala’s fragility and 
of all the internal and external forces that pushed and pulled even before Op 
PBSUCCESS’s planning and execution, and how this specific environment was decisive 
to its success. If the United States had been fully aware of the Guatemalan situation, 
including the related vulnerabilities and the weakness of the Arbenz government, they 
would not have tried to apply the same concept in Cuba, which experienced significantly 
different conditions. 
The system analysis applied to the Guatemala case allows the teasing out of specific 
lessons for small states. First, the central variable that most influenced the relationship 
between Guatemala and the United States and therefore contributed to the overthrow of the 
Arbenz government was the domestic institutional changes, namely Arbenz’s reforms. 
Second, eventually, President Arbenz would have been able to change the power balance 
with the United States by decreasing the tempo of the domestic institutional changes, by 
countering the foreign influence with a sound information campaign in Guatemala and 
abroad, by relaxing the ongoing polarization and radicalization, addressing the different 
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social groups, and reducing distrust within elites, in  particular within the senior military 
leadership. Third, the Arbenz government exploited its opportunities very limitedly and 
mostly too late. Fourth, the Guatemalan government fueled specific positive loops in the 
policy, military and social domains, which catalyzed an overall system destabilization to 
its disadvantage. Accordingly, Arbenz should have prioritized the interventions in these 
domains. Finally, the system analysis shows that a great power does not only target the 
vulnerability of the smaller one but also tries to undermine or contain its opportunities. 
After having analyzed the Guatemala case, it is possible to argue that to some extent 
the characteristics of a hybrid threat were already observable during the period of the Cold 
War. In this case, however, the United States as a great power, was not solely responsible 
for its success. Conversely, the small state of Guatemala was largely responsible for 
Arbenz’s defeat. To assess whether a hybrid approach by another great power in more 
recent times may have further implications for a small state, the next case deals with 
analyzing the confrontation between Ukraine and the Russian Federation starting from the 
1990s to the armed conflict in 2014. 
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V. UKRAINE 1990s–2014 
The main roots of the crisis between Russia and Ukraine in 2014 lie in the tumult 
of the decades following the dissolution of the Soviet Union; however, turbulent relations 
between Ukraine and Russia about the self-determination of the former go back at least to 
the beginning of the 20th century. 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
At the beginning of World War I, today’s Ukraine was not yet an independent state. 
The central and southeastern piece was part of the Russian Empire, while its western part 
was territory belonging to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Therefore, Ukrainians fought on 
both sides, under the Central Power Austria-Hungary, and the Triple Entente member 
Russia.315 As result of the Great War, both empires fell apart. In 1917, in the wake of the 
Russian revolution, Ukrainians of the former Russian Empire proclaimed the Ukrainian 
People’s Republic first as part of the newly born Russian Republic and a year later as 
independent state. In 1918, western Ukraine declared its independence from Austria-
Hungary, proclaiming the creation of the West Ukrainian People’s Republic. At the same 
time, the significant Polish population called for the support of neighboring Poland. In 
December of the same year, both Ukraine Republics signed a unification agreement, which 
was implemented on January 22, 1919.316 The unification did not last long, however, and 
in the summer of the same year, Polish forces invaded and took over the West Ukrainian 
People’s Republic. The remaining Ukrainian People’s Republic fell victim to the Russian 
Civil War, becoming in 1922 one of the Soviet Socialist Republics. 
From the early 1920s and the beginning of World War II Soviet Ukraine was 
subjected to Stalin’s forced agricultural collectivization, which proved to be a calamity for 
the Ukrainian people. Agriculture productivity deteriorated, and peasants who resisted the 
communist program were arrested, tortured, and deported. In 1932 and 1933, the 
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communist agriculture production plans and the foreseen punishments in case of failure to 
achieve the unrealistic goals created a period of hunger, better known in Ukrainian as the 
“Holomodor” (Great Famine).317  In 1939, following the German invasion of Poland and 
its partition with the Soviet Union, Stalin annexed the former western territory of Ukraine 
that belonged to Poland since the 1920s. During World War II, many Ukrainian nationalist 
movements, mostly in western Ukraine, fought together with the Nazis.318 After World 
War II, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic became a pillar of Soviet Union military 
capability, with large arms production facilities and military bases multiplying on 
Ukrainian territory. In 1954, the Crimean oblast was administratively transferred to 
Ukraine.319 Until the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine remained a mainstay of the 
Soviet system, giving birth to some of its most famous leaders including Nikita Kruschev 
and Leonid Brezhnev. In 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed, and finally, Ukraine 
proclaimed independence. 
From the beginning of the 1990s, the Russian government endorsed institutional 
arrangements to bind post-Soviet republics, including Ukraine, to Russia. The keystone of 
this enterprise was the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Ukraine, though, 
showed little interest in joining the Commonwealth.320 Nevertheless, Russia wanted to 
protect its critical interests in the Crimean Peninsula and, in general, maintain control over 
Ukraine and its policy. Accordingly, Russia’s interference into Ukraine endured through 
the 1990s, culminating in the 2014 confrontation that continues today. 
After 1991, the independence of Crimea and the ownership of the Black Sea fleet 
was a central topic in the relationship between Ukraine and Russia. Just after the Ukrainian 
declaration of independence, the Russian president sent Russia’s deputy vice president to 
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the Crimean Peninsula to restate the Crimean declaration of independence.321 In 1992, 
after an escalation of the nationalists’ rhetoric in Ukraine calling for the refusal of Russian 
basing rights on the Crimean Peninsula, the relationship between Kiev and Moscow 
worsened. Russia responded with economic measures, increasing the price for gas 
delivered to Ukraine by tenfold, and in May 1992, the Crimean parliament proclaimed the 
Republic’s independence and adopted its own constitution, which compelled Kiev to 
instantly reject the act as illegal, forcing the Crimean authority to withdraw the 
announcement.322 It did so only after receiving from Kiev a guarantee of greater rights to 
self-governance and hence more regional power. 
In 1993, the Russian parliament, the Duma, attempted to declare the Crimean city 
Sevastopol, a “Russian city.”323 In 1994, several EU countries, as well as the United States 
and Russia, persuaded Ukraine to sign the “Budapest Memorandum on Security 
Assurances” giving up its nuclear arsenal, while assuring security against threats or the use 
of force against its political independence or territorial integrity.324 In the same year, 
Ukraine rejected the Russian proposition to exchange Ukrainian debt for Russian 
ownership of energy infrastructure, and, even more critical for Russia, Ukraine entered the 
NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. In response, Moscow started a new diplomatic 
and economic retaliation campaign, dictating new customs duties on Ukrainian goods, 
disconnecting Ukraine from the Russian power grid, and reaffirming its resolve to preserve 
the control of the Black Sea fleet.325 Only in 1997, after a several-year dispute, did Ukraine 
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and Russia agreed about the partition of the Black Sea fleet; in the “Big Treaty,” both 
countries formalized that Russia received 82 percent of the fleet, while Ukraine received 
18 percent; Ukraine, however, sold part of its share to Russia and decommissioned another 
part.326 The treaty effectively reduced Ukrainian war capacity in the peninsula and laid the 
groundwork for incremental Russian influence in the region.  
Russia took advantage of its official presence in the Crimean Peninsula by 
expanding its footprint and leveraging the local population. By the end of 1999, Russia 
opened a consulate in Simferopol and started to hand out passports to all Black Sea sailors 
and their families.327 In 2004, the Orange Revolution represented another milestone for 
the fate of Crimea. After this event and until the secession in 2014 numerous groups 
including the Russian Community of Crimea, the youth group called Proryv 
(Breakthrough), the People’s Front Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia as well as paramilitary 
Cossack groups, and the Eurasian Youth Movement, tried to shift the Crimean Peninsula 
into the arms of the Russian Federation.328 The years-long shaping of the human 
environment in the Crimean Peninsula would play a decisive role for the events in spring 
2014 that led to the Crimean secession. Nonetheless, Russian involvement was not only 
limited within the Crimean Peninsula but extended over the whole of Ukraine. 
Russia has always supported Ukrainian actors who were able to influence Ukrainian 
politics to keep it within the Russian sphere of influence while punishing those who tried 
to get out of it. In 1994, when the first Ukrainian president, Leonid Kravchuk signed the 
NATO PfP Program, Moscow in response, during the upcoming election, reportedly 
provided financial support to the leader of the opposition, Leonid Kuchma, who argued for 
closer ties with Moscow during his campaign.329 Despite his rhetoric, Kuchma did not 
completely fulfill Russia’s expectations, pursuing a NATO approach. In 1997, the 
signature of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Russia and 
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Ukraine which dissipated the dispute regarding the Black Sea fleet, overlooked the fact that 
Russia—which faced significant internal political turmoil and substantial economic 
crisis—supported Kuchma’s opponents in the Ukrainian elections. In 2002, Kuchma 
signed the NATO Action Plan sustaining a “long-term goal of NATO membership,” and 
in June 2003 this intent was further formalized into Ukrainian military doctrine.330 The 
Ukrainian turn to the West had a short duration. When numerous scandals on corruption, 
assassination plots, and electoral fraud undermined Ukraine’s image in the West, Kuchma 
turned to Russia where companies had meanwhile started to heavily invest in Ukrainian 
market sectors such as energy, metallurgy, telecommunications, and banking.331 In 2003, 
he accepted the (symbolic) post of Chairman of the CIS, and a year later, he restated the 
strategic relationship between Ukraine and Russia, putting on hold the NATO membership 
goal.332 In the 2004 presidential elections, Russia decided to assure consistent financial 
and political support to the Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, who ran against Viktor 
Yushchenko, the opposition leader.333 However, the support and the related election fraud 
rebounded and when irregularity about the victory of Yanukovych emerged, more than half 
a million Ukrainians gave birth to what became the Orange Revolution, which led to a 
revolt and the victory of the opposition leader Yushchenko. 
The substantial improvement of the Russian economy and Ukrainian dependence 
on Russian energy allowed the Kremlin to use energy and finance to shape the political 
relationship with Kiev. In 2005, following the unfavorable result of the Orange Revolution 
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and the rise to power of Western-oriented and Russian-adverse president Yushchenko, 
Russian companies raised the fuel, petroleum, gas, and nuclear fuel prices in Ukraine.334 
A year later, when the Ukrainian government declined to pay the new gas prices and the 
negotiations froze, Russia interrupted the supply, and only some days later the supply 
restarted at the new price of $95 per thousand cubic meters (bcm).335 In 2008, when Yulia 
Tymoshenko was elected prime minister, beating Russian-backed Yanukovych, the 
Russian gas company Gazprom intervened, cutting gas supplies and starting another 
dispute about debt repayment.336 In 2009, when Yushchenko refused to uphold a deal that 
his prime minister had reached with the Russian President Vladimir Putin, Ukraine was left 
without a contract on gas prices and transit fees, and Russia replied by setting new prices 
first at $250 bcm and then at $450 bcm.337 In 2010, the continuing conflicts within the 
“Orange” coalition, Yushchenko’s dramatic loss of consensus, and an assertive Russian-
backed Viktor Yanukovych changed the Ukrainian political landscape in favor of Russia. 
After 2010, Viktor Yanukovych’s political course swayed between balancing, 
bandwagoning and bargaining toward the European Union and the Russia Federation, and 
this had disastrous effects for Ukraine. Immediately after being elected, President 
Yanukovych indicated his intent to refocus Ukraine foreign policy toward Russia.338 In 
April 2010, an agreement between Yanukovych and the Russian President Dmitrij 
Medvedev granted Russia a new lease on its naval base in Crimea until 2042, in exchange 
for an export tax decrease of 30 percent on purchases of Russian gas.339 Furthermore, the 
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Ukrainian government dissolved by decree the structures coordinating the NATO-Ukraine 
integration process, while inviting the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) to 
establish offices in Kiev.340 Moreover, Kiev readmitted the Russian Federal Security 
Service (FSB) to the Black Sea Fleet and reinstated the cooperation between the FSB and 
the Sluzhba Bezpeky Ukrayiny (Ukrainian Security Service) (SBU) to enhance SBU 
capabilities.341 Despite these concessions to Moscow, Yanukovych did not bow to Russian 
pressure to enter the Eurasian Economic Union, while pursuing closer ties with the EU. In 
2012, the Ukrainian government and the EU intensified negotiations about the Association 
Agreement (AA) and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). Both 
required Yanukovych to implement massive economic and political reforms that would 
have disrupted the system providing power and wealth to him, his party, and to many 
influential oligarch groups.342 As the political scientist Rajan Menon asserts that “in 
retrospect, it appears that Yanukovych was more interested in the negotiations themselves 
than in their outcome,” arguably because it “provided Yanukovych a hedge against Russian 
pressure.”343 In summer and autumn of 2013, both the EU and the Russian Federation 
made implicitly clear to Yanukovych that the time had come to decide which side to take. 
Yanukovych, in an attempt to protect his interests and those of his entourage, 
decided to bandwagon towards Russia, thus triggering a chain of events that led to his 
dismissal. In June 2013, just after the Ukrainian agreement to become a Customs Union 
observer, Russia made clear that Ukraine’s status would be lost if Yanukovych signed the 
DCFTA. The following month, Russia imposed an import embargo on numerous 
categories of Ukrainian products and introduced extensive inspections on its border with 
Ukraine, causing Ukraine losses of over $500 million.344 Based on the reactionary 
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measures taken by Russia, Kiev increasingly claimed the potential costs of signing the 
agreement were too burdensome, in an attempt to wrest concessions from the EU.345 In 
September 2013, the EU negotiators made clear that due to legal impossibilities, “the 
Customs Union membership is not compatible with the DCFTAs.”346 Yanukovych was 
yet forced to choose, and the deadline was set: the Vilnius Partnership Summit on 
November 28–29, 2013. 
Following a secretive meeting between Yanukovych and Putin near Moscow on 
November 9, the Ukrainian Prime Minister met on Wednesday, November 20 with his 
Russian counterparts in St. Petersburg.347 The day after, just one week before the Summit 
in Vilnius, Viktor Yanukovych unexpectedly suspended the preparation for the AA and 
DCFTA signature. For Yanukovych, this decision might have seemed a good deal. The 
decision, though, shocked many Ukrainians who started to demand Yanukovych to rescind 
the decree that froze talks with the EU. 
The Maidan Square popular demonstrations, born as a protest against 
Yanukovych’s decision to abandon negotiations with the EU, escalated into a popular 
uprising. On November 24, 2013, the first Sunday demonstration took place, under the 
slogan “For a European Ukraine,” involving some 100,000 people. The Ukrainian 
government, thinking that the demonstration was one of the many commonly “paid” 
events, did not undertake any measures. However, when the week after, the square filled 
up again, the government decided to use violence to disperse the protesters. The 
demonstrators continued to demonstrate and the Ukrainian anti-riot police, the Berkut, tried 
again to disperse the protesters with increased violence. As a first reaction to the 
intervention of the security forces, the protesters began to organize themselves, making 
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Maidan Square a real camp: they erected barricades and created self-defense groups. The 
Ukrainian–Russian “Action Plan” signed on December 17, 2013 meant for the protesters a 
twofold defeat: it confirmed the re-approach to Russia and the discard of the European 
option, and it gave the Yanukovych government the necessary means to endure.348 On 
January 16, 2014, the government, having failed in the previous weeks to dissolve the 
demonstrations with the usual use of force, voted the anti-protest laws commonly known 
as the “Dictatorship Law,” that de jure came close to abolishing freedom of speech, 
assembly, and information as well as other activities related to the protest.349 On January 
19, an unprecedented violent clash between the protesters and the Berkut triggered nation-
wide dissent and occupations, which now involved a large part of Ukraine. 
The uprising of the radicalized citizenship could be quelled only by Yanukovych’s 
departure. The following main factors caused the nature of the demonstrations to change 
in the last month of protests from a mere claim for Europeanisation to a quasi-revolution: 
the repression laws, the extensive and increasingly uncontrolled violence of regime actors, 
and the failure of negotiations.350 The Berkut and the hired thugs, the titushki, unable to 
de-escalate and displace the protesters from the Maidan square started to seize, snatch, and 
beat them elsewhere, at any time of the day or night.351 In the last month, there were fatal 
victims in the protests.352 On February 21, after the last and bloodiest days of the revolt, 
the government and the opposition signed an agreement that included the restoration of the 
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2004 constitution, constitutional reforms and a new election for the end of 2014, however, 
upon signing the agreement, Yanukovych fled the capital.353 
Following Yanukovych’s departure, Russia, with the intent to protect its assets in 
the Crimean Peninsula, supported a coup aimed to annex Crimea. On February 27, armed 
men stormed the Crimean government and at gunpoint compelled the present officials to 
pass a motion on secession and motion on organizing a referendum to sanction the 
decision.354 The same night, Russian armed forces began the Crimean occupation with the 
capture of Simferopol and Sevastopol airports. From March 6, Russian forces started a 
conventional build-up on Ukraine’s eastern border and on Crimea, sealing the peninsula 
from the mainland.355 On March 16, the secession referendum was backed by 97 percent 
of voters and two days later Russia absorbed Crimea into the Russian Federation. 
The unrest in eastern Ukraine began with the same secession intent as in Crimea. 
Up to the present day, the region remains disputed between Kiev and the Russian-backed 
separatists. On April 7, 2014, protesters seized and occupied administrative buildings in 
the east Ukraine cities of Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Luhansk, calling for a referendum on 
independence, and five days later, twenty men seized the City Council in Slovyansk. 
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Figure 7. The Donbass Region356 
When pro-Russian rebels, with the support of Russian security forces, started 
creating armed militias and proclaiming “people’s republics” in the Donbas, there were no 
national or regional forces there capable of countering them.357 On April 17, Russia, 
Ukraine, the United States, and the EU agreed on measures to de-escalate the crisis in 
eastern Ukraine.358 Nonetheless, because of repeated cease-fire breaks, on the April 22 the 
Ukrainian acting president ordered the relaunch of military operations against the pro-
Russian militants in the east. In response, Donbas leaders, copying the Crimean scenario, 
conducted a secession referendum on May 11. The referendum took place only in Donetsk 
and Luhansk where the separatists were stronger, while the other eastern key cities of 
Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhzhya remained under government control.359 
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During summer 2014, Moscow intensified support for the rebels even with conventional 
forces to rescue them from collapse and reify the initiative against Ukrainian forces. In 
September, after extensive talks under the aegis of the OSCE representative of Ukraine, 
the Russian Federation, the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR), and the Luhansk People’s 
Republic (LPR) signed the Minsk Protocol and the follow-up memorandum agreeing 
among others on a ceasefire, among other points. Unfortunately, after two weeks, the 
ceasefire was consistently violated and in January 2015 had completely collapsed.360 On 
February 11, leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany developed a new “Package 
of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreement.”361 At the end of February 
2015, both Ukraine and the separatists started to implement parts of the Agreement. As of 
mid-2019, the conflict in eastern Ukraine persists with periods of escalation and de-
escalation, and as restated by the UNIAN at the end of 2018, “not a single provision of the 
Minsk deal has been implemented by 100%.”362 
B. PMESI VULNERABILITIES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
Since its independence, Ukraine has been confronted with institutional changes that 
have led to increased distrust between the elite, fueled favoritisms, and polarized the 
population, creating favorable conditions for the Russian hybrid threat. During the 1990s, 
Ukraine was governed by politicians forged by communism that did not implement deep 
economic and social reforms as in the case of the Baltic countries.363 At the end of the 
1990s, President Kuchma facing near-bankruptcy appointed the former head of the 
Ukrainian central Bank Viktor Yushchenko as prime minister and the gas trader Yulia 
Timoshenko as his deputy. Their reforms alarmed the oligarchy elite, who through their 
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influence brought down both in spring 2001.364 This maneuver laid the foundations for 
mistrust between the country’s Western-oriented and Eastern-oriented political elites and 
their electorate, breaking the already meager cohesion between the two land parts and 
undermining the integration of the pro-Russian minorities. 
The “reformers” founded their parties laying the foundations for what would 
become the Orange movement and related revolution in 2004. The Orange Revolution 
revealed underlying tensions and polarization between the Ukrainian elite and between the 
pro-Western Ukrainian citizen’s majority and the pro-Russia minority, exposing Ukraine 
to the competing geopolitical intent of Western powers and a resurgent Russia.365 The 
initiated institutional changes focused on approaching EU membership were thwarted by 
an increasingly disruptive relationship between Timoshenko and Yushchenko. The 
alternating period of rivalry and appeasement finally ruined the cohesion that had 
supported the 2004 revolution, allowing the rise of Russia-backed Viktor Yanukovych. 
Yanukovych’s institutional balancing acts brought further polarization and 
radicalization, eventually being the last act leading to the Ukrainian internal conflict. From 
the moment he took office, Yanukovych re-established favoritism for his loyal oligarchs, 
allowing corruption to develop at even higher levels than in the 1990s.366 At the same 
time, he approached the EU to appease the Western-oriented populace and counterbalance 
rising Russian pressure. However, when he realized that the EU agreements would have 
put in grave danger his oligarchic apparatus, suddenly he backed out of the AA, pleasing 
Russia and the pro-Russia minority, but triggering protests from the pro-Western majority. 
These activities soon escalated and forced Yanukovych to leave Ukraine abruptly. 
Afterward, the Russia-backed leaders tried with mixed results to enforce other institutional 
changes in Crimea and Donbass. Yanukovych’s policy adaptation may be interpreted as an 
attempt to balance an assertive and asphyxiating Russia on the one hand, and a demanding 
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but hesitant EU on the other. Even so, his attempt to adapt did nothing but fuel polarization 
of the society and mistrust among the Ukrainian elites. 
Ukraine’s dependence on international organizations and membership in 
supranational organizations has repeatedly proved to be a major vulnerability. In 1994, the 
bona fide act of signing the Budapest memorandum resulted in a loss of decisive means of 
deterrence, reducing Ukraine’s military capabilities. In 2008, at Bucharest’s NATO 
Summit, France, Germany, and Italy made pressure to relax the U.S. administration’s 
enthusiasm to admit Ukraine into the alliance.367 Eventually, these European allies, 
worried about the consequences for their relations with Russia, slowed Ukraine from 
entering the alliance. Russia exploited Ukraine’s dependence on international 
organizations. For instance, in 2015, during the Minsk agreements, Russia compelled 
Ukraine’s recognition of the Russian-backed proxies. Further, it polarized Ukrainian 
society and automatically inhibited future re-integration of the eastern minorities. Ukraine 
relied on Western mediation and its membership in the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) to de-escalate the conflict in Donbass. Nevertheless, neither 
of the Minsk agreements, both under the aegis of the OSCE, stopped the fights; conversely, 
they framed the conditions for a frozen conflict that Russia could heat and cool at will. 
Russian interference and direct involvement in Ukraine’s internal conflicts has 
consequences that go beyond the Crimean secession and the ongoing conflict in Donbass. 
In Crimea, the coordinated and synchronized operations of special forces, Russian airborne 
units on Sevastopol and Simferopol airports as well as the landing of marine infantry 
supporting the ongoing Russian “support” operation demonstrate direct Russian 
involvement in the—at that time—the Ukrainian internal conflict in Crimea.368 In the 
summer of 2014, the transfer of weapons from Russia to Donbass rebels as well as the fire 
support and even direct employment of Russian soldiers on Ukrainian territory demonstrate 
that Russia was and maybe remains involved in the Ukraine internal conflict in 
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Donbass.369 The international community condemned this involvement and many 
governments have imposed a variety of punitive measures on Russia. Even though Russia’s 
intervention has further stimulated Kiev’s westward drift, it has also led several Western 
countries to rethink Ukraine’s integration into the EU and NATO. Governments such as 
France, Germany, Italy, and Hungary may consider it too dangerous and risky for their 
national interests to approve EU and NATO membership status for Ukraine. 
The limits on Ukrainian military capabilities were caused both by the direct 
influence of Russia and by Kiev’s erroneous policies. In 1997, Ukraine allowed Russia to 
maintain ground forces in Crimea and leased to Russia its share of coastal facilities in the 
area to decrease the rising Ukrainian gas debt.370 In 2010, Ukraine extended the lease in 
Sevastopol to 2042 as a deal for reduced gas prices. The years-long neglect Ukrainian 
troops on the Crimean Peninsula, and corruption within the forces, mainly constituted by 
local conscripts and officers, played a crucial role in Russia’s ability to capture all 
Ukrainian infrastructure and assets without a noteworthy fight.371 Russia also actively 
intervened in limiting Ukrainian response capabilities. For instance, it carried out cyber-
attacks aimed at preventing communications between the peninsula and the capital during 
the operations’ peaks in the Crimea;372 or by employing special forces to support 
irregulars. 
The Ukrainian and Russian governments employed, with divergent results, 
irregular forces to enhance their objectives’ achievements. Since 2010, President 
Yanukovych had been creating his loyal security forces, the Berkut. Due to the Berkut’s 
limited numbers and the intent to raise the level of violence toward the protesters, 
Yanukovych increasingly started to engage titushki; however, their engagement did 
nothing but further intensify protestors’ frustration and further broaden the grab between 
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them and the government.373 Conversely, in Crimea and Donbass, Russia explicitly and 
successfully exploited irregular forces to create an image of a popular revolt against Kiev. 
On February 22, 2014, the Crimean Berkut came back to the Crimean Peninsula. Five days 
later members of the same Berkut as well as alleged Russian special operations forces 
disguised as local irregular forces formed the commando unit that seized Crimea’s 
parliament building.374 Furthermore, the irregular forces employed in Crimea were also 
composed of Night Wolves—Russian biker groups intimately related to the Russian 
president—that supplied the Crimean irregulars with uniforms and communication 
equipment.375 In Donbass, strong circumstantial evidence demonstrates that Russia 
provided the insurgents with equipment, personnel, as well as financial and military 
support.376 These examples show that Russia made extensive use of irregular forces and 
their combination with special forces to fuel the Ukrainian internal conflicts. 
The Ukrainian approach to multilateral security agreements has revealed an 
insidious path that has brought mostly adverse effects. In 1996, as a result of the Budapest 
Memorandum on Security Assurances, Ukraine completed the de-nuclearization process. 
Unfortunately, the clause “respect the independence and existing borders of Ukraine” was 
not observed by the memorandum signatory Russia, and when on March 15, 2014, the UN 
Security Council voted a resolution against Crimea’s secession referendum, Russia 
imposed its veto.377 Some scholars argue that the U.S. proposal to invite Georgia and 
Ukraine to prepare “Action Plans” for NATO membership in 2008 may have triggered 
Russia to engage Georgia the same year and start to contemplate measures toward 
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Ukraine.378 The Ukraine petition for NATO membership did not only fuel Russian protests 
and retaliation measures in the economic domain but also increased distrust between the 
Ukraine elite and polarized the population already divided between pro-Russia and pro-
Western countries.379 Accordingly, multilateral security agreements can turn into a 
double-edged sword, especially if the agreements have not yet been reached or if they do 
not have a legally binding character. 
On many occasions, Russia leveraged Ukraine’s dependence on gas imports to hit 
numerous Ukraine vulnerabilities. One of Ukraine’s most prominent inheritances from the 
Soviet era was the heavily discounted gas import from Russia.380 For Ukraine, gas is a 
vital source of energy for both private and industrial consumers; the Donbass economy 
based on steel mining and chemical industries is highly dependent on Russian gas.381 
Accordingly, it is not surprising that Russia exploited this reliance on its gas supply to 
express discontent with Kiev’s policy decisions and leverage domestic institutional 
changes in Ukraine. Three significant examples were in 2006 after the Orange Revolution 
and the rise of Yushchenko, in 2009 after Ukraine’s request to start the NATO membership 
process, and in 2014 after Yanukovych’s deposition. 
Moreover, in 2009 Russia’s increase of gas prices forced the IMF to step in and 
finance Yushchenko’s government with $25 billion in loans, increasing Ukrainian 
dependency on international organizations. The worldwide economic crisis in 2008–2009 
let the Ukrainian GDP slip by 15 percent and made it impossible for Ukraine to pay the 
IMF loan, which was suspended in 2011.382 This dependence on Russian gas imports was 
also undermining Ukraine’s adaptability to economic changes in the international 
environment. On April 21, 2010, Russia and Ukraine signed an intergovernmental 
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agreement that provided Ukraine with Russian subsidized gas at the expense of budget 
revenues; in exchange, Ukraine extended the lease for the Russian naval bases in Crimea 
until 2042. Thus, Russia exploited Ukraine’s gas need to reduce Ukrainian military 
capabilities in Crimea. In October 2013, arguably to persuade Yanukovych to abandon 
negotiations with the EU, Russia offered to supply 5 bcm of gas at $268/Mcm which 
represented a 33 percent discount over Naftogaz.383 Hence, in 2013, Russia—similar to 
the 2009 NATO approach—exploited Ukraine gas dependency to undermine its efforts of 
pursuing membership in the EU. 
Russia exploited its position as Ukraine’s major trading partner to exploit trading 
policy changes to target Ukraine vulnerabilities and contain opportunities. The gas supply 
and transit contract signed between Russia and Ukraine in 2009 constituted a decisive 
Russian instrument to leverage the gas trade with Ukraine and imposed upon Ukraine 
important clauses that would have economic repercussions in the following years.384 The 
long-term character of the contract forced Naftogaz into a disadvantageous position of 
dependence on Gazprom. The new price calculation exposed the Ukrainian company to 
significant gas price increases. The high price of take-or-pay gas reinforced Ukraine’s 
pathological inefficient consumption pattern, causing needs for Russian gas and making 
gas import diversification uneconomical.385 Furthermore, Ukraine accepted complete 
responsibility for ensuring stable and secure gas transit to Europe, exposing Naftogaz to 
important financial obligations related to network maintenance, thereby creating potential 
risks for the Ukrainian government if for some reason it was not able to safeguard the 
European gas supply. Accordingly, Russia used policy changes to increase Ukrainian 
dependency on strategic imports, decrease Ukrainian financial adaptability in case of 
economic challenges, and increase its dependency on international organizations. 
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Russia exploited trading policy changes in domains other than gas to force domestic 
institutional changes in Ukraine. In July 2013, to increase the pressure on Ukraine to join 
the Customs Union (CU) Russia imposed a ban on several categories of Ukrainian imports 
and introduced extensive Ukrainian goods inspections at the borders, causing economic 
losses for Ukraine, estimated between $500 million and $2.5 billion.386 The $15 billion 
loan that Russia offered to Ukraine in December 2013, as an exchange for the withdrawal 
from the Association Agreement with the EU, would have indeed provided instant and 
significant financial relief for Yanukovych. In the spring and summer of 2014, to put 
pressure on the westward shifting elements of the new Ukrainian government, Russia 
closed its border to Ukrainian trucks forcing some Ukrainian factories in Russia to close, 
and, as had become usual, increased the gas price.387 Thus, Russian trading policy changes 
in different economic domains influenced Ukrainian institutional changes, while exploiting 
Ukraine’s limited export diversification and at the same time fueling polarization within 
Ukrainian society. 
The passage of gas to Europe was Ukraine’s potential opportunity that Russia had 
to contain. In 2013, the gas pipelines “Soyuz” and “Bratstvo” on Ukrainian territory 
brought 16% EU’s total natural gas demand from Russia to Europe.388 This fact provided 
Ukraine with some strategic opportunity. However, Russia, becoming aware of the possible 
risks, built two new pipelines, Nord- and South-Stream, bypassing Ukrainian territory. 
With this move, Russia diminished Ukraine’s significant tax revenues, reduced the 
advantages of Ukraine’s broker position in the gas transit niche, and finally augmented its 
dependency on the import of Russian gas. 
In 2014, Ukraine, aware of its vulnerabilities related to Russian gas supply, tried to 
find a solution to decrease this dependency and enhance its adaptability to the economic 
challenges caused by the ongoing confrontation with Russia. Accordingly, it 
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operationalized the key inter-connector pipeline Vojany-Uzhgorod with Slovakia that 
would have allowed Ukraine to substitute most of the Russian imports with imports from 
the EU.389 The Ukrainian attempt did not go unnoticed by Russia. Slovakia noticed that, 
based on the contractual clause with Russia, gas reversal (the resale of gas) was not allowed 
without Russia’s approval.390 Furthermore, Russia decreased gas supply to its EU clients 
to reduce the potential amount of gas surplus that could have been re-exported to 
Ukraine.391 Thus, Russia was able to head off Ukraine’s attempt to enhance its adaptability 
to economic challenges. 
Since Ukrainian independence in the 1990s, the varied policies of Ukrainian 
regimes have been the main culprits of the rift between the pro-Russian minority and the 
pro-Western majority of the country. In the early 1990s, Leonid Kravchuk initiated a policy 
of administrative and cultural Ukrainization, pursued by his successors Leonid Kuchma 
and Viktor Yushchenko; that policy fueled Ukraine political polarization and radicalization 
in the southeastern and western parts of the country and allowed regional politicians and 
Russia to exploit the division for its own purposes.392 As a result, the most conservative 
and Russophile-related social minority groups felt increasingly marginalized and not 
understood by the central government. This process did nothing but degrade the social 
cohesion of the country and prevent the development of societal pluralism. On the one 
hand, Crimea associated the government in Kiev with corruption and inefficiency that had 
little to offer to their region, while on the other hand, they developed an idealized image of 
Russia, based on the wealthy Russian tourists and the Russian naval base that significantly 
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contributed to the local economy.393 Over the years, these two images polarized the 
Crimean population, between a minority that recognized Ukraine as their homeland and 
those who wanted to break away. 
Russia, aware of the divisions within Ukraine, exploited the separatism topic to 
increase rifts within Ukrainian society and finally create the ideal conditions for internal 
conflicts that could lead to institutional changes. In the past, in Ossetia, Abkhazia, and 
Transnistria, regional separatism worked well by generating a virulent environment that 
proved its utility as a Russian instrument to shape the policies of its neighbor countries. 
Hence, Crimea presented a favorable environment to foster the same scheme. With a key 
Russian military base, a majority of Ukraine’s Russian ethnic population, persistent 
dissatisfaction with Kiev policy, and a long history of separatism ambitions, Crimea was 
an almost perfect target for perpetrating a significant blow to Ukrainian sovereignty.394 A 
similar pattern was recognizable in eastern Ukraine. Accordingly, Russia not only 
exploited the frustration of societal minorities but also supported those minorities to foster 
internal conflict leading to institutional changes in Ukraine. 
Russia also employed its means to foster the polarization of Ukrainian society. 
Since Ukraine’s independence, Russia has supported Russian-speaking neo-communist 
parties in order to catch the Soviet-nostalgic part of the population and counter the 
Westernizing parties.395 In 2004, Yanukovych was supported by Russian “political 
technologists” who pursued the polarization of the eastern part of Ukraine against the 
western one, to degrade the Ukrainian social cohesion.396 During the Maidan 
demonstrations, Russian political instructors, politruks, infiltrated the Berkut to radicalize 
them.397 The Berkut radicalization not only caused an escalation of their violence, but also 
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alienated the unit from other Ukraine security organizations, making future reintegration 
impossible and, finally, marking the unit’s destiny. On February 25, 2014, the acting 
Minister of Interior, Arsen Avakov, signed the unit’s dissolution decree. 
Favoritism has shaped Ukrainian society and its elite for many years, fostering 
distrust and having deleterious effects on different socio-economic domains. Ukraine has 
been governed since 1991 by a predatory elite that incentivizes the polarization of the 
society.398 The privatization of the Ukrainian economy in the 1990s occurred through a 
path of favoritism; government connections and political appointments were used to 
accumulate wealth via favors in the organized crime groups that ruled the private business 
sector, generating a ruling elite focused primarily on its own wealth accumulation—
resulting in merged big business.399 The oligarchic environment created strong rivalry and 
distrust among its members, as well as with those who wanted to break such a system of 
favoritism. Moreover, the rapidly growing gap between the wealthy and poor exacerbated 
the popular antipathy against corruption and the exploitation of political charges. 
The corruption machine did not stop with the Orange Revolution. The constant 
rivalry between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko proceeded with ups and downs until 2010. 
While the two leaders focused on their leadership, oligarchs continued to feed officials 
playing a divide and rule game that persisted and even increased under the successor Viktor 
Yanukovych.400 Therefore, it is not surprising that surveys showed that most Ukrainians 
felt helpless and estranged from the state they considered corrupt.401 Accordingly, it is 
possible to argue that the corrupted system disrupted social cohesion and created favorable 
ground for the polarization and radicalization of groups that felt oppressed by what they 
saw as unjust resource distribution. 
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The system of favoritism not only corrupted the socio-political domain, but also 
affected the state’s capacity to shape the informational environment. The more unpopular 
the government was, the more it resorted to freedom of press limitations and increased its 
surveillance and information manipulation.402 The fact that oligarchs owned most of the 
private mass media companies made information manipulation all the more possible. This 
diminished opportunities to develop critical media diversification and an uncorrupted 
public broadcasting service that would have been able to expose the malicious activities of 
corrupted officials and greedy oligarchs. 
Even the security domain was not immune to the vast system of favoritism. For 
decades, the Ukrainian Armed Forces was a neglected organization, which, with the end of 
the Cold War, saw its importance decline. Corruption and favoritism also filtered through 
the armed forces, creating disinterest and passivity among the lower ranks.403 Under 
Yanukovych, most of the expenses in security organizations were in favor of his loyal 
interior troops and militias and the highly corrupt customs service, rather than the regular 
forces.404 Therefore, it is not surprising that when the time came for the Ukrainian Armed 
Forces to stand up and fight against a brutal authoritarian regime, foreign infiltrations, and 
take-over attempts, the organization simply ignored the situation, surrendered, or waited 
inert for orders that never came. 
Russia applied its years-long anti-Western narrative to shape its influence in 
Ukraine. The patriotic “hostile West” rhetoric was already present in Russian media 
narratives long before the Ukraine crisis bloomed.405 In 2004, Russia tried to undermine 
Yushchenko’s presidential election campaign by organizing alleged pro-Yushchenko 
nationalist extremist demonstrations with the presence of Nazi flags and banners.406 Five 
years later, Russia accused Yushchenko of anti-Russian policy targeted at discrediting 
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Russia in the West, and of supporting the Orthodox Church’s split from Moscow and the 
Georgian anti-Russian war the previous year.407 Hence, Russia’s influence in Ukraine was 
explicitly targeted for suggesting an endangerment of Russian patriotic culture by alleged 
right-wing politicians. Accordingly, during Euromaidan the Russian state-run media 
portrayed the protests as pro-Western and pro-Nazi, treating the two terms interchangeably, 
and playing on the population’s fears in Crimea and eastern Ukraine.408 This information 
campaign was supposed to further reduce the poor social cohesion between the pro-
Western majority and the pro-Russian minority and their polarization. 
In February 2014, just after Yanukovych left Kiev, the pro-Russian leaders 
exploited the narrative developed in the previous years. Russian propaganda accused the 
Maidan uprising as a neo-Nazi coup that would have disrupted the Crimean Russian 
culture.409 Russian influence targeted the Crimean feeling of being an “oppressed” 
minority. A robust propaganda campaign in the Russian media supported the Crimean 
annexation process.410 In Donbass, in the previous decade, the pro-Russian elite supported 
by Russian media had fostered the narrative of ethnic-based Ukrainian political divisions 
by associating civil society and democracy with Ukrainian right-wing nationalism; and the 
narrative allowed the same people to depict the new Ukrainian government as a reborn 
fascist trend.411 Accordingly, the informational environment in both Crimea and Donbass 
was a powder keg ready to trigger internal conflicts between the new government and the 
pro-Russian population. 
Russia was able to heavily influence the Ukrainian population in the rebel regions 
because Kiev by neglecting the importance of the own media lost its capability to shape 
the informational environment there. In 2014, a Gallup report stated that television was the 
dominant news medium in Ukraine, as almost all Ukrainians (97%) and Crimeans (96%) 
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watched TV for news at least weekly; of particular interest is the evolution of this media 
in Crimea where, in the 2012 survey, the population enumerated only Ukrainian news 
media in the top five spots, while in 2013 it enumerated only Russian media.412 This 
evolution shows an evident Russian take-over in the informational environment and a 
blatant lack of public service from the Ukrainian state. Hence, it is no surprise that Russia 
was able to claim the informational environment for its propaganda purposes. In Donbass, 
in order to establish pro-Russian information dominance, some Ukrainian broadcasts were 
blocked and replaced by Russian broadcasts.413 Accordingly, in this region, Russian TV 
outlets further polarized society.414 Hence, in this region, Russian influence increased the 
hostility and distrust toward the new government in Kiev. Yet, it did not extensively raise 
public support for separatism as in Crimea.415 Russian informational superiority in the 
separatist regions was essential to shape the conflict environment, and Kiev’s misconduct 
in previous years allowed this take place. 
The Yanukovych regime significantly undermined media diversity and disregarded 
public service. Since 95 percent of Ukrainians rely on television for political information, 
control over this mass media is essential in Ukraine. Accordingly, Yanukovych and his 
supporters took over most of the media outlets, acquiring the largest media conglomerates 
to shape the informational environment according to their needs.416 This move undermined 
media diversity and degraded public service, putting it at the oligarchs’ service. One of the 
centerpieces of media diversity is the freedom of the press. Unfortunately, since its national 
independence, Ukraine’s press has never been free from government pressure, and the 
situation deteriorated rapidly in 2013 and worsened further in the first half of 2014.417 The 
situation started to change in spring 2014 when the new government started to improve 
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access to information and increase the independence of the broadcasting regulatory 
body.418 Furthermore, to diminish the impact of Russian media, the new government 
started to ban the broadcasts of Russian television, and some private initiatives started to 
support independent media coverage and monitoring.419 Yanukovych’s loss of the media 
domain put Russia in a position of even greater strength to shape the informational 
environment in the Crimean and Donbass regions, exploiting Ukraine’s vulnerabilities. 
Nonetheless, the new Ukrainian government has shown the will to seize some 
opportunities. Whether these initiatives will allow Ukraine to develop opportunities and 
diminish its information vulnerabilities remains to be seen. 
C. ANALYSIS  
The Ukraine-Russia HT system reveals a higher level of complexity compared to 
the previous case (Figure 8). The cross-linking values are higher on average, and all the 
opportunities and vulnerabilities were exploited by at least one of the two actors.420 
Nonetheless, similarly to the Guatemala-U.S. case, the small state Ukraine did not exploit 
specific opportunities, and when it did, it did so negatively. Kiev did not engage in sub-
state diplomacy, instead shaping the political environment in a highly centralized manner, 
and leaving the initiative of engaging in sub-state diplomacy to the great power Russia. 
Furthermore, Kiev did not support civil-military force integration. Conversely, with its 
favoritism, it fostered rivalries and distrust between the armed forces and the internal 
security forces. Some Ukraine governments tried to increase their opportunities by setting 
out on the path to affiliation with multilateral economic organizations and increasing their 
adaptability to economic challenges. Unfortunately, the steps taken were repeatedly 
hindered by Russia or slowed down by involved third parties. Successive Ukrainian 
governments devoted limited attention to societal opportunities; on the contrary, their 
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policies aimed to exploit partisanship and societal divisions. Similarly, the political and 
personal interests of the Ukrainian elite hindered and even disrupted the development of 
opportunities in the informational environment. 
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Figure 8. Ukraine–Russia HT System 
125 
 
Russia had the most significant influence on the HT system, though, Ukraine was 
still highly responsible for the ongoing dynamics. As in the previous case, G has the highest 
influence on the system. On the other hand, S shows almost the same influence value.421 
The three variables with the highest cross-linking value—thus, more essential for the HT 
system—are vulnerabilities, indicating that also in Ukraine’s case the power balance was 
decisively influenced by vulnerabilities. Hence, the hybrid threat was mainly based on 
vulnerabilities (Table 3). 
Table 3. Ukraine–Russia HT System, Top Vulnerabilities and 
Opportunities422 
 Crosslink (AS+PS) Active Sum (AS) Passive Sum (PS) 
Rank Vulnerability Opportunity Vulnerability Opportunity Vulnerability Opportunity 














































Ukraine’s most influential vulnerabilities were self-induced. Polarization and 
radicalization and domestic institutional changes had a central role in the HT system. 
Many of the system’s variables fueled these vulnerabilities. Thus, the different positions 
between the pro-Europe western Ukrainians, the pro-Russia southeastern Ukrainians—
supported by an indigenous significant ethnic Russian population—as well as the 
continuously changing posture of Ukraine toward Russia and the EU were a central element 
in the persistence of the Russian hybrid threat. In Ukraine, dependency on strategic import, 
specifically on gas, is the vulnerability with the highest influence on other variables. Since 
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its independence, Ukraine did almost nothing to escape this “addiction”; on the contrary, 
its oligarchic system fed this vulnerability to the detriment of Ukraine’s security. 
Favoritism is a key societal feature for Ukraine that had a negative impact across the 
PMESI spectrum, fueling other vulnerabilities. The domestic institutional changes 
implemented by the different governments over the years were inconsistent and 
contradictory. The continuous oscillations between the West and Russia did nothing but 
reinforce other vulnerabilities. 
Based on the system interactions, the most critical opportunities turned out to have 
detrimental effects on Ukraine. The opportunities that show the highest degree of cross-
linking are membership in supranational organizations, irregular forces, and social 
cohesion. However, deeper analysis of the results reveals that the active influence of 
membership in supranational organizations on the system is mainly a reinforcement of 
vulnerabilities, and the opportunity itself is negatively affected by other system 
vulnerabilities. Similarly, the opportunity irregular forces reinforces other systems 
vulnerabilities. Social cohesion was negatively affected by vulnerabilities and was 
involved in positive loops that decreased other opportunities. Furthermore, membership in 
supranational organizations and social cohesion have more ingoing than outgoing links, 
meaning that they are more influenced by changes in the system rather than being sources 
of change. 
The analysis of Ukraine’s intervention variables shows that most of the primary 
intervention variables are vulnerabilities that Kiev would have been able to address. (See 
Figure 9, Quadrant I). The only intervention variable in Quadrant I that Ukraine arguably 




Figure 9. Ukraine Intervention Variables 
The package of intervention variables that Ukraine could have implemented as a 
priority extends across the PMESI spectrum. In the policy domain, domestic institutional 
changes (3) and dependence on international organizations (6) show among the highest 
influence and a relatively quick impact. In the military domain, internal violent conflicts 
(11) and multilateral security agreements (13) show the same values of influence and 
delay; irregular forces, although having the same influence value (AD), shows the ability 
to impact the system more quickly. In the economic domain, the dependency on strategic 
import (16) shows the highest influence value on the system and a relatively quick impact 
on it. In the societal domain, addressing “oppressed” societal groups (22) would have had 
a relatively high and fast impact on the system. In the informational domain,  Russian 
foreign influence (28) should have been addressed with priority. 
The Ukrainian governments were responsible for generating specific reinforcing 
feedback loops that destabilized the system and finally decreased Ukraine’s political 





Figure 10. Ukraine’s Primary Reinforcing Feedback Loops 
Accordingly, it is possible to observe that Ukraine actively catalyzed two of the 
most significant vulnerabilities: domestic institutional changes and favoritism. The third 
and most active vulnerability within the system dependency on strategic import falls within 
the loop between favoritism and domestic institutional changes. Hence, Ukraine was 
pivotal in creating the HT system’s critical conditions, not only in some domain as in the 
Guatemala case, but across the entire PMESI spectrum. This result suggests that these three 
vulnerabilities should have been the focus of the attention of the Ukrainian government. 
Furthermore, it demonstrates that Ukraine would have been able to substantially decrease 
its vulnerabilities without outside intervention. 
D. DISCUSSION 
It may be argued that the Russian hybrid warfare in Ukraine started after 
Yanukovych left Ukraine in February 2014; but, Ukraine was under the influence of the 
Russian hybrid threat many years before. During the 1990s, Russia applied various 
instruments of statecraft toward Ukraine to shift or maintain the balance of political power 
129 
 
in its favor. Moscow exploited Ukraine’s vulnerabilities and contained Kiev’s attempts to 
develop opportunities. Moreover, the case study demonstrates that Ukraine was responsible 
for its vulnerabilities and missed opportunities at least as much as Russia. From a historical 
perspective, Russian achievement in Crimea and Donbass was the result of highly 
favorable conditions that both Russia and Ukraine had created over the years. 
Russian policies over the years were aimed at keeping Ukraine within its sphere of 
influence and maintaining its capability to influence the balance of power of the 
asymmetrical relationship decisively. Nevertheless, at this point, one can only speculate if 
and how long in advance Moscow planned the annexation of Crimea and southeastern 
Ukraine. Many critical factors across the PMESI domain had been mounting for years, 
fueled by both the Russian and Ukrainian governments. Yanukovych’s escape on February 
22, 2014, marked just the tipping point that triggered Russian escalation in the military 
domain. 
Russia has applied an integrated design of simultaneous and synchronized uses of 
multiple instruments of statecraft across the PMESI spectrum. The analysis of the HT 
system shows that to achieve specific effects and objectives Moscow targeted Ukraine’s 
specific vulnerabilities and opportunities, attaining second and third order effects that in 
some cases also proved detrimental for Russia. For instance, only a minority was genuinely 
anti-Russian before 2014, while after the crisis, the Ukrainian population with anti-Russian 
sentiments drastically increased; the Russians resorting to violence had consolidated a 
feeling of national pride and belonging in Ukrainian regions which hitherto had been more 
diffused.423 With current information, it is challenging to infer how much the events and 
actions carried out by Russia were all part of an established overarching plan. 
Moscow targeted Ukraine’s specific physical and psychological vulnerabilities, and 
according to its own needs, Russia generated ambiguity, compulsion, and coercion toward 
the Ukrainian governments. Over the years, Russia has applied a stick-and-carrot approach 
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across the PMESI domains. Moscow proved to be friendly to Ukraine in specific areas and 
then punished Kiev in others. Ukraine was compelled to adapt its policies to the extent that 
they were in Russia’s interests, and when Ukraine failed to comply with Russian requests, 
coercive measures followed. 
Strategic gradualism over the years granted Russia the initiative and put Ukraine in 
a constant reactive position. The Russian gas import policy toward Ukraine demonstrates 
how Russia escalated the situation with exorbitant price increases, and then, in the 
negotiation phase, proved to be magnanimous in redefining its requests, which, however, 
remained higher than the original price. The permanent pressure on the Orange 
Revolution’s government and the support to its detractors are an example of a Russian 
salami-slicing tactic that brought about Yushchenko’s fall and the rise of Yanukovych. The 
power vacuum after Yanukovych’s escape and the absence of a functioning government in 
Kiev gave Russia the momentum to achieve a fait accompli in Crimea. 
According to the characteristics of the hybrid threat, Russian military escalation in 
Crimea and southeastern Ukraine (specifically in Donbass) took place in regions that 
showed the best conditions for it. The Russian military base of Sevastopol fully justified 
the presence of Russian troops in Crimea. Secessionist intents in Crimea were not at all 
new. The Russian majority in the region, influenced by Russian media that emphasized the 
worsening of the “fascist” turn in Kiev saw secession as an escape route within reach. 
Russian laws related to the protection of Russians abroad guaranteed Russia a pseudo-legal 
basis to justify the legitimacy of its action. In southeastern Ukraine, the situation was 
different. Hence, it required another approach. Russia could not enter Ukrainian territory 
with military means without explicitly transgressing international laws, so it had to rely 
more on clandestine and covert operations in support of local proxies. The gathering of 
troops at the border with the Donbass allowed both to conceal troop movements along and 
across the borders, but it was also a powerful deterrent to possible conventional Ukrainian 
military reactions. 
The Russian hybrid threat was characterized by the extensive use of proxies. The 
list of Russian proxies who have played a role during the years and influenced Ukrainian 
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political power in Russia’s favor is long. Politicians like Yanukovych, oligarchs such as 
Dmytro Firtash, private or public companies like Ostchem and Gazprom, who “reinforced” 
local militias and biker gangs are just some examples of the actors involved in the principal-
agent relationship between Russia and its proxies. Unfortunately, one of the disadvantages 
of using proxies is that of not having absolute control over them. It proved to be the case 
with Yanukovych and his assertiveness after he came to power, or with the incident of the 
Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 (MH17), apparently shot down by a surface-to-air missile fired 
from the separatist-controlled area.424 
The crisis between Russia and Ukraine that started in 2014 was the result of the 
years-long Russian hybrid threat and internal factors to Ukraine, which created favorable 
conditions for Crimea’s annexation and the destabilization of southeastern Ukraine. The 
historical evidence shows that since Ukraine’s independence, Russia has tried to influence 
the relationship with Kiev across the PMESI spectrum. Although Ukraine also played a 
decisive role in not reducing its vulnerabilities, and on the contrary worsened them and 
failed to develop opportunities that could have helped to reduce malicious Russian actions. 
Accordingly, it is factually wrong to assert that the Crimean annexation and the internal 
conflict in southeastern Ukraine is solely the logical result of the Kremlin’s plan. This 
deterministic monocausal approach disregards all the conditions and chain of events 
generated by both actors and the interactions of vulnerabilities and opportunities across the 
HT system. The Russian hybrid approach decisively helped Russia to catalyze the system’s 
destabilization. Nonetheless, the different results in Crimea and Donbass suggest that the 
differences in conditions in the two areas had a decisive impact on secession success.425 
The system analysis applied to the Ukrainian case allows drawing specific 
implications for Ukraine. First, two variables were the most influential in the Ukraine-
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Russia HT system, namely dependency on strategic import and favoritism, bringing to light 
the most significant of Ukraine’s vulnerabilities in its relationship with Russia: its 
dependence on the importation of Russian gas, as well as the oligarchic system present in 
Ukraine that extends its influence across the PMESI spectrum. The first vulnerability is 
relatively straightforward to offset: Ukraine should make better use of its natural energy 
resources, improve the energy efficiency of individuals and industry, and above all, seek 
alternative partners to reduce dependence on imports from Russia. Conversely, the second 
vulnerability needs a structural change in Ukraine’s social system, which would arguably 
take decades. Meanwhile, Ukraine could implement measures to relax the third most 
important vulnerability, domestic institutional changes. Over the years, the successive 
Ukrainian governments have implemented or tried to implement inconsistent and 
contradictory policies. The continued policy oscillation between the West and Russia had 
a catalytic effect in polarizing society and increasing mistrust among its elites. Second, 
geography matters. Russia’s ability to exploit the ambiguity of its closeness to Ukraine and 
ethnically related population in neighboring Ukrainian regions was not present in the 
previous case. The United States is hundreds of miles away from Guatemala; hence, for 
the U.S. government it would have been more challenging to apply the same strategic 
gradualism, ambiguity, and proxy support than it was for Russia in Ukraine. These two 
countries are neighbors; therefore, Ukraine must develop the ability to manage Russia’s 
Derzhavnost (Statehood) thinking in terms of identity and actions as a great power. 
Finally, it is arguable that in the Ukraine-Russia case it is possible to observe the 
characteristics of the great power’s hybrid threat applied toward a small state. Similar to 
the previous case, the great power was not solely responsible for its success. Conversely, 
Ukraine was mostly responsible for its defeat. Furthermore, the systems approach allows 
understanding why and how events and variables interact with each other to cause an 
increasing destabilization of the system that was not observable and leading to unexpected 
results. The lack of a systemic vision has led various pundits to hypothesize the rise of an 
extremely effective Russian hybrid strategy. In light of a systemic analysis, the hybrid 
threat proves to be sophisticated and hard to understand, but too far away to be part of an 
alleged “silver-bullet” strategy. Conversely, it seems that this threat aims to disrupt the 
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small state both from the outside and from the inside by exploiting the small state 
vulnerabilities present in the system and decreasing its opportunities. To assess a further 
implication of the hybrid approach during a more extended period, the next case deals with 
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VI. TAIWAN 1970s–2016 
The beginning of modern Chinese history arguably straddles the last decade of the 
nineteenth century and the first of the twentieth. This period marks the end of the imperial 
system that reigns in China for thousands of years. The End of the Chinese Empire also 
marks the beginning of a turbulent process of change in the Chinese state system and the 
estrangement between Mainland China and Taiwan. 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The island of Taiwan was a province of the Chinese Empire under the Qing dynasty 
until 1895, when the Empire of Japan defeated the Chinese land and maritime forces in the 
First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895). Consequently, Japan occupied Taiwan and other 
islands. Despite the iron fist Japan used to govern the new colony, the Japanese governorate 
was instrumental in the creation of modern infrastructure, a formal education system, and 
the launch of the island’s industrialization. On the other hand, Mainland China continued 
to suffer under the millennial Chinese imperial rule and a longstanding Western 
exploitation. At the beginning of the twentieth century, however, the worldwide flourishing 
of revolutionary thoughts and underground movements also influenced Mainland China. 
In 1911, members of the New Chinese Army—created after the defeat with Japan and 
influenced by revolutionary thoughts—launched the Wuchang Uprising that signaled the 
beginning of the Xinhai Revolution that finally led in 1912 to the downfall of the Qing 
dynasty. 
In 1912, the Republic of China replaced the Chinese Empire on the mainland, 
giving way to a very turbulent period in the Chinese history. In 1913, the newly elected 
president Yuan Shikai, former army general to whom the new republic promised the 
presidency in exchange for support for the rebellion, dissolved the majority party 
Kuomintang (KMT) and declared himself emperor in 1915.426 Shikai’s power 
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centralization enraged the provincial governors; hence, many of them declared their 
provinces’ independence, dropping the mainland in a decade-long period of warlordism.427 
At the same time, young Taiwanese studying at Japanese universities took the opportunity 
to form an “Enlightened society” aimed at preserving Taiwanese culture and national 
identity.428 In 1925, on the mainland, Chiang Kai-shek became the leader of the 
regenerated KMT, and one year later, with the support of the Soviet Union and 
simultaneously, the newly-founded Chinese communist movement, started a military 
reunification campaign. However, in 1927, Chiang quickly realized the communist plan to 
eradicate the KMT. Accordingly, he started a violent purge of the communist movement. 
On the other hand, in south China, where the communist movement outnumbered the 
nationalists, the scenario repeated itself with inverted roles. The conflict between the 
Chinese nationalist and communist movements led to the Chinese Civil War that lasted 
until 1949.429 
The end of World War II and the defeat of the Japanese Empire re-ignited the 
conflict between the nationalists of Chiang Kai-shek and the communists of Mao Zedong. 
Immediately after the Japanese surrender, skirmishes erupted between the two actors and 
escalated into a full-scale civil war in June 1946. At the same time, the KMT troops and 
officials, with the U.S. support, took over the island of Taiwan, marking an end to the 50-
year-long Japanese colonial rule. Despite the initial euphoria, the Taiwanese islanders soon 
became disappointed by the incompetence and authoritarianism shown by the new rulers, 
the KMT mainlanders.430 On the mainland, the Chinese communists, emboldened by 
growing popular support, gradually inflicted a series of devastating defeats on the 
nationalists of Chiang Kai-shek. The nationalists, recognizing the impossibility of 
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maintaining control of the mainland, evacuated their troops, the KMT officials, and the 
Republic of China’s (ROC) political apparatus to the only part of China still in their hands, 
the island of Taiwan. 
The conflict between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the ROC, or 
Taiwan, has evolved over the years into a small-state–great-power conflict. To date, the 
vast majority of states do not officially recognize Taiwan as an independent state, but rather 
as an integral part of China. Consequently, the question arises as to why one should analyze 
the asymmetrical relationship between these two countries in the framework of a small-
state–great-power relationship. Despite lacking de jure recognition of Taiwan as a state, de 
facto it is. Indeed, Taiwan shows primary state characteristics: it maintain the monopoly of 
the legitimate use of force on its territory, it has a political organization, a centralized 
government, and a society able to provide productivity and political interest in practical 
terms.431 Hence, Taiwan is a fully formed state able to generate political power. Therefore, 
despite neither China nor Taiwan officially recognizing the other’s sovereignty, or refuting 
the other’s authority to govern, this thesis considers Taiwan a state. 
Since the escape of the Kuomintang (KMT) leader Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT 
governmental apparatus to the island of Taiwan in 1949 until the beginning of the 1970s, 
relations between the mainland PRC and the Taiwan KMT were belligerent and mainly 
focused on military confrontation. The Chinese Communist Party leader Mao Zedong 
aimed to definitively defeat the KMT by invading Taiwan, while Chiang Kai-shek aimed 
to retake the mainland. The two parallel alliances, the Sino-Soviet continental and the U.S.-
ROC maritime alliances, in addition to the conflict in Korea polarizing these positions 
between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, probably had a fundamental role in preventing 
an armed confrontation that would have dragged in the major allies on both sides. Yet, in 
1954–55 and 1958, two Taiwan Strait crises brought the PRC and ROC close to a military 
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confrontation. The first time, a brief armed conflict took place regarding the occupation of 
the Yijiangshan, Tachen, Kinmen, and Matsu islands in the Taiwan Strait. Despite its initial 
success, the PRC backed down after United States intervened, demonstrating military 
support for the ROC and threatening the use of nuclear weapons.432 In August 1958, the 
PRC again started to bomb Kinmen and Matsu islands. Despite the decrease of 
bombardment after October 1958, the PRC and the ROC continued to bombard each other 
sporadically until 1979. 
Until the 1970s, the PRC, despite its connections with other countries, mainly from 
the eastern bloc, was de facto relatively isolated from international relations, allowing the 
ROC to officially represent China on the international stage and maintain diplomatic ties 
with numerous countries around the world. The Sino-Soviet split that started in the second 
half of the 1950s and reached its climax at the end of the 1960s with the Sino-Soviet border 
conflict, pushed the PRC onto the international stage.433 Eventually, the fracturing 
between the Soviet Union and the PRC convinced the U.S. government to approach the 
PRC to weaken the Soviet Union. Thus, in July 1971 Nixon’s security advisor Henry 
Kissinger secretly met with China’s head of government Zhou Enlai in Beijing.434 This 
visit was instrumental in paving the way for the UN’s recognition of the PRC as the only 
representative of China in October 1971 and the PRC’s consequent takeover of the China 
seat on the UN Security Council. Until 1971, the ROC occupied the China seat at the United 
Nations, allowing Taipei to maintain an extensive network of diplomatic relations with the 
rest of the world. Nevertheless, the ROC pull-out from the United Nations signaled a key 
change for international relations in both countries and was the beginning of the ROC’s 
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political isolation.435 Beijing was ultimately able to block the ROC from developing and 
maintaining its diplomatic ties.436 Arguably, these two moments—the recognition of the 
PRC as the only representative of China in 1971 by the United Nations and a year later by 
the United States in the Shanghai Communiqué during President Richard Nixon’s visit to 
China—represent the major milestones that laid the groundwork for the asymmetric 
relationship between Taiwan and Mainland China. 
In the 1970s, despite increasing pressure from Mainland China on the international 
stage, Taiwan was able to advance fundamental changes in its economy and its political 
structure. After the PRC’s recognition by the UN and the United States, Taiwan appeared 
condemned to political collapse: by 1975, all its diplomatic liaisons in Southeast Asia were 
gone. Yet, Taiwan did not rest on its growing political smallness but focused on economic 
reforms. During the 1970s, Taiwan successfully switched away from low-cost 
manufacturing based on foreign technology to an independent manufacturing country 
focused on electronic components for emerging information technologies.437 A 
combination of dynamic private entrepreneurship and significant state-supported 
development projects and policies allowed Taiwan to become one of the four Asian 
Tigers.438 Taiwan’s roaring economy generated a growing middle-class of entrepreneurs 
mostly dominated by Taiwan natives who increasingly pressured the KMT mainlanders to 
focus its resources and political commitment more on the needs of the island, its people 
and the economy, and not on the increasingly vanishing dream of reunification with the 
mainland.439 Finally, the death of Chiang Kai-shek in 1975 most strongly signaled the 
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decline of the KMT’s mainland-led nationalism and primacy, and furthermore catalyzed 
the Taiwanese democratization process. 
At the same time, profound changes on the mainland allowed Beijing to expand its 
influence worldwide and pave the way for strategy change over the “Taiwan question.” 
During the 1970s, China was recovering from Mao’s 1960s Cultural Revolution, the cause 
of significant social and economic setback.440 Beijing increasingly established diplomatic 
ties worldwide undercutting Taipei’s international recognition and status.441 In 1976, 
Mao’s death opened the door to a new generation of PRC leaders, resolute to approach the 
relationships with Taiwan in a less bellicose way and to emphasize a more indirect 
approach.442 In January 1979, the U.S. administration withdrew its state recognition of 
Taiwan, and switched its diplomatic representation to Beijing. Furthermore, President 
Carter went on to abrogate the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the 
Republic of China. However, in April of the same year, the treaty was replaced by the 
Taiwan Relations Act, which re-formed diplomatic relations between the United States and 
Taiwan, as well as U.S. support of the latter in the military domain.443 This approach sealed 
the so-called U.S. “strategic ambiguity” that was meant to dissuade both Taiwan and China 
from unilateral actions toward the other.444 
During the 1980s, the Taiwan government started to relax the KMT notion of 
reunification with Mainland China. For decades, both sides of the Taiwan Strait swore to 
liberate by force the other part of the strait from what they saw as the opposition and 
illegitimate government of China. Taiwan, however, witnessed its international diplomatic 
ties eroding and a growing friendship between the United States and China. In August 
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1982, the Sino-U.S. Shanghai II Communiqué restated that the United States would not 
have pursued a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan and that the qualitative and 
quantitative sales level would not exceed the current level.445 Yet, according to its 
“strategic ambiguity,” while officializing the Shanghai II, the United States established 
with Taipei the “Six Assurances,” which underlined the content of the Taiwan Relations 
Act and restated the major power’s willingness to help Taiwan in its defense in case China 
attempted to retake the island of Taiwan by force.446 Meanwhile, China set out to 
undermine international recognition of the ROC, and the number of governments 
recognizing the Taiwanese KMT government was on a constant decline. In 1985, only 23 
governments worldwide recognized Taipei as the representative of China. At the same 
time, Taipei established a new “pragmatic diplomacy” concept, which shifted its focus off 
of the recognition of Taiwan as the only Chinese representative and onto the daily business 
of political and economic affairs; this allowed Taipei to switch from decreasing diplomatic 
representations to increasing “representatives offices” worldwide.447 In the 1980s, Taiwan 
eventually realized that the KMT reunification goal was not achievable. The increase of 
Mainland China’s importance and recognition on the international stage, the U.S. push for 
a peaceful reconciliation, and pragmatic economic interests, all convinced the Taiwanese 
leadership that it was time for Taiwan to move forward. 
Chiang Kai-shek’s son, Chiang Ching-kuo who followed his father as leader of the 
KMT and president of ROC, was pivotal in the Taiwanese process of democratization and 
progress. In 1984, Chiang decided to break the tradition of assigning mainlanders in high 
government positions by appointing the insular Lee Teng-hui as his vice president. 
Furthermore, he gradually loosened his father’s hard hand against opposition movements. 
In fact, despite opposition parties still being officially outlawed, in 1986 he informally 
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accepted the foundation of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).448 Moreover, in July 
1987, Chiang made the historic decision to end, after 38 years, martial law on Taiwan, 
allowing Taiwanese citizens to visit Mainland China.449 Chiang’s premature death in 1988 
did not stop the democratization process of the island; his successor Lee Teng-hui brought 
Taiwan into the next phase. 
During his presidency, Lee Teng-hui started a “Taiwanization” process that 
comprehensively affected Taiwanese society, while causing alternating relations of conflict 
and conciliation with the mainland. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the Taiwanese 
identity started to supplant the Chinese one in many areas of Taiwan’s culture including 
arts, media, and education but also in politics.450 In 1991, President Lee started a reform 
of the political system aimed at supplanting the anachronistic KMT political structure. He 
reformed the Legislative Yuan as the parliament of Taiwan and not, as the Chiang Family 
insisted for decades, as the whole of China parliament, by streamlining the island’s political 
system, abolishing the Taiwanese province structure and refocusing on Taiwan as a 
state.451 Lee’s pursuit of Taiwan’s de jure statehood did not go unnoticed in Beijing, which 
observed Lee’s shift toward independence. Their interpretation was mainly focused on 
Lee’s personality and less on the ongoing social changes on the island, believing that the 
Taiwanese continued to yearn for unification.452 Confirming Beijing’s interpretation, in 
January 1990, Taipei appealed the investment ban on China that had officially prevented 
Taiwanese entrepreneurs from investing in the mainland.453 Furthermore, the leading 
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KMT party conducted secret talks with Beijing representatives to discuss the reunification 
issue, leading to the controversial “1992 Consensus” about one China, two 
interpretations.454 The Taiwanese decision was not so much an approach to reunification 
but dictated by the new challenges that Taiwanese microelectronics companies faced on 
the world market that encouraged a shift of the standardized manufacturing to Mainland 
China.455 This caused economic relations between Taiwan and China to intensify. At the 
same time during the 1990s, Taipei intensified its relations with other Southeast Asian 
countries, and in 1994, in order to redirect Taiwanese investments from China to Southeast 
Asia, Lee promoted a southward policy.456 Taipei’s pursuit of economic and foreign 
policies alien to the one-China policy, combined with the increasing U.S. compliancy 
toward Taiwan, compelled Beijing to resort to intimidating measures. 
In the mid-1990s, China’s use of military instruments as intimidation measures only 
brought to light the weaknesses of Beijing’s strategy when it came to its one-China policy. 
Taiwan’s independence shift had already alerted Chinese leaders, but when President Lee 
received permission from the U.S. government to officially visit Cornell University (his 
alma mater) in the summer of 1995, Beijing saw this as a tipping point that it could not 
overlook. Eventually, in the following months, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
conducted missile tests and military maneuvers in the Strait of Taiwan, triggering the 
“Third Taiwan Strait Crisis.”457 On March 8, 1996, arguably to influence the Taiwanese 
population just before the Taiwan presidential elections, China conducted another series of 
missile “tests” in the proximity of two Taiwanese major international sea ports, Keelung 
and Kaohsiung. These actions not only had consequences for international shipping and 
flying routes but also triggered a major U.S. response, namely President Clinton’s decision 
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to send two Air Carrier Battle Groups into the region.458 China’s military enterprise had 
negative consequences for Beijing. First, it did not prevent Lee Teng-hui from becoming 
the first president of Taiwan by popular vote; on the contrary, a rally-around-the-flag effect 
increased Taiwanese distrust toward the Chinese narrative about peaceful reunification. 
Second, it increased the military relationships and arms sales between the United States 
and Taiwan.459 Third, the PLA’s relative impotence in front of the U.S. military 
deployment highlighted China’s weaknesses in the maritime domain, demonstrating to 
Beijing the importance of investing in sea power. 
At the dawn of the 2000s, Taiwanese independence aspirations seemed to have 
taken over the historical goal of rejoining the mainland. In 2000, Chen Shui-bian, the 
candidate of the Democratic Progressive Party won the Taiwanese presidential election. 
From the beginning, in line with his party program and pursuing his predecessor’s 
“Taiwanization,” Chen took many steps to underline Taiwan’s distinctiveness from China. 
For instance, emphasis on the island language, Minnan, for official purposes increased; the 
name “Republic of China” was increasingly replaced by “Taiwan”; and school history 
programs started to detach the island’s history from its mainland context.460 Chen’s hostile 
attitude toward the mainland made cross-Strait relations complicated and political 
exchange drastically decreased.461 In 2001, China entered the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) further improving the conditions for external investors and enhancing its already-
increasing economic power. At the same time, Beijing realized that direct approaches based 
on political relations or military threat toward Taiwan carried out up to that point had 
failed.462 Beijing started to reiterate a policy based on strategic patience, underlining the 
                                                 
458 Barton Gellman, “U.S. and China Nearly Came to Blows in ‘96,” The Washington Post, June 21, 
1998, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1998/06/21/us-and-china-nearly-came-to-blows-
in-96/926d105f-1fd8-404c-9995-90984f86a613/?utm_term=.46c78abac520. 
459 Shirley A. Kan, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990, CRS Report no. RL30957 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 29, 2014), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL30957.pdf. 2. 
460 Manthorpe, Forbidden Nation, 232–233. 
461 Tsai, “The Nature and Trend of Taiwanese Investment in China (1991-2014),” 133. 
462 Manthorpe, Forbidden Nation, 236. 
145 
 
fact that unification must not forcibly come soon.463 Beijing’s strategy change was a 
switch to a more indirect approach rather than an admission of defeat. Taiwanese 
entrepreneurs continued to increase their investments in the mainland, reinforcing 
economic ties that the DDP government tried unsuccessfully to scale back through an 
“invest in Taiwan” policy.464 The slowdown of the Taiwanese economy between 2000 and 
2008 may also have compelled Taiwanese entrepreneurs to invest in the Chinese market, 
which was not hit so hard from the 2001 and 2008 worldwide economic recessions.465 
Therefore, at least in the economic domain, Taiwan’s position toward China was shifting 
from competitor to partner. 
The return to power of the KMT allowed China to relax tensions in relations 
between the two countries accumulated by the two previous presidents. During the 2004 
presidential election campaign, the outgoing president Chen Shui-bian refueled the 
independence rhetoric supporting the intent to pass a law that allowed constitutional 
changes by popular referendum. After his disputed re-election, in June 2005 he 
successfully pushed through the referendum prerequisite for future constitutional 
revisions.466 However, Beijing—based on Cheng’s campaign rhetoric in 2004, and fearing 
a Taiwanese escape forward toward a formal independence referendum—this time did not 
react as in 1996 in a direct military way. Instead, in March 2005 the PRC passed an anti-
secession law that explicitly underlined China’s willingness for a peaceful reunification 
while reasserting the use of non-peaceful means in case of a Taiwanese unilateral 
declaration of independence.467 After 2006 the increasing corruption allegation that 
affected President Cheng and his entourage, as well as the tension in the cross-Strait 
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relationship and an unstable economic situation, paved the way for the KMT rising star Ma 
Ying-jeou. 
In 2008, Ma Ying-jeou after winning the presidential election quickly and deeply 
reversed the previous administration’s confrontational approach toward China, reinitiating 
interaction with the mainland. While maintaining his three-no’s policy: “no reunification, 
no independence, and no war,” Ma was able to balance Taiwanese fear of a forced 
reunification and Chinese apprehension about Taiwanese independence. In 2008, Ma 
relaxed the restrictions on sea and air connections with the mainland. In 2010, he signed 
the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), a preferential trade agreement 
that provides a reduction of tariffs and commercial barriers between China and Taiwan. 
Despite its economic advantages, the ECFA is a very controversial topic in Taiwan. 
Already during the discussions that led to its ratification, the opposition party DDP had 
complained about the danger of ECFA creating economic ties with China so critical that 
they could be exploited by the latter for political reasons.468 Furthermore, Taipei and 
Beijing ceased diplomatic competition about recognition as the true China.469 
Consequently, Ma’s administration was able to regenerate diplomatic ties with some 
Southeast Asian countries including Singapore. 
The rapprochement with China created more ties but did not bear the economic 
results set forth by Taipei. During the presidential election, Ma Ying-jeou was able to 
convince the Taiwanese majority that the KMT would be able to handle cross-Strait 
relations with China more quickly than the DDP and that an improved relationship with 
Mainland China would bring growth and development. Despite regenerating the 
relationship between Taipei and Beijing and the signing of the ECFA, between 2008 and 
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2014 the unemployment rate in Taiwan increased and its economy grew slowly.470 In 
2013, Ma’s administration signed the Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement (CSSTA) 
with China to liberalize trade service between the two countries. The government 
advocated that more Chinese investments would have boosted the Taiwanese economy. By 
contrast, the opposition party DDP and the public opinion, in general, feared a “Trojan 
Horse” that would have handed over mass media and high-tech firms to the mainland.471 
As a result, Taipei did not ratify the CSTA. In the eyes of the Taiwanese majority and of 
the DDP, Ma and the KMT had brought the island dangerously closer to the mainland, 
creating links that could threaten the political independence of the country. 
Consequently, the DDP won the local elections in 2014, and in 2016, it won the 
presidential-parliamentary election, achieving for the first time a majority in parliament. 
Since his election, President Tsai Ing-wen has pursued a pragmatic policy towards the 
cross-Strait relations based on the status quo. The DDP, recognizing the dangers of a 
unilateral declaration of independence has set aside the objective of a formal declaration 
of independence pursuing instead a de facto independence that continues to make Taiwan 
a sovereign state. 
B. PMESI VULNERABILITIES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
Taiwan undertook numerous institutional changes over the years that had 
fundamentally positive effects. The agrarian reform program initiated in the 1950s made it 
possible to improve equity within the country, laying the foundations for the light industrial 
revolution during the 1960s and 1970s.472 During the 1970s, critical events such as the 
death of Chiang Kai-shek, the increasing isolation of the ROC government, and the central 
importance of economic growth dominated by islander entrepreneurs led the ground for 
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the democratization process.473 These developments triggered domestic institutional 
changes that initiated an integration process between KMT mainlanders and Taiwanese 
islanders, decreasing the pressure that until that point the Chang Kai-shek regime had 
exercised on the islander population. In the 1970s, Chiang Chin-kuo started to promote 
islanders to provincial and local government posts making an effort to integrate Taiwanese 
into the KMT organization, at both low levels and at leadership levels.474 In 1973, the 
government started to inject money into scientific research and education institutions like 
the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI), the Academia Sinica as well as the 
Tsinghua and Taiwan universities, encouraging cooperation between scientists, 
manufacturers, and policy makers.475 Finally, in 1987 he ended martial law, enabling 
massive changes in Taiwan’s political scene by opening the door to islander political 
independence and allowing freedom of the press in the political domain. 
All these institutional changes allowed Taiwan to continually decrease the political 
constriction of the islander, increasingly integrating them into the political decision-
making process. Furthermore, the growing openness diffused the distrust between the 
political elite (mostly mainlanders) and the increasingly powerful economic elite (mostly 
islanders), enhancing the environmental adaptability of the state that now was more and 
more able to rely on a decision-making process based on discussion rather than imposition. 
The fact that within five decades Taiwan was able to evolve from a preindustrial 
agricultural state in 1949 into a worldwide high-tech leading country at the dawn of the 
21st century testifies to its high adaptability to environmental changes. 
Greater political openness and participation allowed independents to accede to 
power and to implement institutional changes that exposed some vulnerabilities. The two 
presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian who led Taiwan for two decades pushed 
Taiwan away from a formal reunification with the mainland, hence increasing the rift 
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between conservative KMT members and fueling Beijing malevolence. Lee’s concept of 
“one China, two political diplomacies” and Chen’s ideology of “a zero-sum game with 
China” did nothing but increase polarization in the homeland. The mistrust between the 
DDP and the KMT and their coalitions led during the Chen administration to a decrease in 
military capabilities.476 Moreover, it contributed to the disruption of Taiwan’s diplomatic 
network, closing the doors to the ROC’s membership in supranational organizations, or 
imposing conditions to the ROC membership. 
For decades, China has successfully sought to reduce Taiwan’s diplomatic relations 
with other countries to counter Taipei’s independence drift. When in the early 1970s, the 
United States initiated the “One-China policy” and the United Nations officially recognized 
the PRC as the only representative of China to the United Nations, China saw this as an 
opportunity to isolate Taiwan diplomatically. For instance, within five years of China’s 
first investment in Africa, the number of African states recognizing Taiwan fell from 13 to 
only 4.477 Both Chinese presidents Hu Jintao and  Xi Jinping prioritized the prevention of 
Taiwan’s de jure independence over the promotion of reunification.478 Taiwan has tried 
over the years through “dollar diplomacy” to offer economic and technological assistance 
and benefits to minor countries around the world; however, the number of states officially 
recognizing Taiwan eroded constantly over the years reaching the actual number of 17, 
including the Holy See.479 Therefore, aggressive institutional changes focused on 
distinguishing Taiwan from China has had a detrimental effect on Taipei diplomatic 
network. 
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The decline of its lack of an official state-to-state diplomatic network has forced 
Taipei to depend on various international organizations and partners. From 1949, Taiwan 
had a relationship of dependence with the United States, and still today maintains this 
dependency in the political and military domains.480 Hence, every time Taipei undertakes 
a political decision that could degrade the security context with China, the Taiwanese 
government must consider Washington’s position on the matter. Therefore, Taiwan has 
reduced environmental adaptability. At the same time, the close ties with the United States 
in the military domain allow Taiwan to relax its military capabilities. The consequences 
demonstrate Taiwan’s dependence on international organizations particularly following its 
expulsion from the United Nations in 1971. Indeed, the KMT’s loss of legitimacy at the 
international level also weakened its legitimacy at home, forcing the party to regenerate 
legitimacy by starting a democratization process.481 As such, the dependence on 
international organizations caused institutional changes at home. 
Over the years, China, to avoid Taiwan’s de jure recognition, has tried to reduce 
the ROC’s representation in supranational organizations. During the 1970s and 1980s, 
China actively sought to decrease Taiwan’s representation in intergovernmental 
organizations (IGO) by requesting to expel Taiwan or degrade it to a regional 
representative as a precondition for China’s admission.482 This goal is almost achieved, 
given that Taiwan is excluded from almost all international governmental organizations.483 
China has thus actively decreased Taiwan’s membership in supranational organizations 
and multilateral economic organizations. 
Taipei seeks to remedy its lack of diplomatic ties and membership in supranational 
organizations through economic sub-state diplomacy. Starting with its economic boom in 
the 1960s and 1970s, Taiwan has developed a robust trade and investment network and 
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relationships at a corporative and individual level around the world that allows Taiwan to 
shortcut official diplomatic channels and supplement its diplomatic weakness with sub-
state diplomacy.484 However, economic sub-state diplomacy can also induce domestic 
institutional changes. For instance, in 1996, the powerful Taiwanese elite entrepreneurs, 
the Taishang, of the high-tech sector cast sharp criticism of President Lee’s “go slow” 
policy toward Taiwanese investments in China; eventually, this criticism pushed Taipei to 
change its policy to an “active opening, effective management.”485 Hence, economic sub-
state diplomacy turns out to be an essential opportunity for Taiwan, even though in the 
future it could become a source of vulnerability if the Taishang were exploited by the PRC 
to influence the Taiwanese political decision-making process. 
Similarly, in the political domain sub-state diplomacy enhances Taiwan’s ability to 
influence policies in other states through lobbyist groups. For instance, at the end of 1978, 
after the announcement about the normalization of the U.S.-Sino diplomatic relations and 
the withdrawal of Taiwan’s state recognition, Taiwanese diplomats in the United States 
and Taiwanese American scholars organized a lobbying campaign which eventually led to 
the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) approved by the U.S. Congress in 1979.486 The U.S. 
“ambiguity strategy,” as well as the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Offices 
(TECRO) that Taiwan has in 75 countries are rooted in the principle of sub-state diplomacy 
that allows the ROC to supplement its weak diplomatic network. This is how the ROC 
maintains its most-important ties with the United States in order to enhance its reduced 
military capabilities. 
The U.S. government’s support remains a cornerstone of Taiwan’s defense. The 
TRA of 1979 specifies that the United States should provide Taiwan with arms to enable 
the ROC to maintain its self-defense capabilities. Despite that in the “Three Joint 
Communiqué” of 1982 the United States agreed to decrease arms sales to Taiwan, from 
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the beginning of the 1990s until 2017 the United States continues to regularly sell 
armament to Taiwan.487 Furthermore, the “Six Assurances” agreed by the Reagan 
Administration in 1982 and formally adopted by the U.S. House of Representatives in 2016 
restated that there are “no plans to seek revisions to the Taiwan Relations Act.”488 
Therefore, the United States continues to provide arms and military equipment to the ROC, 
relaxing pressure on the latter for its inability to join a military alliance, and formally 
enhancing its military capabilities. 
Taiwan over the years has implemented various institutional measures to adapt its 
military posture; nevertheless, in recent years economic pressure has pushed Taiwan to 
reforms that could increase its vulnerability in the military domain. In recent decades 
Taipei has implemented structural reforms to Taiwan’s military by reducing its personnel 
from 370,000 (2000s) to 170,000–180,000 (2017), rationalizing the chain of command, 
enhancing its joint-ness and rapid reaction capabilities, as well as engaging with the 
development of a national armaments industry focused on area denial weapons such as 
land-attack and anti-ship cruise missiles.489 These changes have contributed to Taiwan’s 
ability to relax over its reduced military capabilities and the vulnerability given by the 
impossibility of entering a military alliance. In the early 2000s, the Taiwanese government 
decided to switch from conscription to an all-volunteer force by 2019 in order to improve 
the proficiency and readiness of its military organization.490 Military analysts and scholars 
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are divided about whether this decision will improve ROC defense capabilities.491 The 
transition from a conscription system to an all-volunteer force not only demands increased 
personnel costs to the detriment of the investment budget, but also could consistently 
disrupt an essential pillar of Taiwan’s deterrence potential, namely its reserve. The RAND 
report Transformation of Taiwan’s Reserve Force consistently argues that the 2.5–3.5 
million military and civilian reservists represent a crucial deterrent factor in case of a PRC 
decision to force reunification.492 Hence, even though the current strategy still considers 
military reservists and civil contractors irregular forces, the dismantling of the conscription 
system could drain these two crucial sources of strength that helped Taiwan in the past to 
bridge its reduced military capabilities. 
In recent years, China has taken a leading role in supplying Taiwan with critical 
import goods, exposing Taiwan to future pressure. As an island, Taiwan is highly 
dependent on natural energy resources, electrical machinery equipment, and food 
imports.493 From the early 2000s, the steadily increasing trade relationship between 
Taiwan and China has dramatically amplified Taiwan’s dependency on Chinese strategic 
imports. In 2000, China represented Taiwan’s fifth major trade partner (3.63%), while in 
2018 it has become the first one (24.19%) (Figure 11). As in 2018, Mainland China 
accounts for 63.9 percent and 85.5 percent of all Taiwan imported agriculture and industrial 
categories.494 Becoming the largest importer in Taiwan, China will increasingly be able to 
leverage Taiwan’s vital strategic imports. 
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Figure 11. Taiwan’s Five Major Trade Partners, 2000–2018495 
Taiwan has become increasingly vulnerable to China’s economic policy changes. 
The ROC and PRC have become economically tightly bound.496 The bilateral ECFA 
opened numerous trade sectors for both Taiwan and China, encouraging Taiwan to invest 
about 70% of its foreign direct investments (FDI) in China.497 Nonetheless, the 
exceptionally high FDI in China prevents Taiwan from investing in other countries and 
accordingly, from geographically diversifying its investments. Furthermore, Taiwan has a 
sizeable foreign-trade surplus in its trade with the PRC, and its high-tech industry’s export 
is highly dependent on the supply relationship with the mainland.498 Taiwan industrial 
manufacturing and sales are thus increasingly entangled with Chinese producers. On the 
other hand, the significance of Taiwan in relation to Chinese foreign trade has 
diminished.499 This “embrace” by Beijing could indicate a trend like the one observed in 
the case of Hong Kong, where what started as an increase in economic relations 
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transformed into the exercise of political pressure. Through its economic opening, China 
has already demonstrated with the ECFA that it can influence institutional changes in 
Taiwan, even though the change can lead to polarization within Taiwanese society as was 
the case for the CSSTA. Therefore, China will be able to impose economic policy changes 
in order to shift the power balance in its favor. 
Taiwan seeks to maintain and develop economic relations also with other countries 
in Southeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific region. In the last 30 years, Taiwan has put much 
effort into creating economic ties with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) and its members. First by the two presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian, 
and more recently by the current president Tsai Ing-wen, however, as in the first two cases, 
China’s intervention has undermined the effort.500 President Tsai, since her election in 
2016, has tried to rekindle ties with ASEAN by increasing Taiwanese investments into 
infrastructure projects in the region.501 Taiwan’s effort to generate new bilateral and 
multilateral economic partnerships with other countries can be interpreted as an attempt to 
increase its export market diversification and its flexibility in the event of economic 
challenges due to policy changes by its principal economic partner, China. 
Taiwan’s focus on high-tech niche products has allowed the country to leverage its 
position among the leading nations in this sector. In the 1970s, the Taiwanese government 
started its shift toward high-technology, low-energy industries allowing the island to 
become one of the world market leaders in semiconductors and electronics.502 Taiwan’s 
position in this specific IT market niche has various implications. First, Taiwan occupies a 
key position in the IT sector worldwide. In 1999, a power transmission tower in the 
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Taiwanese central mountains crumbled, interrupting the high-tech island industry for a day; 
this event almost doubled the price of microprocessors worldwide and slowed down the 
TFT-LCD flat screen supply for six months.503 This micro-scale example allows 
estimating what the disruption of the entire Taiwanese IT production would mean for the 
world production of IT systems, in case of an armed conflict between the mainland and 
Taiwan. Hence, governments worldwide should be interested in a peaceful relationship 
between Beijing and Taipei. Second, major Taiwanese IT companies are the turntable 
linking Taiwanese know-how, American technologies, and Chinese production 
capabilities.504 Hence, both major partners, the United States and China have extensive 
economic exposure with Taiwan. Third, China has not yet overcome its dependency on 
Taiwan in the high-tech and innovation sectors, meaning that Taiwan maintains a 
competitive advantage in those sectors, and Taipei arguably maintains a relationship of 
interdependence rather than one of strictly dependence.505 Therefore, Taiwan’s focus on 
niche IT products allows the island—at least in the economy domain—to reach a degree of 
local and global influence that otherwise it would not achieve. Taiwan takes advantage of 
this opportunity to increase its adaptability to economic challenges and to empower its 
Taishang sub-state diplomacy. Nonetheless, China, through targeted acquisitions and state-
sponsored investments in research and development programs, is increasingly filling the 
gap with the Taiwanese industries.506 Thus, as long as Taiwan manages to maintain a gap 
with China in cutting-edge technology, it remains unlikely that Beijing will enforce 
economic sanctions on Taipei. 
Beijing’s “One-China” policy, by attempting to target Taiwan’s specific societal 
vulnerabilities, has done nothing but reinvigorate Taiwanese feelings of self-determination. 
From the PRC’s point of view, the “One-China” policy is a zero-sum game that consistently 
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asserts that there is only one China; hence, Taiwan belongs to China, and the PRC is the 
only legitimate government to represent China. Therefore, Taiwan should not be 
recognized internationally as a state government. Beijing exploits both tenets to isolate 
Taiwan and increase political and economic pressure on the island. China’s bully attitude 
toward Taiwan has for a long time polarized the Taiwanese political environment. In the 
last two decades, however, the continuous isolationist policy conducted by Beijing may 
have led the population, especially in the younger generations, to a specific trend of not 
only rejecting the idea of reunification and therefore of “One China,” but also rejecting 
more and more the very concept of being “Chinese.”507 A survey of the Taiwan Elections 
and Democratizations study shows that in 1992, the percentage of interviewed Taiwanese 
citizens who identify as Taiwanese, Chinese, or both were respectively 18%, 26%, and 
46%; while in 2016 the percentages were 59%, 3%, and 34%.508 Furthermore, the PRC’s 
assertive attitude has instigated the sociopolitical elites to assume a “trenching” mentality 
toward Beijing.509 Thus, Beijing’s attitude and appropriation of the “Chinese identity,” 
instead of polarizing Taiwanese society or persuading citizens to rejoin the mainland, has 
caused an increased Taiwanese social cohesion around the idea of being an independent 
country. 
Taiwanese society is the catalyst that has allowed Taiwan to achieve remarkable 
economic goals while maintaining its political independence. The gradual process of 
economic and political democratization permitted Taiwanese society to weave a robust 
social network and strengthen political, economic, and social exchanges, and bolster 
entrepreneurship.510 Until the termination of the KMT hegemony towards the end of the 
1980s, islander Taiwanese felt like second-rate citizens at home; many social elements 
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including history, religion, and language were discriminated against by the mainlander 
ruling class.511 In the 1990s, the new political openness encouraged the rise of the “New 
Taiwanese” citizen identity. This new identity progressively provided stable and favorable 
conditions for Taiwan political and social development, respecting and increasingly 
encouraging societal pluralism. Therefore, social groups that until then were marginalized 
were now gradually integrated into a Taiwanese society that became more pluralistic and 
active. The highly dynamic political life encourages discussion and critical thinking. At the 
same time, the virulent and critical discussions around the cross-strait relationship should 
not be misunderstood as an a priori dislike for China. During his second term, the 
Taiwanese president Chen Shui-bian initialized a deliberate attempt to elevate Taiwanese 
culture by institutionally and culturally discarding islander Chinese heritage. Chen’s 
reform rebounded because, for most of the Taiwanese, pro-Taiwan does not necessarily 
mean anti-China.512 Consequently, Taiwan political thinking shifted from the binary 
posture focused on “unification or independence” to a more pragmatic one focused on 
“people’s capability to determine their future.”513 This change in Taiwan’s political 
posture has undoubtedly contributed to strengthening social cohesion, allowing Taiwan to 
increase its adaptability to changes in the political environment. 
In the past, China has sought to exploit critical figures in Taiwanese society as 
agents of influence. Numerous Taishang economically active on the mainland have 
developed long and deep relationships with local Chinese governments, which in exchange 
for benevolent treatment has pressed the entrepreneurs into “reunification-friendly” voting 
behavior.514 The economic favoritism did not work out so well, however, mainly because 
the Taishang are not interested in getting involved in political discussions that can 
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undermine their business on either shore of the strait.515 Thus, in the early 2000s, Beijing 
changed its target and started a charm offensive toward mainlander KMT members, 
inviting them to China and even persuading a few anti-Chen DDP members to take 
advantage of the Chinese Communist Party’s generosity.516 It is tough to evaluate how far 
this strategy influenced President Ma’s rise to power in 2008 and his rapprochement 
policies toward China, yet Chinese favoritism-based strategy has undoubtedly contributed 
to increasing mistrust among the political elite, particularly between the KMT and DDP 
coalitions. 
Since the late 1950s, the PRC has continuously tried to influence the ROC through 
different means. In 1958, the PLA put on the air “Voice of the Strait” (VOS), a radio 
broadcast that supports information operations for influencing Taiwan; over the years, 
VOS has evolved into an international broadcast that exploits different media channels.517 
China has never renounced the use of force as a possible option in order to prevent a formal 
separation from Taiwan and as a mean of influence. Conversely, on many occasions it has 
used military exercises in order to display its capability for carrying out military action 
against the island or, as in case of the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1954–55, 1958, and 1995–96, 
to attempt to coerce the Taiwanese government.518 The PLA has combined show-of-forces 
and readiness as a sophisticated means of influence. For instance, in the early 2000s, on its 
side of the strait, China started to build up an impressive arsenal of missiles aimed at 
Taiwan; this build up not only actually increases the PLA readiness in case of armed action 
against Taiwan but also represents an import element of influence toward the Taiwanese 
population. Indeed, the PRC missile build-up played a significant role in polarizing polls 
opinions during the Taiwanese election campaigns in 2004.519 Given the official position 
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of the PRC regarding reunification with the island of Taiwan, as well as the periodic 
military and media measures aimed at influencing the Taiwanese population and its 
political elite, it makes sense to believe that the PRC’s influence measures will also 
continue in the future. 
The Taipei government has on several occasions put in place measures to counter 
the influence of the mainland and to improve its posture in the informational domain. Since 
the beginning of its confrontation with the PRC in the late 1940s, the ROC has developed 
its own media channels in order to counter the communist propaganda. In 1942, the KMT 
founded the “Voice of Han” (VOH) a broadcasting station aimed at supporting the Chinese 
nationalist narrative, which over the 1990s evolved into the Taiwanese nationalist 
narrative, creating new communication channels on the internet and on social media.520 
Additionally, in 1949, the KMT after its withdrawal to Taiwan island founded “Voice of 
Free China,” which until 1998 was focused on Chinese nationalist propaganda; however, 
the government integrated the radio into the Taiwanese public service “Central 
Broadcasting System” changing the name first to “Radio Taipei International” and later to 
its current name “Radio Taiwan International.”521 Moreover, the KMT and later the 
Taiwanese government exploited print media in order to shape the informational 
environment, such as “Free China Review,” which was renamed “Taipei Review” in 2000 
and the “Free China Weekly,” which after some rounds of renaming changed into the 
current “Taiwan Journal.”522 Thus, Taipei supported a robust public service aimed at 
countering Chinese propaganda and communicating the government’s point of view. 
The increasingly dynamic Taiwanese media environment has prompted the 
Taiwanese government to intervene in order to ensure media diversity, with beneficial 
consequences for Taiwanese society. The lifting of martial law in 1987 signaled the start 
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of increasing deregulation of the media environment. The following two decades saw a 
dramatic increase of media outlets, shifting the informational sphere from the highly 
controlled and censored state-owned public media to a highly diversified multi-platform 
environment.523 Unfortunately, the increase in communication channels brought with it a 
significant loss of content quality, which stressed cheap, entertaining, and sensationalist-
oriented content.524 In 2007, the Taiwan Normal University conducted a survey on mass 
media; the results showed that two-thirds of the respondents argued that mass media and 
the related opportunity for individuals to create and spread news were the leading cause for 
Taiwan social distrust and disorder.525 The Taiwanese government perceived the growing 
distrust toward public service as created by uncontrolled reporting by the citizen media. 
Therefore, in the same year, the public broadcaster Public Television started a multimedia 
website focused on citizens’ journalism called People’s Post (PeoPo).526 PeoPo focuses 
citizens’ journalism on firsthand reporting rather than on second-hand commentaries on 
news reports, and supports citizen journalists with sophisticated online training programs 
that allow individual amateur journalists and social movements to improve their ability to 
produce and transmit news with a certain degree of quality.527 The PeoPo example shows 
how the Taiwanese government has succeeded with a public service initiative in enhancing 
media diversity by allowing individuals as well as social movements—that otherwise 
would not have much media attention—to produce and broadcast their own media content. 
As a result, media diversity has enhanced societal pluralism by facilitating and increasing 
the quality of the opinion exchanges between people of different social groups. 
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In the past, the Taiwanese government and its citizens opposed changes in the 
media landscape that would have undermined its diversity. In 2008, the return of the KMT 
to the government coincided with the start of an aggressive print and television media 
acquisition campaign by the Want Want China Times Group, a Taiwanese holding 
company with massive interests on the mainland.528 In 2012, the acquisition campaign 
reached its climax, when a Want Want-led investor group launched an offer to purchase 
major stocks of the Taiwanese Next Media Company, which would have put about 50 
percent of the Taiwanese media under Want Want control.529 The Next Media acquisition 
increasingly attracted great attention from the student “anti-media-monopoly” movement 
that criticized the increasing media monopoly for deteriorating Taiwanese democracy.530 
In addition to the monopoly aspect, Want Want represented other problems. Many 
Taiwanese perceive the Want Want Group as a strong pro-China corporation; its chairman, 
Tsai Eng-Meng overtly hopes for reunification and in the past expressed pro-Communist 
Party thought.531 Hence, it is not surprising that many Taiwanese feared that behind Mr. 
Tsai hid Beijing’s “long hand.” As of the time of this writing, there is no evidence of 
China’s support for Tsai’s acquisition plans. Yet numerous professionals in the media 
environment argue that Mr. Tsai intervened several times in the media of his property to 
limit the freedom of expression of his journalists.532 Consequently, the fear of Chinese 
interference, combined with the willingness to preserve freedom of the press, attracted 
more than 100,000 Taiwanese citizens, Taiwan’s media, and antitrust watchdogs as well 
as the Taiwanese National Communication Commission and the Free Trade Commission 
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to intervene and to announce their opposition to the acquisition.533 Finally, the National 
Communication Commission drafted the “Media Monopolization Prevention and Diversity 
Act” that defines the conditions under which the commission would not approve deals on 
media companies’ fusions. As a consequence, the Want Want Group and the other investors 
decided to pull out from the controversial deal.534 This case demonstrates the 
government’s willingness to prevent the threat of an alleged foreign takeover of Taiwanese 
media companies by implementing specific media regulations. 
C. ANALYSIS  
The Taiwan-China HT system shows a complexity degree that can be situated in 
between the two previous cases (Figure 12). Accordingly, the cross-linking values are an 
average of the Guatemala and Ukraine cases, demonstrating that despite the presence of a 
hybrid threat of more extensive proportions than in the Guatemala–U.S. case, in the case 
of Taiwan–China the hybrid threat is not so robust as in the Ukraine–Russia case. Both 
China and Taiwan do not exploit vulnerabilities and opportunities completely. 
Nonetheless, conversely to both previous cases the small state Taiwan exploits more 
opportunities, and in a more efficient way.535 
Taiwan exploits most of its opportunities while avoiding those which could trigger 
an adverse reaction from China. Taipei addresses opportunities and vulnerabilities across 
the PMESI spectrum. The exploited opportunities generate feedback loops that decrease 
some of Taiwan’s vulnerabilities. As the HT system shows, Taiwan does not engage in 
multilateral security arrangement, arguably for two reasons. First, ROC is de jure widely 
not recognized as a state; hence, a supranational security organization would not recognize 
Taiwan as a partner. Second, Taipei and other possible partners understand that engaging 
in this opportunity would trigger an adverse reaction from China toward both Taiwan and 
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the security partner. In this specific case, there is no evidence of internal violent conflicts, 
neither internally generated (as in the previous cases), nor generated or fueled by the great 
power (as in the Ukraine case). The absence of internal violent conflicts shows, on the one 
hand, the internal stability of Taiwan, and, on the other, the difficulty or lack of will on the 




Figure 12. Taiwan–China HT System 
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Taiwan has the most significant influence on the HT system. In contrast to the 
previous case, the small state Taiwan with a cross-linking value of 17 has a higher influence 
value than the great power China with 9. Hence, the small state is able to maintain the 
balance of power in its favor. The variable with the highest crosslinking value is a 
vulnerability. However, unlike the previous case, two of the four variables with the second 
highest value are opportunities that have a significant influence on the system. Conversely, 
both vulnerabilities with the second highest crosslinking value have a low active influence 
on the HT system (Table 4). Therefore, opportunities rather than vulnerabilities mostly run 
this HT system as a whole. 
Table 4. Taiwan–China HT System, Top Vulnerabilities and 
Opportunities536 
 Crosslink (AS+PS) Active Sum (AS) Passive Sum (PS) 




















































The systems analysis reveals that Taiwan has been able to generate positive effects 
from its vulnerabilities. Domestic institutional changes remains the central variable of the 
system (highest crosslink) that mostly influence the HT system as a whole (highest AS). 
The high crosslink value shows that the institutional decisions taken by the Taiwanese 
government are fundamental in the system dynamic. Furthermore, Taipei exploits this 
vulnerability in order to ease others and to support opportunities in other domains across 
                                                 




the PMESI spectrum. Hence, Taipei in some ways turns a vulnerability into an opportunity. 
Taiwan is conscious that its reduced military capabilities are a significant vulnerability 
confronting the PRC that has not yet ruled out armed intervention as a means of imposing 
reunification. 
Nonetheless, the ROC has been able to mitigate this vulnerability by direct 
intervention, through beneficial effects generated by other opportunities, or even by 
exploiting other vulnerabilities such as dependence on international organization/group of 
interest. The second most important variable for the system is sub-state diplomacy. The 
opportunity is not only central to the system but also is the opportunity that mostly 
influences the system itself. Hence, Taiwan’s sub-state diplomacy is crucial to generating 
positive effects on the system and, therefore, keeping the balance of power in favor of 
Taiwan. A further crucial element in the Taiwan-China HT system has been and still is 
Taiwan’s ability to relax internal differences between those who pursue reunification and 
those who would prefer independence. The two variables minority integration and 
polarization are respectively the second opportunity and the third vulnerability most 
important for the system. The integration between mainlander and islander was a pivotal 
opportunity to ease increasing social tensions during the first decades of democratization. 
Over the years the mainlander–pro-reunification and islander–pro-independence 
connotation have been exploited by local personalities for political purposes, and logically 
it could have also been exploited by China to fracture the Taiwanese society in order to 
weaken the government’s legitimacy. Yet, the creation of a Taiwanese society that 
embraces all social groups and goes beyond the two associations described earlier 
prevented deeper polarization. 
The HT system shows the significant influence that a third actor has on the dyadic 
relationship between Taiwan and China. Although the system is bounded around the 
relationship between the ROC and PRC, it is possible to appreciate the impact that the 
United States has on this dynamic. Taiwan dependence on group of interest expresses the 
U.S. influence, which encompasses U.S support to Taiwan. The vulnerability has the 
second highest active sum (AS) score, and so has a significant influence on the system. 
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Taiwan purposefully engages in this vulnerability, which has a positive effect in increasing 
Taiwan’s political domain opportunity and decreasing its major military domain 
vulnerability. 
Taiwan’s success in maintaining the power balance in its favor depends on its 
ability to maintain its good governance while strengthening specific opportunities and 
engaging some vulnerabilities. The ROC intervention variables confirm how crucial it is 
for Taipei to operationalize sound institutional changes (Figure 13). All the intervention 
variables in Quadrants I and II are variables that Taipei can control. Hence, Taiwan can 
continue to maintain the balance of power in its favor. 
 
Figure 13. Taiwan Intervention Variables 
The crucial intervention variable with the highest effect on the system in the 
shortest term remains Taiwan’s institutional changes (3). In the past, sound policy has 
allowed Taipei to maintain the balance of power with China. Nonetheless, examples show 
that some of Taipei’s poorly informed decisions had rapidly disruptive consequences on 
the relationship. Sub-state diplomacy (9) is an excellent opportunity that can have rapid 
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positive effects on the system. Taiwan should invest in maintaining this approach in order 
to fill the gap created by its lesser diplomatic network, which until now, despite China’s 
effort, does not seem to have a very detrimental effect on the balance of power. Although 
it seems completely trivial, the ability to count on a diverse media landscape enhances 
Taiwan’s resilience to falling victim to Beijing’s influence. Therefore, Taiwan should take 
care of its media diversity (32). Relations with China are a central theme for Taiwan, which 
in the past created distrust among the political elites as well as between the latter and the 
economic elite. Distrust within elites (5) is one of the vulnerabilities that Taiwan should 
keep an eye on. Two other variables must be taken into foremost consideration by Taiwan. 
Although they belong to Quadrant II and should have second priority, dependence on 
international organizations/group of interest (6) and focus on niche product (20) should 
be considered priority intervention variables. As previously mentioned, this vulnerability 
and this opportunity have a high degree of active influence on the system. Therefore, 
although their effect on the system is more delayed, Taiwan would do better to invest in 
maintaining a healthy relationship with its group of interest (specifically with the United 
States) and in preserving its worldwide leadership position in cutting-edge technology. 
The dyadic power relationship between Taipei and Beijing remain in favor of the 
small state because it was able to generate balancing loops, effectively ameliorating 




Figure 14. Taiwan’s Primary Reinforcing Feedback Loops 
Taiwan’s reinforcing feedback loops demonstrate that by engaging in opportunities 
and defusing vulnerabilities, the small state can generate dynamics that influence the 
balance of power with the great power in a way that the small state would not be able to 
through a direct confrontation. In the Taiwan–China case, the small state translates the 
domestic institutional change vulnerability into an opportunity, triggering strengthening 
loops across the entire PMESI spectrum. Furthermore, the great power’s successful 
influence of the less diplomatic network vulnerability has pushed the small state to invest 
in the sub-state diplomacy opportunity. The small state choice not only succeeds in filling 
the gap created by the vulnerability but also allows Taiwan to influence other variables 
within the HT system with a positive result on the balance of power that goes far beyond 
simple compensation for the Chinese exploited vulnerability. This fact shows how the 
complex system’s dynamics can benefit the small state in order to counter the great power 
hybrid threat. 
D. DISCUSSION 
Even though the confrontation between the PRC and ROC goes back to the 1940s, 
and the rivalry between Chinese communist and nationalist even to the 1920s, only from 
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the 1970s did it start to become a conflict between what could be called a small state and a 
great power. Before its recognition as the only China, the PRC was not able to play a very 
influential role at the international level, even when its economic potential started to 
emerge in the 1970s and 1980s. Before the 1970s was Taiwan already a small state vis-à-
vis China? Before Taiwan’s expulsion from the UN, the PRC was the representative of 
China on the world stage; moreover, given its representation in international organizations 
and its strong ties with other countries in the Asian area and with the United States, Taiwan 
was in a stronger position than the PRC. Due to the ROC’s extraordinary economic rise 
between the 1960s and 1990s, it is reasonable to say that at least until the mid-1990s 
Taiwan was able to compete directly with China in the economic sphere. In the military 
domain, Taiwan could not rely on the atomic weapon (although Taiwan had pursued the 
acquisition of one for a certain period), and in the conventional military domain, the PLA 
already showed in the Korean War its capability to successfully face even a world 
superpower. Therefore, the asymmetric relationship arguably began to take its form in the 
1970s. 
It is not correct to state that China is solely responsible for reducing Taiwan to a 
small state. The decision to marginalize Taiwan from the international political scene was 
not a decision made unilaterally by the PRC. The United States participated in this process 
out of its own national interests, and its allies and other countries with growing interests in 
China have somewhat condescendingly accepted this trend. 
China has always sought reunification with Taiwan through a combination of 
policies aimed at international segregation and economic marginalization. To date, Beijing 
has focused its measures toward Taipei mainly on international isolation across the PMESI 
spectrum. The PRC has consistently targeted ROC diplomatic relations, it has prevented 
Taiwan from entering military alliances, and it has with partial success tried to disrupt ROC 
international economic ties while increasing its ties with China. On some occasions, the 
PRC has also tried to exploit societal and informational vulnerabilities. As of the time of 
this writing, it is possible to recognize the PRC’s attempts at achieving specific objectives 
in a consistent and coordinated way through exploiting multiple instruments of power in 
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particular in the political, as well as the economic, domain. Therefore, it is possible to 
deduce that the PRC policies are part of a strategy aimed at limiting Taiwan’s political 
power. Beijing’s reticence in fully exploiting the PMESI spectrum, however, may suggest 
an attitude of strategic patience. Thus, it is not possible to judge how far the PRC policies 
are synchronized and part of an integrated all-encompassing design. 
China’s measures exploited some of Taiwan’s vulnerabilities and tried to limit the 
small state’s opportunities. Most of Beijing’s political and economic measures aimed to 
generate compliance with Beijing’s agenda. In some cases, China applied coercive 
measures in the military domain, albeit with poor results that only enhanced Taiwan’s 
political power. These adverse effects could be a reason for Beijing’s reservedness in using 
coercive methods toward Taipei. Furthermore, PRC relations with the ROC bring 
economic advantages for both countries, so the former has an interest in not completely 
antagonizing the latter. Arguably, the dynamics of the symbiotic economic relationship 
may be one of the critical elements that could allow the small state of Taiwan to stabilize 
the balance of power. 
China’s strategic gradualism constantly tests Taiwanese adaptability. Beijing has 
applied a salami-slicing approach in reducing Taipei’s international diplomatic relations, 
forcing the later to engage in sub-state diplomacy in order to address the emergent gaps. 
The Chinese government, arguably to deflect accusations of “bullying behavior” from 
other members of the international community and defuse negative publicity on Taiwan, 
tolerates Taipei officials in international organizations in which China is a member, under 
the conditions of representing a regional actor and not a state. In the economic domain, the 
PRC actively stimulates bilateral economic relationships with ROC, while hindering the 
ROC’s economic exchange with external partners. This behavior demonstrates a 
combination of escalation and de-escalation in order to achieve a fait-accompli that isolates 
and marginalizes Taiwan. Nevertheless, the latter has so far been able to adapt its policies 
and its economic ties, and thus to limit the consequences of the Chinese strategy. 
According to a hybrid approach, the Chinese strategy towards Taiwan, up to now, 
has avoided military escalation for a reason related to the strategic environment. Most of 
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the states do not recognize Taiwan as an independent state; neither do they recognize it as 
an integral part of the PRC. Therefore, Chinese unilateral military action aimed to force 
reunification would undoubtedly have repercussions at least similar to those that Russia 
suffered in the case of the Crimean annexation. In case of a Chinese military action, the 
United States is more committed to intervening in support of Taiwan. Yet, how far the 
United States will escalate the conflict with China risking a major war to defend Taiwan 
rest to be seen. However, any measures from the international community to punish the 
military take-over would be detrimental to China. Furthermore, as mentioned previously, 
an armed conflict between the mainland and Taiwan would disrupt Taiwanese goods-
production on the island with logical consequences for high-tech production on the 
mainland. Moreover, the U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific and its relations with Taiwan 
will probably convince Washington to undertake specific retaliatory measures of some kind 
toward Beijing. Therefore, the conditions of the strategic environment are not favorable for 
a threat escalation encompassing a military confrontation. 
China combines the deliberate use of proxy with the instrumental exploitation of 
third parties. China has exploited state-owned companies to influence relations with 
Taiwan. Through joint ventures and targeted acquisitions, Beijing has partially eroded the 
technological gap between Taiwanese and Chinese high-tech companies. Some Taiwanese 
Taishang and Taiwanese politicians have been exploited to try to influence Taipei’s 
policies. Furthermore, all the states that over the years have denied Taiwan state 
recognition or that have avoided engaging in economic ties with Taiwan out of fears for 
Chinese repercussions, have supported the Chinese strategy, and hence, have behaved in 
some way as a Chinese proxy. 
China represents a hybrid threat for Taiwan; however, so far Taiwan has been able 
to maintain political power to assert its independence consistently. The conflict between 
China and Taiwan dates back more than half a century. During this period China has 
developed a strategy aimed at pursuing the goal of reunification with Taiwan. Nonetheless, 
the analysis presented in this work, while demonstrating the hybrid nature of the threat, has 
allowed for an evaluation of the measures taken by Taiwan to avoid the fate of a forced 
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reunification. The Taiwan-China HT system shows that even the small state can counteract 
the hybrid threat from a great power successfully. 
The systems analysis allows us to deduce specific implications for Taiwan. First, 
Taiwan should continue to ponder its domestic institutional changes in the context of the 
cross-Strait relationship. This variable is the most important within the HT system; hence, 
the dynamics that it can trigger can have profound effects on the whole system. Second, 
Taipei should continue to invest in sub-state diplomacy by empowering its political, 
economic and intellectual elites as “conductors” of such diplomacy. Through them, Taiwan 
can maintain and develop a network of relationships that would help it avoid being 
marginalized and isolated. Third, the importance of the dependence on group of interest 
variable demonstrates that the relations that Taiwan has with the United States are central 
in the HT system. Therefore, it is crucial that Taipei ponder these relationships in the 
context of growing tension between these two great powers. As a result, Taiwan should 
carefully consider which type of partnerships with China and the United States would better 
fit and adapt to the upcoming great-power competition. Fourth, the ROC ability to focus 
its economy on niche products has had very beneficial effects in countering the Chinese 
hybrid threat. For this reason, it is essential that Taiwan manages to maintain this 
opportunity. Although China is decreasing the high-tech gap, in the past Taiwan has more 
than once demonstrated the adaptability needed to explore new market niches that allowed 
it to remain an essential and globally recognized economic partner. 
Finally, although the Taiwan–China case shows hybrid threat characteristics, the 
great power does not yet seem to have wholly exploited the full potential of a 
comprehensive approach along the PMESI spectrum. China has mostly engaged in political 
and economic measures and in a lesser way in the military, societal and informational 
domains. China seems to play on strategic patience. However, if on one hand strategic 
patience can pay off in the economic sphere by allowing a continuous increase in relations 
that increasingly link the island to the mainland, on the other hand, strategic patience allows 
Taiwanese society to develop a self-consciousness of being independent Taiwanese that 
will be difficult to reconcile with an alleged future reunification. The Taiwan–China case 
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shows how a great-power hybrid threat can provide chances for the small state that an 








The previous chapters have explored small-state vulnerabilities and opportunities 
when facing a great-power hybrid threat. This work aimed to identify small states’ favoring 
conditions across the political, military, economic, social and informational (PMESI) 
spectrum to defend against the hybrid threat from a more powerful state. The task of this 
chapter is to discuss the findings and develop the related implications for a small-state 
security strategy that would allow small states to develop a favorable posture to face this 
hybrid threat. 
A. DISCUSSION 
To address the question about favorable posturing for a small state facing a hybrid 
threat, it is necessary first to consider the characteristic of the subjects of analysis, namely 
the small state and its relationship with a great power as well as the hybrid threat. As 
discussed in Chapter II, defining a small state proves to be much more challenging than it 
might seem. Purely quantitative characteristics are a rudimentary way of defining small 
states, leading to arbitrary reductionism not suitable for analyzing small state behavior and 
even less for exploring its relationship to a great power. Qualitative characteristics based 
on the behavior of the small state allow for a better picture of the overall context. 
Nevertheless, the shortcoming of a solely qualitative approach lies in its too-broad 
generalization. The characterization of “smallness” is only possible through a relational 
perspective. In other words, to be able to evaluate “smallness,” it is necessary to relate it to 
“greatness.” A state is not just small per se but is “smaller than” another one that proves to 
be greater. Hence, smallness is a product of at least a dyadic asymmetric relationship, 
where the small state actor is such because it is incapable on its own of altering the nature 
or functioning of the relationship with the great one. The case of Guatemala and the United 
States shows that Guatemala was small in relation to America but not to its neighbor 
countries. The Taiwan-China case demonstrates that “smallness” is a dynamic concept; 
Taiwan became small in relation to China. Hence, the small-state–great-power asymmetric 
relationship can evolve. 
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The modern strategic environment sets limits on great-power exploitation of the 
asymmetrical relationship with a small state. Competitiveness, volatility, complexity, and 
interdependencies characterize the modern strategic environment, creating a dynamic 
international arena that blurs the distinction between forms of competition and conflict. 
These characteristics generate both opportunities and restraints for assertive great powers. 
Interdependence allows such great powers to engage various means of statecraft to exploit 
small state dependencies and achieve their political goals or downgrade the interventionist 
intent of third states. All three case studies show that the great power has exploited in 
different degrees various means of statecraft to influence the small states in the attempt to 
achieve their political goals. Yet, interdependency also restrains the great power from using 
coercive military means to achieve its political goals because of the possible sanctions or 
even armed responses from third states or the international community. For instance, the 
United States avoided a direct armed intervention in Guatemala in order to also avoid the 
adverse effects this would have on its image internationally. The U.S. willingness to 
prevent Chinese unilateral armed actions toward Taiwan is arguably one factor that 
prevents Beijing from engaging in violent reunification with Taiwan. Russia—like the 
United States sixty years earlier—engaged in armed confrontation mainly by proxy in order 
to ensure plausible deniability. 
Assertive great powers highlight and support the international norm system when 
it proves to be advantageous and serves their interests, while they interpret, bend or even 
ignore international and national norms in pursuit of their purposes. For instance, on 
different occasions, the United States exploited its position in international organizations 
to directly influence Guatemala or other organization members to be in favor of the U.S. 
goals for the Árbenz government. Russia exploited WTO rules to enforce Ukrainian 
compliance with loans and energy-related contracts. Furthermore, Moscow membership in 
the Minsk negotiators team allowed Russia to assure favorable conditions for the Ukrainian 
separatists while disregarding OSCE rules on troop movement along the eastern Ukrainian 
border. Since its entry into the United Nations, China has taken advantage of its position 
on the international stage as the exclusive China representative to marginalize and isolate 
Taiwan in the political and economic domains. The pressures of conforming to 
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international standards did not prevent Beijing, as in the mid-1990s, from undertaking 
military maneuvers in contravention of international maritime traffic regulations. 
Nonetheless, the international norms system can still rein-in assertive great powers. In 
1954, John Foster Dulles ultimately failed to achieve U.S. goals at the Inter-American 
Conference in Caracas, because other South American states successfully compelled the 
United States to change the final conference resolution. The unilateral annexation of 
Crimea by Russia, again in contravention of international norms, caused and continues to 
cause international sanctions to be cast on Russia. Taiwan legislation prevented pro-China 
investors from taking control of significant Taiwanese mass media assets. 
Interests of peers and near-peers are a further element that shapes the strategic 
environment of assertive great powers. The interests of other great-power actors can be 
exploited for their purposes, or they can prove to be limits that the assertive great power 
must take into consideration. The Soviet Union’s alleged influence in Guatemala pushed 
the United States to plan a coup against the Árbenz government; ironically, the United 
States’ misperception about peer interests in Guatemala not only caused a dismissal of a 
democratically elected government and its replacement with a military dictatorship, but it 
laid the ground for the disastrous U.S. intervention in Cuba years later. The second case 
study also shows how peer interests can affect great-power actions. When Moscow was 
concerned over increasing ties between the EU and Ukraine, it leveraged EU interests in 
consistent and reliable gas transport through Ukraine to put pressure on the latter. Similarly, 
Beijing exploited the United States’ interest in bilateral relations with China to get the 
Chinese UN seat and expel Taiwan from the United Nations. On the other hand, the United 
States’ ambiguous support for Taiwan prevents China from engaging in too-extreme 
unilateral measures toward Taipei. Moreover, since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the 
United States has assumed a hegemonic position on the international stage, pushing 
assertive great powers to apply more indirect methods to achieve their goals. Consequently, 
as the case studies demonstrate, the great power mixes direct and indirect approaches 
according to the strategic environment, combining and fusing different ways and means to 




The second chapter demonstrates the suitability of the term “hybrid” to designate a 
threat that blurs the continuum between peace and war by applying direct and indirect ways 
of strategic gradualism and a synchronized design of multiple instruments of statecraft to 
target physical and psychological vulnerabilities while also employing proxies. The 
adjective “hybrid” better fits the threat whose five primary characteristics are illustrated in 
Chapter II: first, an integrated design of simultaneous, synchronized and adaptive uses of 
multiple instruments of power along the PMESI spectrum; second, the targeting of specific 
physical and psychological vulnerabilities across the full spectrum of societal functions, 
generating ambiguity, compulsion, and coercion; third, the application of strategic 
gradualism of escalation and de-escalation; fourth, the adoption of military measures only 
when the strategic environment allows it; and fifth, the mix or combination of endogenous 
and exogenous state or non-state entities as proxies. The analyzed case studies indicate that 
many elements characterizing the hybrid threat are not new. In the 1950s, the United States 
applied different means of statecraft; it targeted physical and psychological targets in 
Guatemalan society and exploited private companies, third states, media, and armed groups 
as proxies. Even so, U.S. action in Guatemala does not show all the characteristics of a 
hybrid threat. The reason the modern strategic environment generates more favorable 
conditions for the exploitation by hybrid threats lies in the modern environment’s greater 
complexity, which offers new and more options to mix or combine strategies, ways, and 
means. The resulting complex and dynamic system of interconnected variables is what 
generates the hybrid threat. 
The third chapter analyzed small-state literature in order to determine opportunities 
and vulnerabilities across the PMESI spectrum. The generated framework of opportunities 
and vulnerabilities allows analyzing the hybrid threat dynamic in the context of the small-
state–great-power relationship. The list of opportunities and vulnerabilities examined in 
this thesis and used as variables in the HT system analysis, does not aspire to be conclusive. 
The author is aware that every state may reflect different opportunities and vulnerabilities. 
Nonetheless, in the light of the cases analyzed, the list proved to be adequate, as all the 
opportunities or vulnerabilities were observed in one or more cases. Furthermore, it was 
possible to determine the dynamics that emerged between the opportunities and 
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vulnerabilities. Consequently, the proposed list can be a valid starting point to analyze the 
suitability of such opportunities and vulnerabilities more deeply, and to explore further 
ones. 
The case analysis conducted in this thesis reveals that the result of the great-power 
hybrid threat may not be solely the product of a deliberate strategy. The hybrid threat 
generated by a great power is neither a silver bullet nor a Wunderwaffe. The analyzed cases 
show that the hybrid threat takes time to influence the great-power–small-state relationship. 
In all three cases, the great power had to spend time and resources on generating influence 
over the small state’s vulnerabilities and opportunities. To an external observer, the success 
of a hybrid approach may appear swift and deliberate; however, as the case studies indicate 
neither the great powers nor the small states were fully aware of all the variables that 
influenced their relationship. The dynamics of the hybrid threat system suggest that 
opportunities and vulnerabilities may emerge from the interaction without the great power 
or the small state being fully aware of it; logically, it follows that the first actor to realize 
the emergence of a new opportunity or vulnerability can exploit it to influence the dyadic 
relationship. The United States did not realize how its economic ties with Guatemala 
prevented Washington from engaging in successful punitive economic measures. 
Similarly, Russia wrongly believed the situation in eastern Ukraine to be like the Crimean 
one. China did not realize that the Taiwanese democratization process degraded the 
Taiwanese desire for reunification. On the other hand, the Árbenz government did not 
realize the significant impact of its policies on U.S. perception, Ukraine seriously 
underestimated the polarization and radicalization of its society, and Taiwan does not seem 
to be concerned about the dangers of further increasing economic ties with China. 
The systemic interaction of opportunities and vulnerabilities can have unexpected 
effects on the small-state–great-power relationship. Opportunity and vulnerability interact 
with each other; this interaction may generate counterintuitive second- and third-order 
effects. An opportunity may have a negative second- or third-order effect, while a 
vulnerability can turn into having a positive one. In Guatemala and Ukraine, the domestic 
institutional changes vulnerability negatively influenced the minorities integration and 
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societal cohesion opportunities, which turned out to harm the dyadic power relationship; 
conversely, in the Taiwan case, the same vulnerability had positive effects on the same 
opportunities. The Ukrainian approach to NATO, despite representing an opportunity, 
fueled vulnerabilities, for instance, Russia’s trading policy change. Taiwan’s dependence 
on U.S. military armament increases one of Taipei’s vulnerabilities in the political domain 
(dependence on a group of interest); however, it has a positive effect on reducing another 
vulnerability in the military domain (reduced military capabilities). These and other 
examples in the three analyzed case studies illustrate the meaning of second- and third-
order effects. Moreover, the exemplified dynamics highlight the inappropriateness of 
strategies focused on single PMESI domains. For instance, hybrid threat policies focused 
only on military strategies address just one of the PMESI domains, representing a single 
point of failure. Furthermore, the addressed opportunities or vulnerabilities may have 
positive effects on some countries while having negative effects in others. Moreover, the 
generated positive first-order effect may trigger a negative second- or third-order effect in 
other domains. Consequently, every single country must develop, address, and assess 
strategies from its specific perspective. A comprehensive interdisciplinary strategy in 
countering a hybrid threat, based on a “whole of government” and even “whole of society” 
approach, is not only preferable but necessary. The presented HT system is, in reality, a 
system-of-systems that embraces the political, military, economic, societal, and 
informational systems of the small state. 
B. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SMALL STATE 
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 
The analysis and discussions carried out in this thesis allow us to deduce some 
implications and, accordingly, to formulate some recommendations for a small state 
national security strategy. As stated previously, state “smallness” is a feature that arises 
from the relationship between at least two state actors, which is why the following 
recommendations should be applied in the context of a relationship in which a state that 
considers itself to be in an asymmetric position of “smallness.” The asymmetric 
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relationship may evolve; hence, the small state needs to monitor the relationship with the 
great power. 
1. Monitor, Assess and Exploit the Interdependence with the Great 
Power and the Related Vulnerabilities and Opportunities 
In the small-state–great-power dyadic relationship, “smallness” and “greatness” are 
a continuum. The small state needs to monitor and assess its interdependence with the great 
power across the PMESI spectrum in order to evaluate in which of the domains (politic, 
military, economic, societal, informational) the small state may have stronger ties with the 
great power than in others. Moreover, the small state may be able to recognize great-power 
proxies acting in and across these domains. Hence, to understand and evaluate how 
successfully the great power hybrid threat may or may not affect the small state, it is 
necessary to consider the threat in the context of the relationship and the HT system being 
examined. 
Because geography matters, a state must take into consideration its geostrategic 
position and “locatedness”; the state will be able to assess its “smallness” in relation to 
regional and global “greater” powers by monitoring and assessing the regional and global 
power dynamics. Proximity to a great power can have positive or negative effects; for this 
reason, it is necessary for the small state to monitor and assess the relationship and its 
interdependence with the great power. Furthermore, as illustrated by the case studies, while 
exploiting the entire PMESI spectrum, different great powers demonstrate specific 
preferences in their modus operandi: for instance, emphasizing propaganda, paramilitary 
groups, economic or political measures over others. 
Monitoring and assessment allow the small state to perceive changes in the 
relationship dynamics in the different domains that may suggest the rise of a hybrid threat. 
The small state can assess the emergence of opportunities or vulnerabilities that could 
positively or negatively influence the relationship with the great power. Furthermore, the 
effect of strategic gradualism may be anticipated or at least contained, recognizing in 
advance areas of application of salami-slicing tactics or faits accomplis. Moreover, 
monitoring and assessment of the interdependence allows the small state to evaluate the 
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relationships between the different opportunities and vulnerabilities, their feedback loops 
and delay, making possible the simulation of second- and third-order effects in order to 
anticipate relationship dynamics. 
The small state needs to develop the capability to determine, track, and if necessary, 
capitalize on both opportunities and vulnerabilities across the PMESI spectrum in order to 
successfully counter the great power’s hybrid threat. The Guatemala and Ukraine cases 
illustrate how ignorance about one’s own vulnerabilities or failure to consider them can 
have costly results and finally catalyze malicious dynamics that help the great power to 
achieve its political goals. The same examples highlight the consequences for a small state 
lacking the ability or willingness to leverage its opportunities. Conversely, Taiwan 
demonstrates a certain level of awareness about its own opportunities and vulnerabilities 
that positively influence the relationship, increasing its resilience to the great power hybrid 
threat. 
Small-state policy makers can use the opportunities and vulnerabilities framework 
developed in this thesis as a starting point to create a specific framework that takes into 
consideration a state’s peculiarities as well as the specific characteristics of its relationship 
with the considered great power. The application of the framework in the three analyzed 
cases allows highlighting some opportunities and vulnerabilities that seem to have a more 
significant influence on the system. Nevertheless, the small state’s choice on which and 
how to reinforce opportunities and mitigate vulnerabilities remains a political choice of the 
individual small states. 
In the policy domain, the small state should ponder the impact of its domestic 
institutional changes on the relationship of the great power. All three cases show how this 
vulnerability is central to catalyzing and influencing the hybrid threat. The less diplomatic 
network is a vulnerability that the small state can successfully address through sub-state 
diplomacy. The small state should engage in maintaining a reasonable level of trust within 
its elites, not to achieve an elite homogeneous point of view, but rather to enhance the 
reciprocal predictability about the other’s expected behavior, skills, or intentions. The 
dependence on international organizations or group of interests (including single states) 
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and the membership in supranational organizations are both variables that can have 
positive and negative effects on the relationship with the great power. Hence, it is necessary 
for the small state to consider both variables and to be able to assess the influence of the 
great power in and on the organizations and group of interests relevant for the small state. 
In the military domain, the small state should limit its reduced military capabilities, 
compensating with other variables or by direct interventions, in order to maintain the ability 
to deter the great power by significantly influencing the latter’s expected calculus of 
military intervention or support for violent proxies. Civil-military forces integration and 
irregular forces are two opportunities that can positively influence military vulnerability. 
A sound integration of civilian and military security forces backed by a well-organized 
irregular force could allow the small state to maintain the readiness to preserve the 
monopoly of force across the peace and war continuum. Considering a hybrid approach, 
the non-membership in a military alliance is not an essential vulnerability. The Taiwan 
case shows that despite the impossibility of participating in a military alliance or 
multilateral security arrangements, a small state can still successfully counter the great-
power hybrid threat. Violent internal conflicts can become fertile soil for a great-power 
hybrid threat, so in the case that such internal conflicts arise, the small state should monitor 
and assess whether a great power is exploiting it for its own purposes. 
In the economic domain, the small state should monitor and assess its 
vulnerabilities based on the influence that the great power has or can have on the state. The 
great power can successfully leverage economic vulnerabilities if the small state is unable 
or unwilling to receive external economic support from third partners or through its ties 
with the world economy; in that case, the great-power hybrid threat is less successful. Thus, 
the small state must reduce its economic exposure to the great power and diversify its 
economic ties. If the economic vulnerabilities with the great power cannot be directly 
mitigated, the small state must try to influence these vulnerabilities with economic 
opportunities or with opportunities from other domains. While in the analyzed cases the 
dependency on strategic import from the great power proved to be the most critical 
vulnerability, the focus on niche products and service and the adaptability to economic 
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challenges demonstrate essential opportunities for the small state to relax its dependency 
on the great power. 
In the societal domain, the small state should invest in avoiding or decreasing the 
polarization and radicalization of its society. The small state needs to address the 
arguments and needs of “oppressed” societal groups and avoid favoritism that can 
negatively affect other variables across the PMESI spectrum. Sound policies focused on 
minorities integration should allow increasing the social cohesion that demonstrates in the 
analyzed cases to be a significant opportunity to counter the hybrid threat. The societal 
pluralism remains an opportunity that the small state can leverage positively; nevertheless, 
the analyzed cases do not demonstrate a high influence of this variable on the hybrid threat 
system. 
In the informational domain, the small state should develop the appropriate means 
to counter the great power’s foreign influence. A sound media regulation supported by 
policies focused on enhancing media diversity allows a small state not only to counteract 
great-power influence but also to avoid a mass media takeover by the great power or its 
proxies. An alternative method for avoiding or decreasing the danger of foreign takeover 
is a reliable support to public service. A solid public service allows the small state to 
counter great-power propaganda and at the same time to leverage media exclusivity and 
maintain the information advantage over the great power. 
The monitoring, evaluation, and exploitation of opportunities and vulnerabilities 
are central processes that the small state should master to counter a great-power hybrid 
threat successfully. The process should be focused not only on the opportunities and 
vulnerabilities as such, but most importantly on the feedback loops generated between the 
vulnerabilities and opportunities. The small state’s awareness of the feedback loops and 
their dynamics may help it to restore balance in the dyadic relationship after significant 
great-power malicious actions. To successfully monitor, assess, and exploit its 
opportunities and vulnerabilities, the small state should leverage its “smallness.” The 
“smallness” could represent a favorable condition for achieving a higher degree of 
adaptability, which in turn allows the small state to implement and influence its 
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opportunities and vulnerabilities more quickly and significantly than the great power, 
because of its “greatness,” is able or willing to do. 
2. Evaluate and Exploit International Norms  
In its relationship with the great power, the small state cannot count on fairness and 
rightfulness alone; even if the international community may support the small state when 
threatened by a great power, it is in no way a security assurance. The probability that the 
great power has a greater influence on the dynamics related to international norms is higher 
than it is for small states. Nonetheless, international norms may prove to be an unexpected 
source of support for small states, especially when their violation by the great power can 
create a precedent that other great powers may exploit toward their own interests in the 
future. Hence, the small state needs to analyze its opportunities and vulnerabilities while 
considering the international norms system across the statecraft domains. 
The small state should evaluate which international norm may have an impact on 
its opportunities and vulnerabilities. The linking of vulnerabilities and opportunities with 
international norms allows the small state to achieve two objectives. First, it allows the 
small state to assess which international norm could be exploited by the great power to 
empower its strategic gradualism and to influence small state vulnerabilities and 
opportunities. Second, it allows the small states to assess which international norm it could 
exploit in order to reverse the great power’s strategic gradualism, to target the great power 
proxies, and to enhance the small state’s opportunities while mitigating its vulnerabilities. 
The small state should support the development of international norms that can 
prevent the unilateral malicious actions of great powers. Numerous examples discussed in 
this thesis indicate the power of international norms in restraining great powers’ unilateral 
malicious actions. Consequently, the small state should preventively and preemptively 
support the enactment and application of initiatives aimed at limiting and sanctioning 
malicious actions between states. 
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3. Appraise the Interests of the Great Power and Its (Near) Peers 
For the purposes of this thesis, the great-power hybrid threat is neatly bounded by 
the small-state–great-power dyadic relationship; however, the reality is that often a small 
state is caught between the interests of various great powers. Small state actions may, even 
unintentionally, collide with some great power’s interest. In this case, the great power may 
react in a way that achieves status quo ante the small state’s action. For this reason, it is 
imperative for the small state to be able to understand and assess great-power interests, not 
necessarily to avoid the action that can trigger a great-power reaction, but to be able to 
predict this reaction and, in the case where the small state decides to pursue its initial action, 
to develop appropriate strategies to limit the great power’s reaction. 
Interests of the great power that should be evaluated are divided mainly into three 
categories: the interests related to the small state; the interests related to the geostrategic 
context (regional and global); and the interests related to its peers. The categories are 
related and influence each other. Thus, they can be exploited by the small state to influence 
the dyadic relationship with the great power. The support that the small state can provide 
to the great power to reach its interests at the regional or global level can be used as a 
bargaining chip with interests that the great power has toward the small state, but that does 
not coincide with the interests of the latter. Through this dynamic, the small state may avoid 
or reduce the great-power hybrid threat. Similarly, small-state support for a great power’s 
peer can induce the latter to assist the small state in countering the great-power hybrid 
threat. The use of this strategy may prove to be a double-edged sword; in fact, it would 
place the small state within the great-power competition, increasing the risk of becoming 
a simple pawn in a bigger game. 
4. Apply a Dynamic Systems Thinking Approach to Counter the Hybrid 
Threat 
The small state options to counter a great-power hybrid threat are not limited strictly 
to a choice of bandwagoning, balancing, aligning, or non-aligning. The “multimodality” of 
the modern strategic environment progressively jeopardizes the ability of great powers to 
control the smaller one’s behavior unilaterally. Accordingly, the latter may be less prone 
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to submit to the will of greater powers or refrain from any intervention in international 
relations. Consequently, small states can improve their resilience to the hybrid threat by 
exploiting the system’s dynamics across the PMESI spectrum. 
The application of a systems thinking approach to develop strategies to counter a 
great-power hybrid threat suggests numerous advantages. A systems thinking approach 
helps to reveal and better understand how the hybrid threat is perpetuated. The small state 
can better monitor and analyze the dynamics behind the great-power hybrid threat across 
the PMESI spectrum and the related second- and third-order effects. In a systems thinking 
approach, the primary focus is not predictive; nonetheless, it allows the small state to 
develop preventive strategies to attenuate recognized malicious positive loops and enhance 
its resilience even in periods without apparent confrontation. Moreover, a systems thinking 
approach allows for observing a hybrid threat’s adaptation across time. The hybrid threat’s 
complexity raises opportunities for the small state to develop strategies that lie beyond the 
direct asymmetric relationship that the small state, because of its “smallness,” would 
otherwise not be able to influence decisively. The complexity of the system would allow 
the small state to entangle the great power in a game that the great power cannot easily 
foresee. 
The great power’s choice to apply a hybrid approach can be an opportunity for the 
small state. The hybrid threat system allows both the great power and the small state to 
continuously leverage the opportunities, vulnerabilities and their related dynamics, 
enabling the adaptation of existing measures and the development of new ones to maintain 
the power relationship in balance. Both actors are in the position to contemplate defensive 
and offensive measures. Furthermore, the hybrid threat system does not merely provide a 
single designed course of action, rather a spectrum of convergent strategies, ways, and 
means to achieve multiple desired outcomes. The analysis of the case studies has 
highlighted both negative and positive examples of how the small state takes advantage of 
its opportunities and vulnerabilities. Furthermore, the small state, through active and 
passive behavior, can trigger virtuous or vicious system dynamics leading to balanced or 
unbalanced power relations with the great power. Thus, a small state’s consciousness about 
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its opportunities and vulnerabilities and the related system dynamics as well as the 
exploitation of its “smallness” to increase adaptability and elasticity could allow the small 
state both to increase its resilience toward the great-power hybrid threat and to influence 
the dyadic relationship beyond its expected capacity. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
The increasing complexity of the modern strategic environment promotes what has 
come to be called the “hybrid threat.” Assertive great powers have made a virtue of 
necessity, applying a hybrid approach to achieve their political goals in relation to small 
states. This thesis explored the phenomenon, namely the relationship between small states 
and great powers, focusing on the opportunities and vulnerabilities of a small state 
confronted with a hybrid threat perpetrated by a great power. Analysis shows that the 
hybrid approach is indeed a threat a small state must confront; it also revealed that the 
dynamics arising from this threat are complex and that consequently, they can bring about 
unexpected phenomena, revealing themselves as double-edged swords for both actors 
involved. The small state has the opportunity to assume a favorable posture to counter the 
great-power hybrid threat. Thus, the analysis of the case studies has allowed formulating 
some implications and recommendations regarding the small state national security 
strategy. 
This thesis does not aspire to reach a definitive conclusion, but rather, begin a 
discourse. The use of a systems thinking approach has proved to be a valid study method 
for analyzing the hybrid threat and the small-state–great-power relationship; future studies 
could further deepen and expand its application. Moreover, future analyses could also 
explore further agent-based vulnerabilities and opportunities specific to the relationship 
between a small state and great power. This thesis has mainly focused on how a small state 
can defend itself against the great-power hybrid threat; future studies could explore the 
opposite way, namely how a small state can exploit the opportunities and vulnerabilities of 
a great power to influence the dyadic relationship in favor of the small state. In conclusion, 
this thesis has demonstrated that in order to tie down the amorphous giant, Lilliputians 
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must be better aware of both their vulnerabilities and opportunities, as well as able to 








A. GUATEMALA CROSS-IMPACT MATRIX 
In the cross-impact matrix, the value is positive (1) if the variable in the horizontal row reacts proportional to a shift in the vertical 
column’s variable. Conversely, the value is negative (-1) if the variable in the horizontal row react inversely proportional to a shift in the 
vertical column’s variable. AS (Active Sum), PS (Passive Sum). 
 Name 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 AS 
1 S political power   1     1     1  1                1   5 




-1 1  1 1       1           1 1  -1        8 
4 Less diplomatic 
network 
-1 1      1                          3 
5 Distrust between 
elite 
-1 1            -1                    3 
6 Dependence on int. 
organizations 
-1 1                                2 
7 Environmental 
adaptability 




1 -1                                2 
9 Sub-state 
diplomacy 
                                  
10 No membership in 
Mil alliances 
-1 1          1                      3 
11 Internal violent 
conflict 
-1 1          1                      3 
12 Reduced military 
capabilities 









-1 1                                2 
15 Irregular forces     1                    -1         2 
16 Dependency on 
strategic import 
-1 1               1                 3 
17 Limited export 
Diversification 
-1 1                  1              3 
18 Policy Change by 
major trading 
partner 
-1 1                                2 
19 Affiliation to 
multilateral 
economic org. 
1 -1                                2 
20 Focus on niche 
products and 
services 
1 -1                -1                2 
21 Adaptability to 
economic 
challenges 
                                  
22 “oppressed” 
societal groups 
-1 1                     1           3 
23 Polarization and 
radicalization 
-1 1         1              -1         4 
24 Favoritism -1 1   1                  1           3 
25 Social cohesion -1 1                                2 
26 Minorities 
integration 
-1 1                                2 
27 Societal pluralism                                   
28 Foreign influence -1 1   1         -1           -1         5 
29 Foreign take-over -1 1   1                             3 
30 Lack of public 
service support 
-1 1                                2 
31 Media regulation -1 1                     1           3 
32 Media diversity                                   
33 Media exclusivity                                   
PS  25 25 1 1 6 0 0 2  0 1 4 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 4 1 3 1  1 1 0 1    




B. GUATEMALA CROSS-TIME MATRIX 
In the cross-time matrix, delay values are assumed as follow: short-term = 1 (< 1 month); mid-term = 2 (1 month–1 year); long-
term = 4 (> 1 year). 
 Name 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 PD 
1 S political power   2     4     4  2                2   2.8 




2 2  1 1       4           1 2  2        1.9 
4 Less diplomatic 
network 
2 2      4                          2.7 
 
5 Distrust between 
elite 
1 1            2                    1.3 
 
6 Dependence on int. 
organizations 
2 2                                2 
7 Environmental 
adaptability 




2 2                                2 
9 Sub-state 
diplomacy 
                                  
10 No membership in 
Mil alliances 
2 2          2                      3 
11 Internal violent 
conflict 
1 2          2                      1.6 
12 Reduced military 
capabilities 




2 2                                2 
14 Civil-military 
forces integration 
1 2                                1.5 
15 Irregular forces     1                    2         1.5 
16 Dependency on 
strategic import 
1 2               4                 2.3 
17 Limited export 
Diversification 
2 2                  4              2.7 
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18 Policy Change by 
major trading 
partner 
2 1                                1.5 
19 Affiliation to 
multilateral 
economic org. 
2 2                                2 
20 Focus on niche 
products and 
services 
4 2                4                3.4 
21 Adaptability to 
economic 
challenges 
                                  
22 “oppressed” 
societal groups 
4 2                     2           3.4 
23 Polarization and 
radicalization 
2 2         2              1         1.8 
24 Favoritism 1 1   2                  2           1.5 
25 Social cohesion 1 1                                1 
26 Minorities 
integration 
4 2                                3 
27 Societal pluralism                                   
28 Foreign influence 1 1   1         2           2         1.4 
29 Foreign take-over 1 2   1                             1.4 
30 Lack of public 
service support 
2 2                                2 
31 Media regulation 1 1                     2           1.4 
32 Media diversity                                   
33 Media exclusivity                                   





C. UKRAINE CROSS-IMPACT MATRIX 
 Name 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 AS 
1 S political power   1   1 1 1    1 1  1    1  1 1 1 1  -1    -1 -1 -1  16 




-1 1   1   1   1          -1  1 1          8 
4 Less diplomatic 
network 
-1 1                                2 
5 Distrust between 
elite 
-1 1                     1  -1 -1        5 
6 Dependence on int. 
organizations 
-1 1      -1  1  1           1   -1        7 
7 Environmental 
adaptability 




-1 1    1                 1           4 
9 Sub-state 
diplomacy 
-1 1                                2 
10 No membership in 
Mil alliances 
-1 1         1 1                      4 
11 Internal violent 
conflict 
-1 1 1     -1  1      1                  6 
12 Reduced military 
capabilities 




1 -1   1     -1  1      1                6 
14 Civil-military 
forces integration 
-1 1                                2 
15 Irregular forces -1 1 1        1 1           1           6 
16 Dependency on 
strategic import 
-1 1 1   1  -1  1  1         -1             8 
17 Limited export 
Diversification 
-1 1                   -1             3 
18 Policy Change by 
major trading 
partner 
-1 1 1             1 1    -1             6 
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19 Affiliation to 
multilateral 
economic org. 
1 -1 1                               3 
20 Focus on niche 
products and 
services 
-1 1              1                  3 
21 Adaptability to 
economic 
challenges 
-1 1                                2 
22 “oppressed” 
societal groups 
-1 1         1            1  -1         5 
23 Polarization and 
radicalization 
-1 1 1        1   -1           -1         6 
24 Favoritism -1 1   1       1  -1  1         -1       -1  8 
25 Social cohesion -1 1                         -1       3 
26 Minorities 
integration 
-1 1                     1           3 
27 Societal pluralism -1 1                                2 
28 Foreign influence -1 1         1           1 1           5 
29 Foreign take-over -1 1                     1     1      4 
30 Lack of public 
service support 
-1 1                                2 
31 Media regulation -1 1                                2 
32 Media diversity -1 1                            1    3 
33 Media exclusivity 1 -1                          1      3 
PS  31 31 9 0 4 4 1 5 1 4 8 8 1 2 2 5 1 2 1 1 6 3 12 3 5 3 2 3 1 2 1 3 0  








D. UKRAINE CROSS-TIME MATRIX 
 Name 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 PD 
1 S political power   2   2 4 4    2 4  2    2  4 2 2 2  2    2 1 1  2.8 




1 1   1   4   1          2  2 2          1.8 
 
4 Less diplomatic 
network 
2 2                                2 
5 Distrust between 
elite 
4 1                     2  2 4        2.6 
 
6 Dependence on int. 
organizations 
2 2      2  2  2           1   2        1.9 
7 Environmental 
adaptability 




2 2    2                 1           1.8 
9 Sub-state 
diplomacy 
1 1                                1 
10 No membership in 
Mil alliances 
4 2         1 2                      2.3 
11 Internal violent 
conflict 
2 2 1     2  2      1                  1.7 
12 Reduced military 
capabilities 




2 2   2     2  1      1                1.7 
14 Civil-military 
forces integration 
4 2                                3 
15 Irregular forces 1 1 1        1 2           1           1.2 
16 Dependency on 
strategic import 
1 2 2   2  2  2  2         2             1.9 
17 Limited export 
Diversification 
2 2                   2             2 
18 Policy Change by 
major trading 
partner 
1 1 2             1 2    2             1.5 
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19 Affiliation to 
multilateral 
economic org. 
2 2 2                               2 
20 Focus on niche 
products and 
services 
4 2              4                  3.3 
21 Adaptability to 
economic 
challenges 
4 2                                3 
22 “oppressed” 
societal groups 
2 2         1            1  2         1.6 
23 Polarization and 
radicalization 
2 2 2        2   2           4         2.3 
24 Favoritism 1 1   2       4  4  2         2       2  2.3 
25 Social cohesion 2 2                         4       2.7 
26 Minorities 
integration 
4 4                     2           3.3 
27 Societal pluralism 4 4                                4 
28 Foreign influence 1 2         1           1 1           1.2 
29 Foreign take-over 2 4                     2     1      2.3 
30 Lack of public 
service support 
2 2                                2 
31 Media regulation 1 1                                1 
32 Media diversity 2 2                            2    2 
33 Media exclusivity 2 1                          2      1.7 









E. TAIWAN CROSS-IMPACT MATRIX 
 Name 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 AS 
1 S political power   1   1 1  1 -1  -1  1   -1  1  1    1 1 1   -1 1 1 1 17 




-1 1  1 -1  1 -1    -1          -1 1   1      1  11 
4 Less diplomatic 
network 
-1 1    1                            3 
5 Distrust between 
elite 
-1 1          1           1           4 
6 Dependence on int. 
organizations 
-1 1 1    -1     -1                      5 
7 Environmental 
adaptability 




-1 1                                2 
9 Sub-state 
diplomacy 
1 -1 1 -1        -1         1             6 
10 No membership in 
Mil alliances 
-1 1                                2 
11 Internal violent 
conflict 
                                  
12 Reduced military 
capabilities 




                                  
14 Civil-military 
forces integration 
1 -1                                2 
15 Irregular forces 1 -1        1                        3 
16 Dependency on 
strategic import 
-1 1                                2 
17 Limited export 
Diversification 
-1 1                                2 
18 Policy Change by 
major trading 
partner 
-1 1 1                    1           3 
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19 Affiliation to 
multilateral 
economic org. 
1 -1                                2 
20 Focus on niche 
products and 
services 
1 -1       1         -1   1             5 
21 Adaptability to 
economic 
challenges 
1 -1                                2 
22 “oppressed” 
societal groups 
-1 1                                2 
23 Polarization and 
radicalization 
1 -1                       1          
24 Favoritism -1 1   1                             3 
25 Social cohesion 1 -1     1                           3 
26 Minorities 
integration 
1 -1                    -1   1         4 
27 Societal pluralism 1 -1                        1        3 
28 Foreign influence -1 1                     1           3 
29 Foreign take-over 1 -1                                2 
30 Lack of public 
service support 
1 -1                                2 
31 Media regulation 1 -1                           1     3 
32 Media diversity 1 -1                        1 1       4 
33 Media exclusivity 1 -1                                2 
PS  29 29 4 3 2 2 4 2 2 3  5  1 0 1 1 2 2 1 3 2 5 1 3 4 2 1 1 1 1 2 1  








F. TAIWAN CROSS-TIME MATRIX 
 Name 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 PD 
1 S political power   2   2 4  1 4  2  1   4  2  4    2 2 4   2 2 2 1 2.4 




2 2  2 2  4 2    2          4 1   2      2  2.3 
4 Less diplomatic 
network 
2 2    2                            2 
5 Distrust between 
elite 
2 2          2           1           1.8 
6 Dependence on int. 
organizations 
2 2 2    4     4                      2.8 
7 Environmental 
adaptability 




4 2                                3 
9 Sub-state 
diplomacy 
2 2 2 1        2         2             1.8 
10 No membership in 
Mil alliances 
2 1                                1.5 
11 Internal violent 
conflict 
                                  
12 Reduced military 
capabilities 




                                  
14 Civil-military 
forces integration 
2 2                                2 
15 Irregular forces 4 4        4                        4 
16 Dependency on 
strategic import 
2 2                                2 
17 Limited export 
Diversification 
2 2                                2 
18 Policy Change by 
major trading 
partner 
4 4 2                    1           2.8 
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19 Affiliation to 
multilateral 
economic org. 
2 1                                1.5 
20 Focus on niche 
products and 
services 
2 4       2         1   4             2.6 
21 Adaptability to 
economic 
challenges 
4 4                                4 
22 “oppressed” 
societal groups 
2 2                                2 
23 Polarization and 
radicalization 
2 4                       2         2.7 
24 Favoritism 2 4   2                             2.7 
25 Social cohesion 2 4     4                           3.3 
26 Minorities 
integration 
4 4                    4   2         3.5 
27 Societal pluralism 1 4                        2        2.3 
28 Foreign influence 4 4                     1           3 
29 Foreign take-over 4 4                                4 
30 Lack of public 
service support 
2 2                                2 
31 Media regulation 1 2                           2     1.7 
32 Media diversity 2 2                        2 2       2 
33 Media exclusivity 1 4                                2.5 
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